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The paper estimates the distribution of income of 
the Hungarian households in 2012. Since the first sta-
tistical data concerning the incomes of 2012 will be 
available only in 2014, the figures have been deter-
mined by a microsimulation model. It ages the income 
data of the official Household Budget Survey (HBS) of 
2010 published in 2012 by the Hungarian Central Sta-
tistical Office. The early information on income distri-
bution among different social strata is useful for both 
policy makers and for researchers. The HBS is a repre-
sentative sample of households; therefore their weights 
have to be adjusted in every step of the microsimula-
tion, assuring the best fit to already known macroeco-
nomic data. This means that the model is dynamic al-
though statically aged. The income inequalities are 
presented by income deciles, by the number of de-
pendent children, by age structure of households, by 





Household budget survey.  
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Bloomsburg University (USA) for his very useful comments and suggestions. All errors are the authors’ 
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The financial crisis that erupted at the end of 2008 had serious immediate effects 
on the Hungarian economy. The growth potential was relatively low in that year 
(about 2 percent) and the main indicators of the economic equilibrium were ex-
tremely unfavourable. The debt of the general government had been already continu-
ously increasing for the seven previous years, and by 2008 exceeded 70 percent of 
the GDP. It was then the fourth highest rate in the EU. In addition, foreign exchange 
reserves were relatively low, while the deficit of the current account balance ex-
ceeded 7 percent of the GDP. Suddenly, the government could not finance itself from 
the market. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the EU had 
to assure the necessary credits, the condition of which was the introduction of fiscal 
consolidation measures. Although these measures were necessary, they proved to be 
procyclical, leading to a negative growth of 6.7 percent in 2009. Meanwhile the 
Hungarian currency depreciated resulting in the decrease of disposable income of the 
household sector which had a high rate of foreign currency based mortgage loans. 
All these developments increased the inequalities of the different strata that were 
analysed in Cserháti–Takács [2010] by a microsimulation model. Further measures 
affecting the income distribution were taken in 2011–2012. A flat tax on the personal 
incomes has been introduced combined with a family tax benefit. At the same time, 
tax credit was decreased, and it will disappear starting from 2013. The new tax sys-
tem may further increase income disparities. This was supported by the results of 
Cserháti and Takács [2011], which presented preliminary results for 2011. Espe-
cially the reduction of the tax credit may have a negative effect in the lower income 
deciles. Employees in the government sector received compensation in 2011–2012 in 
order to prevent the decrease of nominal wages: this compensation had to be pro-
vided for 56 percent of the state employees. Meanwhile, on the one hand, several 
measures have been taken to ease the indebtedness of the household sector. On the 
other hand, further austerity measures have been introduced to keep the deficit of the 
general government under 3 percent, since the flat rate could not boost the economy 
as it was expected. These developments have had also significant effect on the 
households. The main purpose of the present paper is to assess the distribution of the 
disposable income among different strata in 2012 using microsimulation. 
There are several papers analysing the austerity measures dealing with this prob-
lem. Agnello and Sousa [2011] examine the economic policy of 18 countries in the 
1980–2010 period. The conclusion of the paper is that austerity measures increase 
social inequalities during the time of fiscal consolidation and the inequalities further 
grow after the adjustment period. Callan et al. [2011] examined six countries by mi-
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crosimulation, and found that the austerity measures after the financial crisis may 
have different effects on income distribution, depending on the specific adjustment 
measures applied in the particular countries. Their research was based on the Euro-
pean Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) database, which 
contains only income data, that is, they could quantify only the effect of direct tax 
increases. Authors found that the distribution of burden shows a different picture, but 
if the effects of indirect taxes are taken into consideration, the adjustment measures 
put an onus especially on the low-income households. Similar results have been pre-
sented in Callan et al. [2012], which simulates incomes for different types of fami-
lies for 2012 by another microsimulation model. Matsaganis and Leventi [2011] 
found that the austerity measures introduced recently in Greece have only slightly in-
creased inequalities. Belyó and Molnár [2006] investigated the opportunities of simu-
lating the capital income for Hungarian data.  
The ECOS-TAX to be presented is a microsimulation model, which was basically 
developed to analyse the impacts of the changes of direct taxes. Its preliminary ver-
sion was developed in co-operation with the experts of the HCSO (Cserháti et al. 
[2007]). Later, the model was further developed and applied for impact analyses (see 
for example Cserháti–Takács [2010], [2011]).  
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, the methodology of research will 
be outlined in Section 1. The results of the model runs will be presented in Section 
2, and finally the conclusions will be drawn in Section 3. The contribution of the 
paper to current scientific achievements is the quantification of expected income 
inequalities in Hungary in 2012. Income distribution processes which are one of 
most hotly debated economic policy issues in Hungary can be analyzed in real time 
by the model.  
1. Methodology 
The distribution of household incomes can be based on the information of the 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) published by the Hungarian Central Statistical Of-
fice (HCSO). However, this survey has several disadvantages. On the one hand, the 
data normally underestimates the incomes, and on the other hand, it does not cover 
all elements of disposable incomes (that is, only the actually withdrawn interests are 
reported). Another problem is that the data are published only with more than a year 
delay. If decision makers wish to get a picture about the actual income distribution, 
the microsimulation seems to be a good tool. The HCSO and the National Employ-
ment Service (NES) provide actual statistics on wages, but it is only a part of dispos-
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able incomes and this information is not suitable for analysis of income distribution 
among different strata. However, with microsimulation, changes can be modelled on 
the level of the households, starting from the last available HBS data. These data 
contain very detailed information on the households and on the observed persons, 
therefore it is possible to determine special response functions for the particular 
households (practically for different groups of households). Then the actual effects of 
economic policy measures can be determined for different groups of households. In 
order to eliminate the former problems of the HBS information, the actual data have 
to be adjusted and/or completed by using external data sources. The method is suit-
able for assessing the results of the previously introduced measures by simulating the 
case of the “no-measures” scenario, and the same is true for the evaluation of 
planned measures (Callan et al. [2011], [2012]).  
1.1. Adjustment of weights 
The ECOS-TAX is a static ageing dynamic microsimulation model, adjusting 
the weights of the observations. However, the weights of the households are ad-
justed in each year of the examination in order to assure the optimal fit to the ag-
gregated data published by the HCSO or by other authorities like NES. Such ad-
justments are needed also for the starting year of the examination. At present, the 
HBS data of 2010 are already available. We note that integrated weights are ap-
plied to the HBS data, that is, the weights of persons belonging to a certain house-
hold equal to the weight of that household. There are certain incomes, which char-
acterize the whole household and there are ones belonging to persons. The wage is 
a typical example of this latter type: it is followed therefore on the level of persons. 
On the contrary, the taxable income is determined on the level of the family in or-
der to take the family tax benefit into account. The ECOS-TAX follows the devel-
opment of wages in a sophisticated way. The original weights of the HBS data 
were calculated primarily on the basis of demographic data, although some eco-
nomic conditions were also taken into consideration. In our investigations eight 
groups of employees have been determined by the appropriate adjustment of 
weights. Employees in the government sphere, in the corporate sector and in non-
profit institutions are distinguished, and also the fostered workers are treated sepa-
rately. For each of these four groups, employees covered by the institutional wage 
statistics of the HCSO are separated from others. The weights have been recalcu-
lated in such a way that the number of these groups should optimally fit the actual 
values of the labour statistics. Also the number of the unemployed is taken into ac-
count. The recalculation of weights requires the solution of a nonlinear optimiza-
tion problem (Éltető–Mihályffy [2002]).   
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1.2. Adjustment of data 
Since the income data in the HBS are underestimated, it was necessary to correct 
the data, in particular the wages, on the basis of an external data source. Three types of 
data sources are available. Although the personal income tax database contains the data 
of all employees, it does not contain information on the duration of employment and 
does not distinguish employees according to institutional sectors. The institutional 
wage statistics of the HCSO is based on average wages (only one record characterizes 
every corporation), therefore it is less suitable for the examination of distribution. The 
wage survey of the NES contains information on full-time and part-time employment 
and also on the (government or corporate) sector. However, its main drawback is that it 
gives a picture for only about one month of the year. We have therefore chosen a spe-
cial two-step method of wage adjustment. In the case of employees covered by the 
HCSO institutional wage statistics (full-time employees and corporations with at least 
5 employees), the adjustment was based on the NES wage tariff data. In this first step it 
was ensured that the distribution among the deciles corresponds to that of the NES 
data. In the second step, both the HBS and the personal income tax data were grouped 
according to regions, age categories and income deciles. Then all the HBS wage data 
were multiplied by the multiplier of its particular group.      
The pension is also underreported in the HBS, although it is a decisive part of the 
aggregate disposable income of the household sector. We started from the aggregated 
value of pension in the starting year (in 2010), which is published by the HCSO 
(STADAT system). The HBS data were adjusted in such a way that the pension per 
capita value corresponded to the value of the STADAT. 
One of the most serious drawbacks of the HBS is that it has very little information 
on property incomes. Even in the case of interest incomes, only the actually withdrawn 
interests are reported, which is probably underestimated. Nor does the personal income 
tax data provide any information about it, since the tax on interest is paid by the finan-
cial institution directly. Therefore, we started from the aggregated value of the National 
Accounts 2010 (D.4. according to ESA95). Since we assumed that interest incomes 
might vary according to region, this amount has been broken down firstly among re-
gions proportionally to the regional GDP (the STADAT contains information on re-
gional GDP). Secondly, these regional volumes have been further analyzed by deciles. 
We assumed that there is no interest income in the lowest three deciles at all. If iS  de-
notes the interest income on the regional level and jidec  is the aggregated net income of 
decile j in region i (i = 1,...,7, j = 4,...,10), the following condition is required:      
4 5 6 7 8 9
10
α α α α 2 α 2 α
   3 α  ,
i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i
S dec dec dec dec dec dec
dec
= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +
+ ⋅ ⋅
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where αi  can be determined. This formula assures that the interest income is not as-
sumed to be simply proportional to the overall income; some progressivity is forced 
by the coefficients assuming that the saving ratio in the richer deciles tends to be 
higher. 
1.3. Ageing of incomes and simulation of taxation  
In the case of certain income categories there were unambiguous rules according 
to which the new values of 2011 and 2012 could be determined, that is, the increase of 
pensions must equal to the annual inflation rate. In other cases there were macrostatis-
tical data that were taken into consideration. For example, gross earning of a particu-
lar person was multiplied by the wage index of his/her corresponding category (gov-
ernment or corporate sector, non-profit institutions, fostered workers). There were in-
comes that were frozen, for example child-care allowance. Certainly, for certain cate-
gories, we could rely only on experts’ judgements. Table 1 presents the applied aging 
rules of the main types of incomes. After aging the gross incomes, the net incomes 
have been calculated by the actual rules of personal taxations. The application of inte-
grated weights provides an opportunity to determine the family tax benefits. Finally, 
real incomes are determined by taking into account the actual inflation rate.  
Table 1 
Aging rules of incomes in the ECOS-TAX model 
Incomes Aging rules 
Personal incomes  
Earnings from main activity 
Gross income from main activity  Average increase of wages in the correspondent 
sector/group 
Dismission pay  Average increase of wages with the maxmimum  
of 3.5 million forints 
Income from second job  Average increase of wages 
Supplementary compensations 
Voucher for meal  Supposed to be unchanged 
Voucher for holiday  100 percent of minimum wage 
Voucher for lodgings  Supposed to be unchanged 
Voucher for clothing  200 percent of the remuneration base of public officials 
(Continued on the next page.) 
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(Continuation.) 
Incomes Aging rules 
Voucher for transport  Experts’ judgement 
Support for starting school  Changed by the growth rate of minimum wage 
Internet access  Supposed to be unchanged 
Other in-kind support  Changed by the inflation rate 
Company car provided for private use  Supposed to be unchanged 
Mobile phone provided for private use  Supposed to be unchanged 
Income from self-employment, total 
Annual revenue in the case of simplified corporate tax  Experts’ judgement 
Income from self-employment  Experts’ judgement 
Income from corporate enterprises (dividend and wage)  Average increase of wages 
Dividend payment from self-employment  Average increase of wages 
Other income from work, total 
Income from single commission  Average increase of wages 
Income from authorship  Average increase of wages 
Income from casual work  Average increase of wages 
Tip, gratuity  Changed by the inflation rate 
Pensions, supplementary pension 
Pension  Changed by the inflation rate 
Pension for disabled persons  Changed by the inflation rate 
Pension for widows  Changed by the inflation rate 
Supplementary pension for widows  Changed by the inflation rate 
Disability benefit  Changed by the growth rate of the minimum pension 
Old age benefit  Changed by the growth rate of the minimum pension 
Unemployment benefits 
Unemployment allowance   According to the law 
Unemployment aid  Changed by the growth rate of minimum wage 
Regular social allowances  Changed by the growth rate of the minimum pension 
Other support  Changed by the growth rate of the minimum pension 
(Continued on the next page.) 
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(Continuation.) 
Incomes Aging rules 
Support related to children 
Child-care fee  Average increase of wages not exceeding the maxi-
mum fixed by the law (or changed by the growth rate 
of minimum wage if there is no gross income from 
main activitiy) 
Child-care allowance  Changed by the growth rate of the minimum pension 
Child-care support  Changed by the growth rate of the minimum pension 
Pregnancy aid  Average increase of wages 
Maternity aid  Changed by the growth rate of the minimum pension 
Other social income, total 
Attendance fee  Changed by the growth rate of the minimum pension 
Scholarship  Experts’ judgement 
Regular allowances  Changed by the growth rate of the minimum pension 
Non-regular allowances  Changed by the growth rate of the minimum pension 
Property income 
Income from leasing of movables and immovables  Experts’ judgement 
Perpetuity for indemnification  Experts’ judgement 
Income from abroad 
Wages and salaries from abroad  Average increase of wages 
Income from self-employment abroad  Experts’ judgement 
Social income from abroad  Average increase of pensions 
Income from abroad, other  Mean of the average increases of wage/pension 
Other 
Transport contribution for disabled persons  Experts’ judgement 
Sick pay  Average increase of wages not exceeding 200 percent 
of minimum wage in 2012 
Household incomes 
Agricultural income  Experts’ judgement 
Agricultural expenditures  Experts’ judgement 
Consumption from own production   Experts’ judgement 
Family allowance  According to the law 
Orphan's allowance  Average increase of pensions not less than the 
prescribed minimum 
(Continued on the next page.) 
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(Continuation.) 
Incomes Aging rules 
Income of children younger than 16 years  Average increase of wages 
Support on housing  Experts’ judgement not exceeding 30 000 forints/month 
Other income, total (income in kind included)  Experts’ judgement 
Income from interest and dividend payment  Experts’ judgement 
Reimbursement from insurance companies  Experts’ judgement 
As a result of the structure of the model, it is not possible to test and to validate 
the equations using the traditional methodology. In the absence of actual income 
data, the only option to validate the results is to check the goodness of fit of gross 
and net earnings for 2011. It was found that the model estimations satisfactorily 
approximated the actual macroeconomic data regarding gross earnings both for the 
corporate and the government sectors. Also, the calculated net earnings proved to 
be plausible, since a remarkable growth rate surplus was experienced, caused by 
the family tax benefit introduced in 2011. However, it would not have been correct 
from the methodological point of view to validate the net earnings data, since the 
official family tax benefit adjusted net earnings calculations were based also on our 
ECOS-TAX model (Cserháti–Dobszayné–Takács [2012]). The complete ex post 
validation of data will be possible only in 2014 when the final national accounts 
will be available. 
2. Analysis of simulation results 
A great number of new laws and changes affected household incomes and the in-
come distribution during the past one and a half years in Hungary. The most impor-
tant change was obviously the introduction of the flat rate personal income tax com-
bined with the family tax benefit. Meanwhile, the tax credit was removed from the 
system. This change itself led to the increase of income inequalities (Cserháti–
Takács [2011]). However, the linear taxes could not boost economic growth in short 
term, but decreased the revenues of the state budget. The government compensated 
this loss partly by introducing special taxes for certain sectors and partly by cutting 
social benefits. It also affected the unemployment benefit; therefore, the government 
supported the increase of fostered work. We wanted to quantify the result of all these 
changes in the income inequalities among the different social strata.   
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Inequality can be characterized by standard indices, like the Lorenz-curve based 
Gini-index1 or the income ratio of the highest and lowest quintiles. Eurostat also 
provides these indices for the EU countries; the last data refer to 2010. It shows that 
inequality in Hungary was relatively low then. (We note that these indices are calcu-
lated on the basis of EU SILC data, which may be biased since households with ex-
tremely low income are typically missing.) The purpose of our investigation was to 
examine how the incomes developed in the last one and a half year.  
We analysed the income distribution from different viewpoints. First, all the in-
come deciles were examined, which basically shows the income inequality of the 
whole society. The number of dependent children was an important view of the anal-
ysis because of the introduction of the new family tax benefit. Also, the generation 
structures of households have been studied. We have calculated the differences ac-
cording to the activity status of the household head and to the number of economi-
cally active family members. Since there are relevant differences among regions, the 
geographical distribution has also been analysed. Finally, the income distribution ac-
cording to various types of settlements has been examined. We note that income 
have been determined for the so-called consumption unit according to the recent 
concept of the OECD. This means that the weight of the first adult (aged 18 and 
over) is 1, while that of subsequent adults is 0.5, and 0.3 is given to persons under 
18. If the income is determined simply per person, it would unrealistically underes-
timate the income. 
According to the simulation results, the overall increase of disposable net real in-
come was 3 percent in 2011, while it may decrease in 2012 by 2.1 percent as a result 
of the fiscal consolidation program and the weak growth. (The forecasted inflation 
rate for 2012 is 5.2 percent.) Table 2 shows the real income distribution per con-
sumption unit among the deciles. The results demonstrate that the income polariza-
tion has slightly increased, the loss of the lowest deciles are definitely higher than 
those of the upper three deciles.   
The Gini-index has grown moderately in 2010–2012 from 0.299 to 0.312. This 
latter value is already higher than the average of the EU27. The ratio of the highest 
and lowest quintiles (S80/S20) shows a similar picture: it has grown from 4.45 to 
4.73. Eurostat reported 5.0 for the EU27 for 2010. Éltető [1997] calculated a spe-
cial index for Hungary (see also Éltető–Frigyes [1968]), this is the ratio of the av-
erage income of those above the mean to the average income of those below the 
mean. This index was around 2 in the 1980s, while it is 2.25 in 2012 according to 
our model. The index is slightly increasing year by year. According to a widely ac-
cepted definition, the poor are those with incomes below 60 percent of the median 
income. After a slight decrease in 2011, the ratio of the poor (poverty headcount 
 
1 It may vary between 0 and 1, where 0 means perfect equality. 
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ratio) may reach 13.6 percent in 2012 according to the model results. The income 
gap ratio – showing the average relative distance from the poverty threshold among 
the poor – is around 23-24 percent; it has also increased in 2012 according to our 
computation.  
Table 2 
Distribution of incomes per consumption unit by decile 
Income deciles Real change 2012/2011  (percent) 
Decile 1 (the lowest incomes) 97,1 
Decile 2 97,5 
Decile 3 97,7 
Decile 4 97,1 
Decile 5 97,6 
Decile 6 97,5 
Decile 7 97,9 
Decile 8 98,5 
Decile 9 98,6 
Decile 10 (the highest incomes) 99,0 
Total 97,9 
Source: Here and hereinafter ECOS-TAX model results. 
Table 3 
Income polarization per consumption unit by the number of dependent children 
Household category according  
to the number of children Consumption units 
Real change 2012/2011 
(percent) 
No children 3 773 482 98,0 
One child 1 262 260 97,4 
Two children 961 773 97,9 
Three or more children 496 879 98,3 
Total 6 494 394 97,9 
If the distribution by dependent children is considered, one can see in Table 3 that 
families with at least three children have the smallest loss. The main cause is obviously 
the realizable family tax benefit. Although this type of benefit already existed in 2011, 
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the parents may be able to realize more benefits as a result of the increase of gross sala-
ries (primarily in the corporate sector). Considering the age structure of the families, 
the dynamics is different compared to our earlier examinations for 2010 (Cserháti–
Takács [2010]). The relatively small loss of families with only aged members can be 
explained by the fact that pensions are still being increased in line with inflation. The 
increase of taxes burdened primarily families with middle-aged members, who cannot 
realize the tax benefit (see Table 4). This may explain also the figures of Table 5, 
where households only with inactive members have the smallest loss. 
Table 4 
Income polarization per consumption unit by the age structure of the household 
Age structure  
of the household members Consumption units 
Real change 2012/2011  
(percent) 
Only young 235 511 98,3 
Only middle-aged 844 046 97,7 
Only aged 1 146 256 99,3 
Young and middle-aged 3 015 729 97,6 
Young and aged 99 728 98,0 
Middle-aged and aged 596 640 97,8 
Three generations 556 484 97,0 
Total 6 494 394 97,9 
Table 5 
Income polarization per consumption unit by activity status of the household head 
Activity status  Consumption units Real change 2012/2011 (percent) 
Households only with non-active members 1 959 132 98,6 
Wage earner, active household head 3 648 492 97,8 
Pensioner, inactive household head 423 004 97,4 
Other inactive household head 463 766 96,4 
Total 6 494 394 97,9 
Regarding the geographic aspects, the capital Budapest has the most favourable 
position (we have examined it separately from Pest County to which it belongs). This 
means that the relative position of the traditionally developed parts of the country 
may increase their advantage, in other words, the regional polarization may become 
EXAMINATION OF INCOME INEQUALITIES OF HUNGARIAN HOUSEHOLDS IN 2012  
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
15 
greater. Similarly, Budapest and the towns increase their advantage if the different 
types of settlements are compared. The unemployment rate is high in small settle-
ments, which may explain the worsening of their position. 
Table 6 
Income per household by region 
Region Number of households Real change 2012/2011 (percent) 
Budapest 756 843 99,0 
Pest County 424 702 98,3 
Central Transdanubia 412 474 98,0 
Western Transdanubia 354 799 97,5 
Southern Transdanubia 342 844 97,3 
Northern Hungary 431 240 97,7 
Northern Great Plain 529 747 96,2 
Southern Great Plain 523 732 97,5 
Total 3 776 381 97,9 
Table 7 
Income polarization per consumption unit by type of settlements 
Type of settlements Consumption units Real change 2012/2011 (percent) 
Budapest (capital) 1 185 682 99,0 
Towns with county rights 1 313 234 98,0 
Other towns 1 871 392 97,5 
Villages 2 124 086 97,2 
Total 6 494 394 97,9 
3. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the effects of fiscal consolidation measures on income dis-
tribution by the ECOS-TAX microsimulation model. The general experience in the 
different countries confirms that such austerity measures increase income inequalities, 
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although the effects of the changes of direct taxes – ceteris paribus – may show a dif-
ferent picture. Our examination was based on the income data of households, so it is 
suitable primarily for quantifying the effect of direct taxes and that of transformations 
in social policy. The results suggest that these changes themselves increase income 
polarization: the Gini-index grew by 1.3 percentage points during the last two years. 
The basic indices of poverty have not changed significantly in this period, but the 
head count poverty ratio has remained near 14 percent, according to the median in-
come criterion. The increase of minimum wage and the relevant growth of the number 
of fostered workers could contribute to the stabilization of these indices. Families of at 
least three dependent children have a relatively smaller loss as a consequence of the 
increase in the realizable family tax benefit. Although the fiscal consolidation re-
quired the reduction of social benefits, there has been no change in the rule of grow-
ing pensions: they increase by the annual inflation. As a result, families with only 
aged members will have a relatively small loss in 2012. Income polarization can also 
be examined from a geographical point of view; the advantage of the traditionally de-
veloped parts of the country has grown in the examined period. Correspondingly, the 
position of the capital and of the larger settlements has improved relatively to others.   
The model ECOS-TAX proved to be a very useful tool to follow the actual in-
come processes. The timeliness is very important for both fiscal and monetary deci-
sion-makers; hence the official data on the income distribution among different so-
cial strata are published two years later. The model is also suitable for ex ante policy 
analyses as well. 
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Using all of the available data on the ethnic com-
position of Hungarian primary schools, this paper 
documents the degree of between-school segregation 
of Roma versus non-Roma students in the 1980–2011 
period. We calculate the measures of segregation 
within school catchment areas as well as within micro-
regions and the larger municipalities (towns and cit-
ies). Catchment areas are clusters of villages, towns 
and cities that are closed in terms of student commut-
ing, and they are defined by us using the observed 
commuting patterns. Our results show that ethnic seg-
regation between Hungarian schools strengthened sub-
stantially between 1980 and 2011. Segregation appears 
to have decreased between 2006 and 2008 and in-
creased again afterwards, but the noise in the data pre-
vents us from drawing firm conclusions. In the cross 
section, school segregation is positively associated 
with the size of the educational market and the share of 
Roma students, similar to the results from US metro-
politan areas. These relationships strengthened over 
time in Hungary, and the change in segregation is as-
sociated with changes in the number of schools and the 
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Over ten percent of the Hungarian students in primary schools are Roma. The 
typical Roma students come from substantially poorer families and have lower 
achievement than the typical non-Roma students (Kertesi–Kézdi [2011]). The extent 
to which Roma and non-Roma students study in the same schools can have serious 
consequences for ethnic differences in accomplishment and other outcomes as well 
as for the integrity of Hungarian society.  
Using all of the available comprehensive data on the ethnic composition of Hun-
garian primary schools, this paper documents the degree of between-school segrega-
tion of Roma versus non-Roma students between 1980 and 2011. We show the long-
run trends and the geographic distribution, and we estimate regressions to uncover 
the associations between segregation and other characteristics of the areas, which are 
identified from the cross-section and from the long-differenced panel of the areas for 
which school segregation is defined. 
It is necessary to have some institutional knowledge of the Hungarian school sys-
tem to understand school segregation. We are interested in the primary schools that 
cover grades 1 through 8 (these include some secondary schools that cover grades 5 
through 8). Importantly, and similar to other countries in the region, Hungary is 
characterized by the dominance of state-owned primary schools, and parents are free 
to choose schools for their children. On top of the enrolment from within their own 
district, which is defined by the municipality, schools can admit children living out-
side of the district. The total enrolment in schools is determined by their capacity, the 
level of demand from within and from outside of their district and the allocation de-
cision by the municipality. 
We estimate the degree of segregation within three types of geographic area: the 
174 micro-regions, the larger school catchment areas (clusters of villages, towns and 
cities that are closed in terms of student commuting in the 2000s and have two schools 
or more) and the larger municipalities (towns and cities with two or more schools). Our 
preferred unit of measurement is the catchment area because it represents the territory 
that is the most relevant for school choice. In a sense, micro-regions are too large: 
school segregation within micro-regions is likely to be heavily influenced by the resi-
dential patterns across towns and villages. The towns and cities are too small: measur-
ing segregation within their administrative boundaries misses potentially important 
commuting from and to villages in their agglomeration. The school catchment areas are 
not administratively registered units; they are defined by commuting possibilities. A 
contribution of our paper is to define the boundaries of those areas using the actual 
commuting patterns of all sixth graders observed in three different years. 
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Our preferred measure of segregation is the index of segregation (also known as 
the isolation index, see Clotfelter [2004]), but we also show results using the more 
traditional index of dissimilarity. There is no data from between 1992 and 2006, and 
the missing data decreases the reliability of the post-2006 figures. Aside from our 
best estimates, we also present conservative lower and upper bounds. We introduce 
time series of the average level of segregation and maps for its geographic distribu-
tion. Finally, we show cross-sectional and log-differenced regressions for partial cor-
relations of the between-school segregation with the size of the educational market, 
the average school size and the fraction of Roma students. 
Our results indicate that school segregation, on average, is moderate in Hungary. 
The mean of the index of segregation is approximately 0.2 in the geographic areas 
covered by our analysis and is approximately 0.3 in the areas around the three largest 
cities. Note that Hungarian schools are characterized by fixed assignment to groups 
within schools (“classes”). Within-school between-class segregation may therefore 
be as important for inter-ethnic contact as between-school segregation. Unfortu-
nately, our data does not make calculating indices within-school ethnic segregation 
possible. But it allows for looking at the segregation of students whose mother has 
eight grades of education or less, both between schools and within schools. On aver-
age, the level of their within-school segregation is about 40 percent on top of the 
level of their between-school segregation (details of the calculations are available 
from the authors upon request). This suggests that the level of ethnic segregation, if 
measured across classes instead of schools, is likely to be about 40 percent higher 
than the level of ethnic segregation across schools (0.28 instead of 0.20 on average, 
and 0.4 instead of 0.3 in the areas around the largest cities). 
The data also show that, on average, the level of school segregation within 
Hungarian towns strengthened substantially between 1980 and 2011. According to 
our benchmark estimates, between-school segregation appears to have decreased 
between 2006 and 2008 and increased again afterwards. However, the trends after 
2006 cannot be robustly identified due to severe data limitations. In the cross-
sectional regressions, school segregation is positively associated with the size of 
the educational market and the share of the ethnic minority, similar to results from 
US metropolitan areas, and these relationships strengthened over time. In the re-
gressions estimated in long term differences, the change in segregation is also 
linked with these factors, but the associations are weaker except for the change in 
the size of the Roma minority 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data, Sec-
tion 3 defines the effective catchment areas of schools, and Section 4 presents the 
measures of segregation. Section 5 shows the average levels of segregation and its 
times series, and Section 6 introduces its geographic distribution. Section 7 details 
the regression results, and Section 8 concludes the paper. 
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1. Data and methods 
The level of school segregation for a particular area is measured using the total num-
ber of students and the fraction of Roma students in each school within the area. We use 
two sources that cover the population of Hungarian primary schools. Before 1992, all 
schools filled out a compulsory questionnaire that contained, among other things, the to-
tal number of students and the number of Roma students in the school. The latter was 
based on counts by classes, carried out by teachers. We have data from the years 1980, 
1989 and 1992. The reporting on Roma students was discontinued after 1992.  
The data on the fraction of Roma students are available from 2006 in the Hungar-
ian National Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC). It is a standards-based as-
sessment, with tests on reading and mathematical literacy in grades 6 and 8 in pri-
mary schools (grades 4 and 8 in 2006 and 2007). The NABC became standardized in 
2006, and we use data from 2006 through 2011 for our analysis. Aside from testing 
the students, it collects additional data on students and schools. School-level data are 
provided by the school principals in May of each year, when the testing takes place. 
Among other things, these contain information on the number of students and the 
school principal’s estimate of the fraction of Roma students in the school. These es-
timates are likely to contain significantly more noise than the figures from 1992 and 
before, but we have no reason to believe that they are biased (they were not used for 
targeting any policy measure and they were not published, either). 
The information is collected from each school site, that is, from each unit of the 
school with a separate address. This level of data collection is important because in 
some towns, the schools as administrative units comprise units at multiple locations, 
sometimes far from each other. Throughout the entire study, we use the word 
“school” to denote the school site and “institution” for the level of administrative or-
ganization that can contain more than one school site.1 
Our analysis contains data on the population of Hungarian schools that teach pri-
mary school students, in other words, students in grades 1 through 8.2 Of these 
schools, the NABC covers all that had students in grade 4 or 8 in 2006 and 2007, and 
all schools that had students in grades 6 and 8 from 2008 onwards. Coverage by the 
NABC is limited because it misses the institutions that teach students with special 
educational needs (S.E.N. students) except in 2006. Another source of bias is that the 
 
1 With very few exceptions, institutions were single-address schools before the early 1990s, so the data 
from between 1980 and 1992 are at the school and the institutional level at the same time. 
2 Traditionally, secondary schools would start with grade 9. In the early 1990s, some secondary schools 
began to recruit students in the lower grades and have incoming classes in grade 7 or as early as grade 5. These 
secondary schools are concentrated in the largest cities, most of them in Budapest. See Horn [2012] for a more 
detailed discussion. Our data cover all students in grades 1 through 8 including those enrolled in secondary 
schools. For simplicity, we call these institutions primary schools as well. 
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information on the fraction of Roma students is missing in some schools that do par-
ticipate in the assessment. In addition to the problem of S.E.N. students, therefore, 
nonresponse is an additional cause of missing data.  
Missing data can bias the segregation indices. Suppose, for example, that the schools 
in which the principal fails to provide information have no Roma students at all. In that 
case, our measures overestimate exposure and therefore underestimate segregation be-
cause the missing schools have exposure levels below the average. In theory, it is also 
possible that the schools with missing data have an ethnic composition that is very close 
to the town-level average. In that case, our measure of segregation would be biased up-
wards. Similarly, missing data can bias the estimates of the size of the Roma student 
population. If the schools with no information all have zero Roma students, the true share 
of Roma students among all students is lower than the estimate. If, instead, all of the 
schools with missing information are all-Roma schools, the true fraction of Roma stu-
dents is higher than the estimates. Note that the bias is different for the segregation meas-
ures (a measure of dispersion) and the overall share of Roma students (a mean).  
Table 1 
Number of institutions and schools in Hungary in the administrative and NABC data, 2006–2011 
Number of institutions Number of school sites 
Year all 
(from KIR-STAT) 
in the NABC 
data 
in the NABC 
data  
in the NABC data  
with non-missing fraction of Roma students 
2006 3334 3267 3966 3444 
2007 3247 3048 3420 2883 
2008 2693 2465 3130 2885 
2009 2541 2371 3097 2858 
2010 2481 2307 3060 2792 
2011 2454 2278 2925 2763 
Note. “Schools” are defined by their physical location (address); “institutions” can contain more than one 
school. We consider primary schools (and their institutions) to be the schools that teach students from grade 1 
through grade 8. KIR-STAT (statistical data collection part of the central Hungarian educational information 
system) is the administrative register for all educational institutions in Hungary. NABC (the National Assess-
ment of Basic Competences) is the national standard-based assessment, with tests on reading and mathematics 
for grades 6 and 8 (grades 4 and 8 in 2006 and 2007). Students with special educational needs do not participate 
in the assessment, except in 2006. The school-level data in NABC cover all schools with at least one student 
who took part in the assessment. 
Table 1 shows the prevalence of missing data. The table shows the number of institu-
tions from the administrative files (KIR-STAT), the number of institutions in the NABC 
data, the number of schools in the NABC data (recall that we define a school as a facility 
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with a separate mailing address; some institutions have more than one school), and the 
number of schools with valid data. Administrative sources (KIR-STAT) have informa-
tion on the number of students at the institution level but not at the school level as we de-
fine it. KIR-STAT has no information on the ethnic composition of schools.  
Table 1 shows that both of the missing schools in the NABC data (and thus the 
missing information on all students) and the missing information on the Roma stu-
dents in the NABC data are potentially important. We address the first problem by 
linking the schools through time and imputing student numbers from KIR-STAT. We 
address the problem of the missing Roma data in three alternative ways. The bench-
mark imputation is our best estimate. We complement the benchmark with an impu-
tation that leads to the lowest possible value for the segregation index and one that 
leads to the highest possible one. Similarly, we compute the lower and upper bound 
estimates for the fraction of Roma students.3 In most of the analysis, we focus on the 
results using the benchmark imputation, but we show the results with the alternative 
missing data treatments as well when they are important. 
2. Defining catchment areas 
School choice results in the extensive commuting of students between their resi-
dence and school. In this setting, the natural geographic unit for studying school seg-
regation is the smallest area that covers all of the schools available to the students 
living in the area. In other words, it is the smallest area that is closed in terms of po-
tential commuting. School segregation measured within larger units is influenced by 
residential patterns that commuting cannot overcome; school segregation measured 
within smaller units misses schools that should be considered. 
In this section, we define the effective catchment areas of primary schools. Our 
smallest geographic units of observation are the municipalities (villages, towns, and 
cities; there are over 3000 in Hungary). A catchment area can consist of a single mu-
nicipality and a single school, more than one municipality and a single school, or 
 
3 The benchmark procedure uses the data from previous and subsequent years for the schools that do not 
experience large changes in total student numbers. Approximately 30 schools are still missing data in each year 
after this procedure. The imputation that results in the lowest possible value of the segregation index uses the 
area-level average fraction of Roma students for the missing data (all initially missing data, including those that 
were filled in with our best estimate in the benchmark procedure). The imputation that leads to the highest value 
of the index of segregation imputes zero or one for the missing fraction of Roma students in a way that leaves 
the overall fraction of Roma students unchanged, up to indivisibility issues (it assigns the value of one to the 
smaller schools and zero to the larger schools following the observed relationship in the non-missing data). The 
imputation that leads to the lowest (highest) fraction of Roma students is simply zero (100 percent). 
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multiple municipalities and/or multiple schools. Ideally, all students who live in a 
catchment area go to a school within the area, and nobody from outside the area goes 
to the schools within the area. The goal is to partition Hungary into a complete col-
lection of disjoint areas. Ideally, they should not be too large. Areas that are too large 
would not only work against the purpose of the exercise (by making area-level 
analysis difficult) but would go against spirit of the definition (very few schools 
would be available for any particular student within the area). 
We used individual data collected from the NABC data for the students’ resi-
dence and the location of their schools for three years. We created a directed and 
weighted graph using the individual data on commuting connections. Municipali-
ties are the nodes (vertices) and the numbers of students commuting between the 
nodes are the links (edges). The direction of the link is from the node of residence 
to the node of the school, and the weights are the number of commuters. The larg-
est weights in this graph are on the links that connect the nodes to themselves 
(loops): these are the students whose school and residence is within the same mu-
nicipality. 
Catchment areas are a partition of the set of all municipalities: every municipality be-
longs to one and only one catchment area. In the language of graph theory, catchment ar-
eas are the connected components in the entire graph. Connected components are defined 
for undirected (symmetric) and unweighted graphs: graphs that indicate whether two 
nodes are connected or not without any further information. For this problem, the original 
graph can be transformed into an undirected and unweighted graph with the help of a 
threshold value: two nodes are connected if and only if the number of students commut-
ing between them exceeds a threshold level in any direction. Given the undirected and 
unweighted graph, the breadth-first-search algorithm finds all of the connected compo-
nents in the graph and thus creates a partition of the set of all municipalities.4 
The data on students’ residence come from administrative records of all sixth-
graders from three years, 2008, 2009, and 2010. The overall number of observations 
is 304 125. Simple coding errors or administrative mistakes could create apparent 
links between two municipalities with no links. The probability of such events is 
never zero, but the same event is unlikely to happen twice. For this reason, we have 
chosen two for the threshold value used to transform the weighted into the un-
weighted graph: nodes are considered to be connected if the data imply that more 
than one student is commuting in any direction between them.5 
 
4 See, for example, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breadth-first_search for a detailed description of the algorithm. 
5 If a municipality has no school and it sends one student only in these three years to any other 
municipality, that link is preserved. Similarly, the links that were below the threshold value of one student were 
preserved if they represented over 20 percent of all students from the sending municipality. Municipalities 
without schools that are not connected to any other municipality in the data were linked to the nearest 
neighbouring municipality that has a school (using geographic coordinates). 
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It turns out, however, that this benchmark graph has one giant component and 
many tiny ones. The graph contains 99 components; out of these, 96 have 13 or 
fewer nodes (the distribution is, of course, very skewed). Of the remaining three 
components, one has 44 nodes, one has 229 nodes, and the largest has 2 669 nodes.6 
The giant component contains Budapest and most cities from all regions of Hungary. 
This partition is clearly useless for any practical analysis. Therefore, we created an 
alternative partition: we broke the largest three components into smaller clusters by 
increasing the threshold value for links to 5 students per year on average (a total of 
15 students for the three years) or at least 20 percent of the originating node (the mu-
nicipality of residence).7 The resulting partition contains 1 055 catchment areas. The 
largest area contains 71 municipalities, and it covers the Budapest agglomeration. 
The other large areas contain large cities and their agglomerations.8 
Table 2 shows the most important summary statistics on the catchment areas.9 
Not surprisingly, the size distribution is skewed, and the areas with the highest num-
ber of municipalities are even larger in terms of student population because they con-
tain the largest cities. 
Table 2 
Number of municipalities, primary schools and students  
Size of catchment area 
(number of municipalities) 
Number  
of catchment areas 
Average number  
of municipalities 
Average number  
of primary schools 
Average number  
of primary school stu-
dents 
1  624 1.0 1.2 232 
2 to 4 297 2.7 2.1 408 
5 to 9 74 6.3 7.1 1 885 
10 to 19 37 12.9 9.4 2 192 
20 to 49 20 30.5 25.4 6 102 
50 to 71 3 60.0 224.9 65 045 
Total 1055 3.0 3.3 782 
Note. Information from schools is averaged over 2006 through 2011. 
 
6 The emergence of a giant component is a classic result in graph theory: if links are created randomly, al-
most all nodes are connected with a high probability when the number of links exceeds a threshold value. 
7 Similarly to the previous step, links were preserved even if they were below the threshold when a 
municipality has no school and it sends its students to one and only one other municipality. Municipalities 
without schools that are not connected to any other municipality in the data were linked to the nearest 
neighboring municipality that has a school (using geographic coordinates).  
8 The threshold values used in the new partition are obviously ad-hoc, but the results represent an intuitively 
compelling partition and any attempt to break the giant component would require assumptions of this kind. 
9 Additional data on the catchment areas, including the set of municipalities in them and further data on 
students, are available from the authors upon request.  
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3. Measuring school segregation 
Following the literature (for example, Clotfelter [2004]), we measure segregation 
with the help of the following three indices: exposure of non-Roma students to Roma 
students (ENR), exposure of Roma students to non-Roma students (ERN), and the 
standardized version of these indices, referred to here as the segregation index (S). 
For completeness, we also look at the more traditional but theoretically less attractive 
index of dissimilarity (D). When we calculate the extent of exposure or segregation, 
we look at schools within a catchment area (or, alternatively, a micro-region, a town, 
or a city). To define and interpret these indices, we work with the following notation. 
Index i denotes the schools, and index j denotes the areas (these are the areas that 
contain the schools; students may reside outside the areas, see our discussion later). 
jI  is the number of schools in area j, ijN  is the number of students in school i in 
area j, jN  is the number of students in area j, ijR  is the number of Roma students in 
school i in area j, jR  is the number of Roma students in area j, ijr  is the fraction of 
the Roma students among all students in school i in area j, jr  is the fraction of the 
Roma students among all students in area j, ( )1 ij– r  is the fraction of the non-Roma 
students among all students in school i in area j, ( )1 jr−  is the fraction of the non-
Roma students among all students in area j. Index jENR  measures the exposure of 
an average (a randomly chosen) non-Roma student in area j to the possibility of 
meeting Roma students. jENR  is equal to the fraction of Roma students in each 
school averaged over schools, where the average is taken with weights that are equal 












∑ ,     so that    0 j jENR r≤ ≤ . 
The minimum value of the exposure index is zero: in this case, no contact is pos-
sible between Roma and non-Roma students within the schools because the schools 
are either all-non-Roma (when 0ijr = ) or all-Roma (when 0ij ijN R− = ). The maxi-
mum value of exposure is when the fraction of minority students in each school is 
equal to the fraction in the area: ij jr r=  for all i in j. For jENR  to make sense, we 
need 0 1jr< < , that is, there must be both Roma and non-Roma students in area j. 
This condition is satisfied in all of the areas that we consider. 
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The exposure of Roma students to non-Roma students ( jERN ) is analogous: it 
measures the exposure of an average (a randomly chosen) Roma student in area j to 
the possibility of meeting non-Roma students. jERN  is equal to the fraction of non-
Roma students in each school averaged over schools, where the average is taken with 
weights that are equal to the share of the school in the Roma student population of 










= −∑ ,     so that    0 1j jERN r≤ ≤ − . 
The minimum value of this exposure index is zero, also, and 0jERN =  exactly 
when 0jENR = . This value indicates that no contact is possible between Roma and 
non-Roma students within the schools because the schools are either all-Roma 
( )1 0ijr− =  or all-non-Roma 0ijr = . The maximum value of Roma exposure occurs 
when the fraction of non-Roma students in each school is equal to the fraction in the 









Despite their intuitive content, the exposure indices are rarely used. Their values 
depend on the overall fraction of minority students in the area, which poses a severe 
constraint on their use in comparing segregation across time or areas. The segrega-
tion index is intended to solve this problem. It is a normalized version of the expo-
sure indices, and thus it retains their information content, albeit in a less intuitive 
way. The normalization amounts to comparing exposure to its attainable maximum; 
there is also a reversal of sign so that the higher levels of the index indicate higher 
levels of segregation (less exposure). Intuitively, the segregation index shows the 












,     so that    0 1jS≤ ≤ . 
The maximum value of the index is one: segregation is at its maximum when the 
exposure is zero. The minimum value is zero: it is attained at maximum exposure, 
which is when the fraction of Roma students is the same in every school. 
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An alternative measure of segregation is the index of dissimilarity. Defined from 
the viewpoint of Roma students, and with many schools in mind, this index can be 
interpreted as the percentage of non-Roma students that would have to move to dif-
ferent schools to have schools with the same fraction of Roma students within the 













∑ ,     so that    0 1jD≤ ≤ . 
Similar to the index of segregation defined formerly, a value of 1 would denote 
complete segregation, and a value of 0 would denote equal distribution across 
schools. In any other case, the index of dissimilarity is, in general, not equal to the 
index of segregation. The index of dissimilarity is a more traditional measure than 
the index of segregation, but it lacks the latter’s theoretical relationship to exposure. 
For that reason, the index of segregation is a more useful measure that is used in the 
new literature on school segregation (Clotfelter [1999]). 
4. Trends in school segregation in Hungary  
between 1980 and 2011 
We measure the ethnic composition of primary schools and segregation between 
schools in years 1980, 1989, 1992 and yearly between 2006 and 2011. Recall that the 
data in 1980, 1989 and 1992 are high quality, that there are no data from between 
1992 and 2006, and that the data starting with 2006 are of lower quality, character-
ized by many schools without information on the fraction of Roma students. For that 
reason, from 2006 onwards, we show the conservative lower and upper bound esti-
mates of both the overall share of Roma students and the index of segregation in ad-
dition to our best estimates. We define segregation within three geographic areas: 
catchment areas, micro-regions, and municipalities. Naturally, between-school seg-
regation is defined for the areas with two schools or more. We restricted the analysis 
to areas that had two schools or more in each year of observation. This criterion was 
fulfilled by 175 out of the 1 055 catchment areas and 140 towns or cities of the over 
3 000 municipalities.  
Table 3 shows the averages of the segregation indices in 1980 and 2011 in the 
three geographic areas. The averages shown in the table are weighted by the distribu-
tion of students.  
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Table 3 
Ethnic composition and ethnic segregation of primary schools in catchment areas as well as in micro-regions 
and larger municipalities (towns and cities) in 1980 and 2011  
Larger catchment areas Micro-regions Towns and cities 
Average values 
1980 2011 1980 2011 1980 2011 
Average number of students 5 153 3 324 6 668 4 235 4 723 3 139 
Fraction of Roma students 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.08 
Exposure of non-Roma students  
to Roma students 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.07 
Exposure of Roma students  
to non-Roma students 0.86 0.69 0.85 0.68 0.90 0.75 
Index of segregation 0.09 0.22 0.09 0.22 0.07 0.19 
Index of dissimilarity 0.48 0.53 0.47 0.53 0.47 0.51 
Number of observations 175 175 174 174 140 140 
Note. Average values (using the benchmark imputations from 2006 onwards) weighted by the number of 
students (except for the average number of students, which is unweighted). 
The first row of Table 3 shows the number of students. The most important in-
formation here is the uniform decline in the number of students by about 35 percent. 
The second row presents the fraction of Roma students. The figures show a strong 
increase: the fraction of Roma students in Hungarian primary schools more than 
doubled between 1980 and 2011. A small part of their growing share is due to the 
greater participation of Roma students in primary school education, but a large part is 
due to demographics.  
The catchment areas shown in this table refer to areas that had two or more 
schools during the 1980 to 2011 period and thus do not cover the smallest catchment 
areas, which have only one school. In the part of Hungary that is covered by these 
two-or-more-school catchment areas, the share of Roma students was 5 percent in 
1980 and increased to 11 percent by 2011. The micro-regions cover the entire coun-
try, and thus the figures in the corresponding columns refer to the overall fraction of 
Roma students in Hungary. From a 6 percent level in 1980, the share of Roma stu-
dents in primary schools (grades 1 through 8) increased to 13 percent by 2011. The 
corresponding figures in the larger municipalities (towns and cities with two or more 
schools) are 3 percent in 1980 and 8 percent in 2011. The lower levels in the larger 
catchment areas and the even lower levels in the larger municipalities show that the 
Roma population is overrepresented in the smaller villages and that the degree of 
overrepresentation did not decrease over time. 
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The exposure of non-Roma students to Roma students increased, but at a slower 
pace than the growth in the share of Roma students, the theoretical maximum of the 
exposure index. Mirroring this trend, the exposure of Roma students to non-Roma 
students declined significantly, more than the decreasing share of non-Roma students 
would imply. Taken together, the trends in the indices indicate a growing trend in the 
segregation index. 
Between-school segregation increased substantially in Hungary between 1980 
and 2011. Taking the average of the catchment areas, the relevant geographic units in 
the system of free school choice in Hungary, the index of segregation raised from 9 
percent to 22 percent. The intuitive content of these figures is that the chance of con-
tact between Roma students with non-Roma schoolmates decreased from 91 percent 
of its theoretical maximum in 1980 to 78 percent of the maximum level by 2011. 
Table 4 
Ethnic composition and ethnic segregation of the primary schools in the catchment areas around  
the largest Hungarian cities in 1989 and 2011 
Indicator 
Year 




1980 237 896 0.02 0.06 
2011 165 931 0.07 0.26 
71 
 Miskolc 
1980 35 255 0.09 0.13 
2011 20 818 0.20 0.36 
33 
 Debrecen 
1980 28 280 0.02 0.09 
2011 20 361 0.04 0.26 
7 
 Pécs 
1980 24 020 0.04 0.13 
2011 15 489 0.08 0.16 
55 
 Szeged 
1980 20 178 0.02 0.16 
2011 14 311 0.03 0.05 
12 
 Gyõr 
1980 19 736 0.02 0.06 
2011 13 316 0.04 0.13 37 
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Table 4 shows the number of students, the share of Roma students and the index 
of segregation for the catchment areas around the six largest Hungarian cities in 1980 
and 2011. Similar to the national trends, these areas experienced a large drop of 30 to 
40 percent in the number of students. Again, similar to the national trends, the share 
of Roma students got higher substantially in each area. The levels differ considera-
bly, but the trends are rather similar except for the catchment area of Budapest where 
the increase was more than three-fold, from 2 percent to 7 percent. The highest share, 
both in 1980 and in 2011, was in the catchment area of the northern city Miskolc, 
while the lowest one was in the catchment area of the southern city Szeged.  
Ethnic segregation strengthened considerably in most but not all of the catchment 
areas. The index of segregation grew almost threefold in the areas of Budapest, Mi-
skolc and Debrecen. Segregation increased by a smaller amount in the Pécs and Győr 
areas, and it decreased substantially in the Szeged area. 
The level of segregation in 1980 could be considered to be low; the level in 2011 
is moderate. The US metropolitan areas that are characterized by the school segrega-
tion of African Americans and whites similar to the levels documented for large 
Hungarian areas include San Diego (0.28), Phoenix (0.31) or Los Angeles (0.33). 
These are not among the most segregated US cities: the segregation index is 0.45 in 
New York City, 0.57 in Chicago; while the most segregated metropolitan area is that 
of Detroit (0.71, see Clotfelter [1999] p. 494.). 
Figure 1. Time series of the fraction of Roma students in primary schools in larger catchment areas,  
micro-regions and larger municipalities (towns and cities) from 1980 to 2011 
 
Note. The fraction of Roma students after 2006 is based using our benchmark imputations for missing data. 
The solid line indicates larger catchment areas, while the long dashed line is for micro-regions and the dashed 
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Figure 1 shows the times series of the fraction of Roma students as estimated using 
the benchmark imputation procedure. Figure A1 in Appendix shows the same time se-
ries together with the conservative lower and upper bounds. Recall that the bounds rep-
resent the most conservative imputations for the missing data. While we cannot rule 
out any figure within the bounds, our benchmark estimates use available information in 
a careful way and are thus likely to be close to the true figures. The post-2006 data are 
also noisier, although that noise is unlikely to have a significant effect on the aggregate 
figures. According to the benchmark results, the increase in the fraction of Roma stu-
dents was concentrated in the 1989 to 2007 period, and it stopped afterwards. When 
one looks at the intervals between the lower and upper bounds in Figure A1, the appar-
ent trend break is lost in the overall degree of uncertainty.  
Figure 2 shows the time series for the index of segregation, and Figure A2 pre-
sents the uncertainty interval for our calculations using the lower and upper bound 
imputations for the missing data in 2006–2011. The figures show the time series of 
the index of segregation from 1980 to 2011 averaged over the geographic areas 
(catchment areas, micro-regions, and larger municipalities).  
Figure 2. Time series of the average of the index of ethnic segregation between primary schools in larger 
catchment areas, micro-regions and larger municipalities (towns and cities) 
 from 1980 to 2011 
 
Note. The index after 2006 is based using our benchmark imputations for the missing data. The average of 
the index is weighted by the number of students. The solid line indicates larger catchment areas, while the long 
dashed line is for micro-regions and the dashed line is for larger municipalities (towns and cities). 
According to Figure 2, between-school segregation by ethnic lines stayed con-
stant between 1980 and 1989 but began to increase afterwards. By 2006, it reached a 
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to the imputation method that we chose for the missing data. Our best estimate for 
the index shows a significant decline in between-school segregation in the 2006–
2008 period that appears to be driven by the larger municipalities. The slope of the 
decreasing trend is comparable to that of the previous increase, resulting in a small 
drop because of the short time interval.  
The trend breaks in the time series coincide with trends in the desegregation ini-
tiatives of the government of Hungary. A law introduced in 2004 banned segregation 
based on race, ethnicity and social background and divided the burden of proof be-
tween the plaintiffs and the defendants. In the following years, advocacies and of-
fices of the central government pressured some of the towns and cities to close down 
segregated schools. By anecdotal evidence, these central government activities came 
to a halt after 2008. The link between desegregation in larger municipalities and the 
observed patterns of segregation is further supported by the fact that the trend breaks 
are largest for the largest municipalities, from 0.21 to 0.16. The drop was smaller, 
from 0.23 to 0.19 in the catchment areas that included not only the towns and cities 
but also some of the surrounding villages. This finding is consistent with the larger 
municipalities implementing desegregation within their administrative boundaries 
without the other parts of their catchment area following suit. Furthermore, some of 
the largest drops between 2006 and 2008 are observed in the cities that carried out 
changes in the composition of their schools as a result of desegregation plans (in-
cluding, for example, Szeged, shown in Table 4). This evidence suggests that the ob-
served trend breaks could be real. 
However, they also coincide with the apparent breaks in the time series of the 
share of Roma students, which is harder to understand. This trend implies that the es-
timated breaks in the segregation indices could be spurious. Indeed, while the large 
increase between 1992 and 2006 is robust to the imputation method used after 2006, 
the trend breaks after 2006 are not robust at all. Similar to the Roma share series, the 
benchmark estimates are surrounded by a very wide interval of possible values be-
tween the conservative lower and upper bounds, shown in Figure A2. As a result, the 
coincidence of the trend breaks with the desegregation activities could be completely 
spurious. Evidently, the missing information in the NABC data simply prevents us 
from identifying trends after 2006. 
5. The geographic distribution of school segregation 
The Roma population is distributed unevenly in Hungary. Using all data available 
up to 1993, Kertesi–Kézdi [1998] presented detailed maps on the geographic distri-
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bution of the Roma population in Hungary. Using school-level information in a sys-
tem characterized by school choice and the widespread commuting of students, we 
can present analogous maps at the level of the catchment areas for the 2000s. Figure 
3 shows a map of Hungary divided into catchment areas (1 055 clusters of villages, 
towns and cities) with the fraction of Roma students for all areas in 2011.  
Figure 3. The share of Roma students in primary schools in all catchment areas of Hungary in 2011 
 
Note. Catchment areas are clusters of villages, towns and cities that are close in terms of student commut-
ing. We defined these areas using the observed commuting patterns. The calculations are based on our bench-
mark imputations for the missing data.  
As we presented formerly, between-school segregation is defined for the larger 
catchment areas. Figure 4 shows the map of the 175 largest catchment areas and pre-
sents the index of segregation in these areas. 
Comparing the two maps suggests two patterns. The geographic distribution of 
school segregation is quite alike to the geographic distribution of the Roma stu-
dents. This similarity indicates a positive and potentially quite strong relationship 
between the share of Roma students in the area and the level of ethnic segregation 
as regards primary schools. However, this correspondence is far from being per-
fect. The areas around Budapest, Pécs and Győr, for example, are characterized by 
relatively strong segregation but a low fraction of Roma students. This finding 
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is likely to be related to these mechanisms. In the following section, we present re-
gression results that show some more systematic evidence for these types of asso-
ciations. 
Figure 4. Ethnic segregation between primary schools  
in the larger catchment areas of Hungary in 2011 
 
Note. Catchment areas are clusters of villages, towns and cities that are close in terms of student commut-
ing. We defined these areas using the observed commuting patterns. The calculations are based on our bench-
mark imputations for the missing data. 
6. School segregation and the size of the educational market, 
schools and the Roma population 
In our final analysis, we show regression results with the index of segregation be-
ing the left hand-side variable and the size of the area (number of schools), the aver-
age size of the schools and the size of the Roma minority (fraction of Roma students) 
on the right hand-side. We first present the results from the cross-sectional regres-
sions for 1980 and 2011. They show cross-sectional associations: whether, in a given 
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of Roma students in the schools are characterized by higher or lower levels of school 
segregation.10, 11 
The results are shown in Table 5, and the summary statistics are in Table A1. The 
number of schools in the area was positively associated with school segregation in 
2011, while the association was substantially weaker in 1980. The change is also sta-
tistically significant. In 2011, the standard deviation of the log number of schools 
was between 0.8 and 1.0 depending on the geographic area definition (see Table A1); 
the areas that are larger by one standard deviation were characterized by a one-tenth 
of a standard deviation higher index of segregation on average, holding ethnic com-
position and average school size constant. The average size of the schools is nega-
tively, albeit weakly, correlated with the segregation between schools, with no clear 
pattern across years or definitions of the geographic area.  
Table 5 
School segregation and the sizes of the educational market, schools and the Roma population  
Larger catchment areas Micro-regions  Larger municipalities 
Dependent variable –   
 index of segregation  
1980 2011 1980 2011 1980 2011 
















































Number of observations 175 175 174 174 140 140 
R-squared 0.12 0.30 0.10 0.35 0.11 0.42 
Note. Cross-sectional regressions for selected years. Robust t-statistics in brackets. * significant at the 5 
percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level. Observations are weighted by the square root of the number 
of students in the area. 
 
10 Apart from the missing information from some schools after 2006, our data represent the population of 
schools. We sew standard errors nevertheless, because we interpret our regressions as models that try to 
uncover more general tendencies in educational markets, characterized by the properties of the Hungarian 
educational markets in the observed years.  
11 Note that the Budapest agglomeration is an outlier in terms of size, and it experienced larger than average 
increase in both the share of Roma students and the index of segregation. Nevertheless, the estimated 
coefficients are very similar when we exclude Budapest. 
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The fraction of Roma students in the area is the strongest predictor of school seg-
regation, with increasing magnitude over time and across geographic units (being the 
strongest predictor within towns and cities). Towns and cities that had a one percent-
age point greater fraction of Roma students in their schools were characterized by a 
0.75 percentage point higher index of segregation. In terms of standardized coeffi-
cients, the towns and cities with a fraction of Roma students that is greater by one 
standard deviation (0.1) were characterized by a half of a standard deviation (0.14) 
higher index of segregation on average, holding the number of schools and the aver-
age school size constant.12 
Table A2 shows the regression results for all years for the larger catchment areas. 
They suggest that the large increase in the coefficients took place between 1992 and 
2006, and the years after 2006 are characterized by further increases, with ups and 
downs without any clear pattern. 
Table 6 
Changes in school segregation and in the sizes of the educational market, schools  
and the Roma population from 1980 to 2011  
Dependent variable –  
change in index of segregation Larger catchment areas Micro-regions  Larger municipalities 
























Number of observations 175 174 140 
R-squared 0.17 0.23 0.14 
Note. Regression results. Robust t-statistics in brackets. * significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at 
the 1 percent level. Observations are weighted by the square root of the number of students in the area. 
After the cross-sectional regressions, we turn to the regressions estimated in long 
differences: changes between 1980 and 2011. Table 6 shows the results, and Table 
 
12 These results are similar to the regression results of Clotfelter ([1999] p. 501.). In particular, the 
magnitudes of all three partial correlations are similar to our estimates. His regression has the log number of 
students as opposed to that of schools and the log average size of the school districts as opposed to that of the 
schools. Of course, his measure of segregation is between African American and white students. Our results are 
very similar if we include the log number of students instead of the log number of schools. 
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A3 has the appropriate summary statistics. Table A4 and A5 show the corresponding 
results separately for the communist period (1980 to 1989) and the post-communist 
period (1989 to 2011). 
The results from these regressions show the extent to which the areas that experi-
enced larger-than-average increases in the number of schools, school size or the frac-
tion of Roma students tend to be characterized by larger-than-average growth in 
school segregation. When interpreting the results, one must keep in mind that, typi-
cally, school segregation strengthened, the number of schools decreased (except in 
the larger municipalities), the average school size became smaller (especially in the 
larger municipalities) and the fraction of Roma students grew during the observed 
period. These trends were the most pronounced during the post-communist period 
(1989 to 2011). On average, there were no significant shifts before 1989, but the 
variation in changes was substantial even then, so that interesting associations can be 
identified. 
The results are qualitatively similar to the cross-sectional associations measured 
in 2011. Growth (drop) in the number of schools by 10 percent is associated with an 
increase (decline) in the index of school segregation by one to two percentage points 
in the larger catchment areas and the micro-regions. These magnitudes are actually 
stronger than the cross-sectional estimates in 2011: a one standard deviation (0.35 to 
0.42) higher rise in the log number of schools is associated with an approximately 
one third of a standard deviation (0.14 to 0.16) increase in segregation. No associa-
tion is present within the larger municipalities. The changes in the average school 
size are not associated with changes in segregation, holding the number of schools 
and the ethnic composition constant. Similar to the cross-sectional results, the change 
in the fraction of Roma students is the strongest predictor of changes in school seg-
regation. The magnitudes are similar to the cross-sectional associations (a one stan-
dard deviation growth in the fraction of Roma students is associated with a half of a 
standard deviation increase in segregation).  
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we documented the degree of between-school segregation of Roma ver-
sus non-Roma students between 1980 and 2011. We showed the long-run trends and 
geographic distributions as well as the regression estimates of some robust associations. 
An important contribution of our paper was the definition of school catchment ar-
eas: clusters of villages, towns, and cities that are closed in terms of student commut-
ing in the 2000s. This geographic aggregation allows school segregation to be ana-
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lyzed at the level of the smallest and most relevant geographic area. The use of the 
catchment areas also allows school-level information to be used to estimate figures 
for the people living in those areas, such as the share of the Roma minority.  
From a theoretical point of view, our most interesting results are the regression 
estimates. They show that the size of the educational markets (defined as the number 
of schools) is strongly and positively associated with between-school segregation. 
This association is consistent with the notion that school choice and selective com-
muting are among the most important mechanisms behind segregation, and the size 
of the market increases differentiation between schools, therefore providing a higher 
incentive to commute. This explanation is, however, not the only possible one. The 
fraction of Roma students in the area is an even stronger predictor of segregation. 
Explaining this association could be even harder. However, both associations are ro-
bust in the sense that they are identified from the cross-section as well as from the 
long differences, and analogous results for both are found in the US as well.  
From a policy perspective, another interesting finding is the coincidence of an 
apparent trend break in segregation between 2006 and 2008, correspondent to the 
timing of the most intensive desegregation campaigns. Unfortunately, the quality of 
the data does not allow for a robust analysis here. Improving the data quality by im-
plementing the full coverage of schools is necessary for fine analysis of the effects of 
desegregation policies and other aspects of school segregation in Hungary. 
Appendix 
Figure A1. Time series of the fraction of Roma students primary schools in larger catchment areas (panel A), 
micro-regions (panel B) and larger municipalities (towns and cities; panel C) between 1980 and 2011  





























GÁBOR KERTESI –  GÁBOR KÉZDI 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
40 
Panel B. Micro-regions 
  
Panel C. Larger municipalities (towns and cities)  
 
Note. The lines are based on our benchmark imputations for missing data after 2006. Grey area shows con-
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Figure A2. Time series of the average of the index of ethnic segregation between primary schools in micro-
regions (panel A), catchment areas (panel B) and larger municipalities (towns and cities;  
panel C) between 1980 and 2011  
Panel A. Micro-regions 
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Panel C. Larger municipalities (towns and cities) 
 
Note. The lines are based on our benchmark imputations for missing data after 2006. Grey area 
shows conservative lower and upper bounds using alternative imputations.  Average of the index is 
weighted by number of students. 
Table A1 
Summary statistics for school segregation and for the sizes of the educational market, 
 schools and the Roma population  
(corresponding to the regressions in Table 5 of the article) 
Larger catchment areas Micro-regions  Larger municipalities 
Summary statistics 
1980 2011 1980 2011 1980 2011 
Mean (index of segregation) 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.20 0.06 0.12 
Log number of schools 2.05 1.83 8.43 7.93 7.81 7.41 
Log average school size 5.71 5.41 5.60 5.33 6.15 5.60 
Fraction of Roma students 0.08 0.18 0.08 0.17 0.06 0.12 
Standard deviation (index of segregation) 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.14 
Log number of schools 0.91 0.93 0.72 0.80 0.90 0.89 
Log average school size 0.44 0.31 0.41 0.27 0.39 0.28 
Fraction of Roma students 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.10 
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Table A2 
School segregation and the sizes of the educational market, schools and the Roma population  
Larger catchment areas Dependent variable  –  
index of segregation 1980 1989 1992 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 








































































Number of observations 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 
R-squared 0.12 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.30 
Note. Cross-sectional regressions for all years for the larger catchment areas. Robust t-statistics in brackets. 
* significant at 5 percent, ** significant at 1 percent. Observations are weighted by the square root of the num-
ber of students in the area. 
Table A3 
Summary statistics of the changes in school segregation and in the sizes of the educational market, schools 
 and the Roma population from 1980 to 2011 
(corresponding to the regressions in Table 6 of the article) 
Summary statistics Larger catchment areas Micro-regions  Larger municipalities 
 Mean 
Log change in index of segregation 0.09 0.10 0.06 
Log change in number of schools –0.22 –0.23 0.15 
Log change in average school size –0.30 –0.27 –0.55 
Change in fraction of Roma students 0.10 0.09 0.06 
 Standard deviation 
Log change in index of segregation 0.16 0.14 0.16 
Log change in number of schools 0.42 0.35 0.35 
Log change in average school size 0.41 0.30 0.39 
Change in fraction of Roma students 0.10 0.09 0.07 
Number of observations 175 174 140 
GÁBOR KERTESI –  GÁBOR KÉZDI 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
44 
Table A4 
Changes in school segregation and in the sizes of the educational market, schools  
and the Roma population from 1980 to 1989 and from 1989 to 2011  
From 1980 to 1989 From 1989 to 2011 
Dependent variable –  





























































Number of observations 175 174 140 175 174 140 
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.19 
Note. Regression results. Robust t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 per-
cent. Observations are weighted by the square root of the number of students in the area. 
Table A5 
Summary statistics of the changes in school segregation and in the sizes of the educational market, schools 
 and the Roma population from 1980 to 1989 and from 1989 to 2011 
From 1980 to 1989 From 1989 to 2011 















Log change in index of segregation –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 0.10 0.11 0.07 
Log change in number of schools –0.03 –0.06 0.03 –0.19 –0.17 0.12 
Log change in average school size 0.02 0.04 0.04 –0.32 –0.31 –0.59 
Change in fraction of Roma students 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.06 
 Standard deviation 
Log change in index of segregation 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.12 
Log change in number of schools 0.19 0.15 0.22 0.38 0.30 0.32 
Log change in average school size 0.18 0.14 0.23 0.41 0.28 0.34 
Change in fraction of Roma students 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.07 
Number of observations 175 174 140 175 174 140 
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The study focuses on the correlations between 
criminalization and prisonization. On the grounds of 
earlier works, it shows that these two phenomena can 
be very hard to be separated from each other at theo-
retical level; they partly overlap. The empirical part of 
the article is based on a research conducted in a Hun-
garian medium- and maximum-security prison in the 
spring of 2010. It attempts to find the answers to the 
questions whether some attitudinal indicators of crimi-
nality and the nonconformity toward the staff expecta-
tions (as a frequently used indicator of the prisoniza-
tion) are associated with one another or not; and if so, 
to what extent. The study also investigates whether 
criminality and prisonization can be related to the 
same factors, which may indicate the non-separable 
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One of the most basic questions of criminology concerns the role prison plays in 
criminality, as long as it has any remarkable impact at all. The widely used notion re-
garding this issue has been that prisons are the “schools of crime” in some respect since 
they intensify the criminal world-view of inmates. Hence, obviously these institutions 
are counterproductive for rehabilitation and re-socialization goals. This introduction 
may seem oversimplified; however, much of the research has dealt with the topic dur-
ing the past decades. After all, the concept of the “schools of crime” has remained only 
an idea until nowadays. The methodological tools used by earlier researches have not 
been able to clarify the basic questions, and the theories were simply accepted with the 
recognition that prisons are harmful to society. Theorists do not appear to re-consider 
this statement. We do not know that if we were to indicate any associations between 
prisons and criminality, which factors would be found to influence this connection and 
in what context we could interpret it. The concepts of prisonization and criminaliza-
tion, used in the title of this study, have surfaced in relation to this issue when thinking 
about prisons. The present study does not seek to support the “schools of crime” no-
tion, but rather attempts to discuss the relationship between prisonization and crimi-
nalization based on data from a Hungarian empirical research.  
1. Theoretical background 
The authors of earlier studies were not consequent in considering these two con-
cepts/ processes separated or closely interrelated. First of all, it is advisable to briefly 
review how prisonization and criminalization were treated at the level of theories, 
theoretical constructions, and measures.  
At the level of theories it is worth going back to the beginnings. There is a semi-
sentence of Donald Clemmer [1940 p. 299] on his definition of prisonization quoted 
in almost every work concerning the prisonization phenomena.1 Moreover, the “uni-
versal factors” of prisonization have also been mentioned by most authors that quote 
Clemmer. At the same time, Clemmer’s work is about a lot more than the issue of 
prisonization. He discusses it in a more nuanced way regarding both its implications 
and its association with criminalization. Although his narrow definition of prisoniza-
 
1 “…the taking on, in greater or less degree, of the folkways, mores, customs, and general culture of the 
penitentiary.”  
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tion does not contain dogmas, he mentions them as one of the objects of “taking on” 
and he asserts that their acceptance has a crucial significance in the process of 
prisonization. In this context, Clemmer mentions different opinions, attitudes regard-
ing prisons, judges, and the police as parts of prison culture. He mentions the follow-
ing examples of dogmas: negative attitudes towards parole board and government of-
ficials, distrust in and hate for prison guards, and finally believing that money is the 
universal solution. He states that prisoners’ dogmas are harmful to themselves and to 
society, since they inhibit post-prison reintegration. Concerning the relationship be-
tween criminality and prisonization, there are two approaches in his writings. On the 
one hand, he asserts that one of the consequences of prisonization can increase 
criminality: “The phases of prisonization… are the influences which breed or deepen 
criminality and antisociality and make the inmate characteristic of the criminalistic 
ideology in the prison community.” (Clemmer [1940] p. 300.) On the other hand, it 
seems that he regards this connection more as a potential than a necessary conse-
quence: “No suggestion is intended that a high correlation exists between either ex-
treme of prisonization and criminality. It is quite possible that the inmate who fails to 
integrate in the prison culture may be and may continue to be much more criminalis-
tic than the inmate who becomes completely prisonized. The trends are probably 
otherwise, however, as our study of group life suggests” (Clemmer [1940] p. 302.).  
One of Clemmer’s contemporaries, Reimer stated the following about the “right 
guy” inmate role: “These men are so known because of the consistency of their be-
havior in accordance with the criminal or prison code…”, as well as that: “…the 
‘right guy’ to be definitely opposed to the law and its enforcement and the institution 
itself…” (Reimer [1937] pp. 152–153.) Another pair of authors posited that: “In the 
prison community, the chronic hostility between cons and screws – to some extent an 
extension of the progressive conflict between criminals and police on the outside…” 
(Hayner–Ash [1940] p. 579.)  
If we have a look at the former trains of thought, we can get confused regarding 
the relationship between prisonization (and the inmate code on which it is based) and 
criminality. The basic rationale behind Reimer’s comment is that he put an equal 
sign between criminal and inmate code. Hayner and Ash assumed a kind of continu-
ity between the opposition to institutional officials (as a main component of the in-
mate code) and negative attitudes toward criminal justice system prior to the entry to 
prison, treating the former as originated in the latter. In his “narrow” definition 
Clemmer discussed changes of attitudes during prison sentence and he also men-
tioned external worldviews regarding the taking-on of dogmas. Some elements of 
dogmas are fairly close to favourable attitudes towards criminality. This is particu-
larly important to note since it is assumed that the concepts of prisonization and 
criminalization are hard to distinguish from each other even at a theoretical level; 
their contents are overlapping in many respects. It seems that, according to earlier 
PRISONIZATION AND/OR CRIMINALIZATION? 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
49 
theories, there is a sort of conceptual contamination regarding the relationship be-
tween prisonization (or rather the main tenets of the inmate code) and criminaliza-
tion. Moreover, besides the “present tense” of the prison period, the argument points 
out the “past” and “future” as well. All this may explain why later researchers could 
translate this theory into the language of theoretical constructions and empirical re-
search only imperfectly. 
A later researcher, Ohlin emphasized the determination by past experience con-
cerning inmate code: “This code represents an organization of criminal values in 
clear-cut opposition to the values of conventional society, and to prison officials as 
representatives of that society. … The code incorporates most of the values and ori-
entations which inmates have shared in their criminal activities in the free commu-
nity.… The prisoners’ code reflects and adaptation of this criminal value system to 
the conditions of prison life.” (Ohlin [1956] p. 28.) He was also the one who started 
to (mis)interpret Clemmer’s prisonization theory and did not really manage to con-
strue the attributes of prisonization theory in full compliance with the author’s inten-
tion. According to Ohlin: “As Clemmer employs the term, prisonization reflects a 
continuous acculturation and assimilation to the criminal values system and the pris-
oner code of the inmate community.” (Ohlin [1956] p. 39.) Likewise, Wheeler – who 
also interpreted Clemmer’s thoughts about prisonization – asserted that “The net re-
sult of the process was the internalization of a criminal outlook, leaving the 
“prisonized” individual relatively immune to the influence of a conventional value 
system.” (Wheeler [1961] p. 697.) In the same study, Wheeler’s expression “com-
mitment to a criminal value system” in connection with prisonization is also telling. 
At the same time it should be noted that this author, regarding the importation model 
(that he labeled “negative selection” model), unambiguously declared his standpoint 
about the relationship between criminalization and prisonization: “Their criminal 
acts indicate in varying degrees an opposition to conventional norms. It follows that 
the inmate culture should give expression to the values of those who are the most 
committed to a criminal value system – the long termers, those who have followed 
systematic criminal careers, etc. And if the culture is viewed as an outgrowth of the 
criminogenic character of inmates, it is reasonable to expect a reinforcement process 
operating throughout the duration of confinement.” (Wheeler [1961] p. 708.)  
However, another author, Glaser emphasized the interdependence of the two 
processes. He asserted that the adaptation to prison conditions (thus committing to 
the inmate code) is rather temporary, and it is far from certain that it has any impact 
after being released from prison (Glaser [1964]).  
Later researchers aimed at translating these theories into theoretical constructions 
by interpreting the original ones. One of them carried on the “prisonization equals 
criminalization” approach. A good example for this is Faine’s study. It obviously re-
veals that he regarded the two concepts exchangeable both theoretically and practi-
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cally (Faine [1973]). Although the title of his study includes the term “prisoniza-
tion”, his measures did not refer to this. Instead Faine took “inmate reference group 
orientation” as the indicator of prisonization, which he considered the “long range 
impact of institutionalization”. Later, a similar practice was followed by Walters too, 
whose study contains the term “prisonization” but he measured criminal thinking and 
identity by his variables (Walters [2003]).  
Another approach treated criminalization and prisonization (or its certain indica-
tors) separately. Its one subtype considered both as juxtaposed components of a 
given group of views. Bondeson exemplifies this approach, constructing three scales 
to measure criminality: inmate solidarity, argot knowledge and criminality scales. 
Within criminality, Bondeson differentiated the sub-scales of criminal ideology, 
criminal association, and criminal identification (Bondeson [1989]). The common la-
bel “criminality” can be somewhat misleading in this instance, because only the last 
mentioned part of that is closely connected with criminality, while the two other 
scales rather relate to the taking-on of the institutional value system (for example 
prisonization). This is fairly similar to the approach of another author, Schwartz, who 
labelled “criminal value-orientation”, “conformity to the inmate code” and “peer 
identification” scales with the common name of “inmate perspectives” (Schwartz 
[1971], [1973]). Thus, in the case of Schwartz, the principles of juxtaposition and 
parity predominate. Although he distinguished between criminalization and prisoni-
zation, he considered them as parts of the same group. 
A different perspective predominates in the publications of Thomas and his asso-
ciates. They mixed up and investigated “cause and effect” relationships in their stud-
ies, following the logic of temporal arrangement. Although the importation model 
was mentioned by Thomas in several works of him, stating that the components of 
the criminal value system are rooted in pre-prison socialization, it was the “conse-
quence” approach that dominated in his theoretical models (Thomas [1977a], 
[1977b]; Thomas–Hyman–Winfree [1981]; Thomas–Petersen [1977]; Thomas–
Petersen–Cage [1981]; Thomas–Poole [1975]; Zingraff [1975]).2 Thomas and his 
colleagues discuss “short-term” and “long-term” consequences of prisonization (or 
rather imprisonment), their variables were defined accordingly in their models. They 
classified the opposition to prison and the priority of interpersonal relationships with 
other inmates as short-term, criminalization (or rather criminal identification) and at-
titudes toward the law and justice system as long-term consequences. Here we are in-
terested in the last two attitudes. The approach of “long-term consequences” was jus-
 
2 It must be noted that his publications are characterized by ambiguity concerning the consequences of what 
he is writing about. Thomas uses the expressions of “consequences of confinement” (or of imprisonment) and 
“consequences of prisonization” simultaneously. Logically, this can be accepted only if we consider imprison-
ment and prisonization equal, thus we accept that imprisonment cause prisonization as a logical necessity. If we 
adopted this perspective, it would be unnecessary to investigate the prisonization phenomenon.  
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tified by a logical slip. For example: “…the adoption of attitudes and values that in-
crease the likelihood of reinvolvement in criminality upon release from the institu-
tion” (Thomas [1977a] p. 58.), or elsewhere: “…the greater the degree of criminal 
identification, the greater the probability of criminal involvement after release” 
(Thomas–Foster [1972] p. 230.). It proves that Thomas hypothesized an essential 
connection between intra-prison thinking and post-prison law-breaking behaviour.  
Compared to the above mentioned works there is an inverse logic in the study of 
Rhodes [1979]. In his theoretical chapter, he apparently took on the “consequence” 
viewpoint, but at the same time he emphasized the “antecedent” role regarding both 
opposition to the law and justice system and criminal identity variables (which he 
treated separately). However, it is noteworthy that only the importation aspect is used 
in the analysis. The tested model of another researcher, Alpert [1978] was based on the 
“attitudinal and ideological import” approach, whereby he investigated the role of atti-
tudes toward justice system (besides different kinds of alienation) as imported views.  
Finally, we need to mention another trend developed almost simultaneously with 
the start of prisonization research. It focused on inmates and, instead of investigating 
the conformity-nonconformity dichotomy, it studied their attitudes towards criminal 
justice and attitudinal changes (Watt–Maher [1958], Hulin–Maher [1959], Mylonas–
Reckless [1963], Cleaver–Mylonas–Reckless [1968], Maher–Stein [1968], Mylonas–
Cleaver–Reckless [1968]). The aim of these authors was the same as that of prisoni-
zation researchers: they considered the prison as a “black box” which generates 
changes in the thinking of inmates and inhibits their reintegration into society.  
2. About the reduced model and the research 
One common feature of the aforementioned studies is that they failed to answer at 
least two questions: what changes occur in prison and what are their consequences 
for the post-prison period. One of the main reasons for this is that prisonization stud-
ies were mainly based on cross-sectional design. Besides, there were some panel 
studies which attempted to reveal changes in thinking only during the course of sev-
eral months (Glaser [1964], Alpert [1978], Bondeson [1989]). The cross-sectional 
studies explored the consequences of imprisonment purely logically. Frequently, it 
was declared in the theoretical part of these works that certain variables would be 
viewed as consequences (see for example the writings of Thomas). Another tech-
nique was creating certain synthetic groups by taking the time spent and time re-
maining into account (for example “early” and “late career phases”, see Wheeler 
[1961]). In theory, panel studies would be suited for revealing changes during and af-
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ter the prison period; however, it is rather illusory to think that these processes occur 
only in a few months. Cross-sectional studies are even less appropriate for answering 
such questions, but they can be suitable for other purposes.  
In my own cross sectional study, I treated the different attitudes as what they 
really are, in other words, juxtaposed with each other, having not causal but correla-
tional relationship. Hence I investigated the correspondence between certain indica-
tors of prisonization and criminalization. That is to say, I did not regard them either 
as imported thinking patterns or ones that prevailed following the imprisonment. I 
exclusively considered them as patterns that were present right at the time of impris-
onment. In some respects this approach means a step back, compared to earlier ones 
because the very components are missing from the model which would replace the-
ory and which, in fact, typically justify the scientific investigation of prisonization, 
that is, the ones related to the effects of prison. Since – as I have already mentioned – 
there was not accordance between the theory and empirically measured phenomena 
in earlier studies, it is necessary to move back. The cornerstone (and maybe the ad-
vantage) of my approach is not showing more than the conclusion that we can draw 
from the data. However, it would be also important to explore the causes and poten-
tial consequences, but it should be emphasized again that we cannot venture on this 
due to the limitations of the current research.  
The present study looks for the answer to three questions. Firstly, to what extent 
the different components of criminal world-view are associated with one another and 
whether they are integrated into a coherent system. Secondly, to what extent they are 
correlated with the possible indicator of prisonization, in other words, with the rejec-
tion of staff expectations. The third question awaiting answer is that which factors 
influence the criminal views and prisonization, and whether these results show a uni-
form pattern.  
To answer these questions, I used data from a survey which was conducted in 
Vác Maximum and Medium Security Prison in Hungary, in March 2010. The aim of 
the study was to explore attitudes of the total population of adult male inmates with a 
definitive sentence in this institution. The number of potential respondents was 618 
at the reference date (1 March). The questionnaires were properly filled out by inter-
viewers in 365 cases, thus the response rate was 59.1 percent. It should be noted that 
there was no preliminary sampling in the prison. Posteriorly, however, it was possi-
ble to liken to the total inmate population with respondents of the study using data 
from institutional records (of course, observing the rules of anonymity and personal 
rights). On the grounds of this comparison, it seems that the respondent population is 
representative to the total inmate population at an acceptable level. There were no 
significant differences between the total and the sub-populations with regard to such 
factors as security and custody levels, age, marital status, nature of committed 
crimes, doing a job in prison or not, length of sentence. The Goodman–Kruskal’s 
PRISONIZATION AND/OR CRIMINALIZATION? 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
53 
gamma (γ) coefficients were used in this analysis, in accordance with the ordinal 
level of measurement of the examined variables (Goodman–Kruskal [1954]).  
3. Analysis and findings 
Before we discuss the analysis in detail, it is important to note that the expression 
of “criminalization” in the title of this study is actually incorrect (as I have men-
tioned already), since criminalization refers to a process, while a cross-sectional sur-
vey can show only a “snapshot”. Therefore, it is more proper to talk about criminal 
world-view and its indicators, which were constructed in conformity with the previ-
ous literature. Accordingly, regarding the components of the criminal world-view, 
the following variables were distinguished by principal component analysis: attitudes 
toward relationship with criminals (criminal associational preference), acceptance or 
rejection of self-definition as a criminal (criminal identity), opinions on the law and 
criminal justice system, and attitudes towards violence and toughness.3 The total 
scores of these variables were trichotomized. Value 3 indicates that the inmate ac-
cepts the criminal value orientations, 1 is the opposite, and 2 is the medium category.  
Associations between the different criminal views  
and their relations to prisonization  
The first hypothesis – stating that criminality indices there are interconnected – 
points to the fact that these variables are interchangeable, they may reflect the same 
phenomenon. The data presented in Figure 1 shows that all the relationships between 
the indicators of procriminal views are positive and significant. On the grounds of 
moderately strong associations, it is obvious that the delinquent self-identification 
also means that one has got a negative orientation towards law and the justice sys-
tem, as well as this type of identification implies supporting close relationships with 
criminals. Similarly, the criminal identity is closely associated with attitudes towards 
violence and toughness, while the latter one is connected with the opposition to the 
law. Being less tightly related to the aforementioned, yet the views on law and crimi-
nal justice do correlate with the level of accepting or rejecting criminal friendships. 
This is accompanied by opinions supporting violence. These findings suggest that 
there is a relatively coherent criminal value system amongst inmates.  
 
3 The items used to operationalize these variables are included in the Appendix B.  
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Figure 1. Associations between criminal views  
(gamma coefficients) 
 
* p < 0.001. 
Figure 2. Associations between criminal views and prisonization 
 (gamma coefficients) 
 
* p < 0.001. 
The second hypothesis pertains to the relationship between institutional noncon-
formity (prisonization) and each component of criminal world-view. Prisonization 
was measured with the use of a tool developed by Wheeler [1961]. It was based on 
some hypothetical conflict situations in which the respondents have to decide be-
tween two alternatives. One option represents the expectations of the prison staff, the 
other those of inmate society.4 I also applied Wheeler’s guidelines when constructing 
the variable. That is, if the respondent agreed with the answers that represented the 
 
4 The situations can be found in Appendix A. They were almost identical with the ones used by Wheeler, 
with the exception that actors had been given Hungarian last names, as well as in the case of the “hiding” story 
the respondents did not have to decide about money but Rivotril pills (which means higher risk-taking). 
Attitudes toward law and  
criminal justice system 
Criminal associational preference 
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supposed staff expectations at least in four out of five situations, he was categorized 
as “conform” inmate. Those who answered this way in zero or only one situation be-
came the “non-conform” (or “prisonized”) type. The latter was coded with 3, the 
former with 1, and the medium category with 2. The data shows that the non-
conform answers are more prevalent among those who consider themselves as crimi-
nals, who did not seclude themselves apart from close associations with criminals, 
who has got violent attitudes, and who is up against the law. (See Figure 2.) 
The third hypothesis is linked to the factors associated with antisocial perspec-
tives: implications of the criminal past and the prison period. Since the parts of 
criminal world-view are undoubtedly associated with each other as well as with 
prisonization, it is worth exploring that to which factors these thinking components 
can be traced back or whether they can be described with a uniform pattern. It is im-
portant because if these components are related to certain background variables in 
similar vein, this would indicate that criminal thinking and nonconformity towards 
institutional staff expectations cannot be distinguished from each other, thus these 
two can be considered one single phenomenon.  
Regarding nonconformity and the components of criminal world-view, I investi-
gated the role of those factors that had been used in earlier studies. These variables 
can be divided into two “rough” groups according to their place in time (past or pre-
sent). The reason of using the word “rough” is justified by the following reason. It is 
hard to decide which time level is represented by certain variables, similarly to estab-
lishing what phenomenon is shown by the given indicator. The variables that repre-
sent the past are casted into two groups. One of them refers to criminal past (juvenile 
arrest, having a clean record or not) and the other to the conventional aspects of the 
past (educational attainment, school behaviour and scholastic records, truancy, long-
est time spent in a given job). It is loosely related to the aforementioned group of 
variables that indicate the type of offense: violent crimes (or not) and sexually ori-
ented crimes (or not). Since I investigated a homogenous population regarding gen-
der (there were only adult male inmates in the prison), the demographic viewpoint 
was limited to age. The other group of variables refers to the “present tense” of im-
prisonment. The security and custody level, whether he works in prison or not, to-
gether with prison rewards and punishments fell into this group because this research 
was conducted in one institution only. The table contains a summary of the associa-
tions between these factors and attitude variables.  
a) Factors related to the past. The assumption concerning criminal past is that the 
earlier and more often one has got into contact with the agents of social control or the 
representatives of the criminal justice system, the more probable that it has strength-
ened his pro-criminal views. However, the opposite is not likely to happen on a theo-
retical basis. Our data seem to support this hypothesis, showing that people who 
were arrested on suspicion of a crime as juveniles (aged 14–17) tend to adopt crimi-
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nal interpersonal relations and stronger criminal identity, they are up against the law 
and its representatives, they accept violence and support nonconformity in prison. 
However, it must be noted that juvenile arrest is a “soft” indicator in some respect, 
since in itself it does not necessarily mean that the person committed a crime. The re-
sults connected to the other criminal past variable (namely whether he has ever been 
in prison) are consonant with that of juvenile arrest. Accordingly, in contrast with 
first-termers, those who have ever been imprisoned before the current sentence ac-
cept pro-criminal views much more and stand clearly in opposition to staff expecta-
tions. The unambiguous findings suggest that a criminal maturation process (in other 
words criminalization) do exist. But it must be kept in mind that these are official in-
dicators. That is, whether a person gets arrested and later convicted are determined 
partly by how the criminal justice system operates, partly by the extent of how “skil-
ful” or maybe “lucky” the criminal is, or rather by the interplay between these fac-
tors. Consequently, being arrested and sentenced can be an indicator of the extend-
edness of one’s criminal history. Moreover, if the individual had not been caught by 
investigator authorities, it can be the best indicator of his criminal potential. Thus in 
this case we are groping in the dark, since the presence or absence of prior arrest or 
conviction would equally indicate strong and weak connection to crime.  
Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to state that there is only one conventional mobil-
ity channel in our age: school. Schooling was measured by official educational at-
tainment as well as subjective indicators such as scholastic records, school behaviour, 
and truancy. The explanatory mechanism behind is that early broken or fragmented 
school career leads the later perpetrators to alternative ways of living, to crime, which 
very likely generate some changes in their way of thinking. As can be seen from data, 
this hypothesis was not unfounded either, since favourable attitudes toward crime and 
opposition to the demands of the institutional staff are more prevalent among the 
poorly educated inmates and the ones who defined themselves as frequent truants. The 
coefficients that show the relationship between school behaviour and certain antiso-
cial views point in the same direction. However, the past scholastic records are sur-
prisingly only associated with negative attitudes toward law and prisonization, while 
in the cases of the three other types of views the coefficients are weak and not signifi-
cant. We can only assume what may stand in the background. Questions about past 
school behaviour and scholastic records seem to relate to the same “unit”, but this is 
only an artifact. The former refers to a more or less narrower phenomenon: following 
or breaking regulations concerning teachers and fellow students. However, regarding 
the latter, the answers are based on more complex experiences, which would lead to 
some kind of distortion. Another reason for the lack of associations can be that school 
failures have different significance in various social groups; in certain ones, they can 
be highly respected instead of stigmatization. Due to subjective retrospection and the 
special conditions, the reliability of the answers about school records is questionable. 
PRISONIZATION AND/OR CRIMINALIZATION? 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
57 
Not independently from past school experiences and educational attainment, it is 
worth looking at the relationship between criminal views and labour market per-
formance. Although there were questions about the respondents’ typical and last oc-
cupation in the questionnaire, the variables that were constructed from them have 
proved unusable. In fact, they should be treated as constants rather than variables, 
since almost all inmates fall into the category of unqualified blue-collar workers. 
That is why we utilized the continuity or discontinuity of the labour market position 
as an indicator, based on the longest time spent at a workplace. We confirmed the 
hypothesis that the shorter time an inmate spent at a given workplace, the more will-
ing he is to accept some criminal views as well as the more hostile towards staff ex-
pectations. It is important to emphasize that “workplace” also refers to non-registered 
types of employment in this study. If it would be restricted to legal or registered jobs, 
presumably the findings would be even stronger.  
The table also shows that the age of inmates is inversely related to the acceptance 
of criminal views and prisonization. In other words, the younger prisoners tend to 
accept such opinions that support close association with criminals, the use of vio-
lence and the rejection of the law and criminal justice system more than the older 
ones do. It seems there is a “fading” process with aging. The question about other 
factors that may influence this association arises again. It is fairly conceivable that 
the data do not indicate a kind of real prosocial maturation process but the strength-
ening of concealing, outwitting and manipulating the outside word. Thus there can be 
a latent “manipulation” factor which would influence the observed relationship. It is 
not impossible either that the younger and older inmates have committed different 
types of offences or they have dissimilar social backgrounds, which would explain 
why members of different age groups think differently.  
The fact that a given person committed a certain kind of crime (for which he was 
sentenced to imprisonment) can indicate a kind of orientation to law, hereby to crime 
itself. The criminal cases are considerably diversified and grouping them – even if the 
penal code contains one classification – can be problematic. Within the framework of 
the present study, the crimes, or rather the perpetrators were categorized according to 
two criteria. One is based on the distinction between violent and non-violent crimes, 
while the other differentiates between sexually and non-sexually oriented crimes. The 
logic behind these distinctions is that violent crimes are at the top of the crime hierar-
chy, while sexually oriented crimes are at the bottom of that, and the position in this 
stratification is supposedly associated with the individual’s own values and views. 
However, the findings suggest that the types of committed crimes in the past are not or 
only slightly linked with antisocial thinking. There is no significant relationship be-
tween the violent nature of crimes and the acceptance/rejection of the inmate perspec-
tives; the values of the coefficients are almost zero. The lack of the latter association is 
interesting because the rate of the violent perpetrators is approximately 80 percent of 
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the total convicted population in the studied prison. There were questions also about at-
titudes toward violence and toughness, but the hypothesis was rejected again. A possi-
ble reason is that a part of violent crimes were motivated by passion or were non-
intentional, thus they were not linked with an ideology that supports violence.  
Committing sexually motivated crimes is associated with only some views in the 
predicted direction. So the opposition to staff expectations and accepting associations 
with criminals are less prevalent among those who committed sexual crimes than 
among other inmates. One’s attitude towards relationships with law-breakers is 
probably not independent from his position in the prison. An inmate’s opinions about 
his fellows can be shaped by others’ general orientation toward him. The perpetrators 
of sexually motivated crimes (or even its suspicion) can be stigmatized by the public 
within the prison what can lead to loneliness. The items/statements of the associa-
tional preference scale explicitly refer to attitudes towards criminals and, inseparable 
from that, towards fellow inmates. This special socially excluded position within the 
prison may explain the similar strength and direction of the association between non-
conformity and committing sexual crimes. The utilized situations are based on two 
important aspects of prisonization: the conflict between solidarity among inmates 
and, as its complementary, the opposition to institutional staff. Interestingly, how-
ever, the otherwise closely associated three other components (attitudes toward law, 
criminal self-identification, violent views) do not show any relationships with the 
sexual-based grouping. A tentative explanation for this can be that inmates who 
committed sexually motivated crimes have more contradictory attitudes towards the 
label of being a “criminal” than other prisoners. Although violence is a typical motif 
and often used also in the case of sexual crimes, the answers do not reflect that it was 
used as an intentional strategy. Similarly, the attitudes towards law and criminal jus-
tice were not influenced by the type of crimes committed in the past.  
b) Immediate context of the prison, factors of the present. The study was con-
ducted in an institution in which inmates serve their sentence at either medium- or 
maximum-security level. Security levels reflect the conditions of imprisonment. Ac-
tually, they are partly related to the present and partly to the past, because court sen-
tences decide on them on the basis of criminal law that defines the conditions and se-
riousness of a crime. From at least two respects, it would be logical to assume that 
the inmates in more rigorous maximum-security sites tend to accept the investigated 
antisocial opinions. Firstly, the maximum-security punishment is characteristically 
imposed upon perpetrators of more serious crimes by the court, who are likely to 
have deeper and more criminal motivations. Secondly, the conditions of confinement 
are harsher than at medium-security level and this can make inmates responsive to 
accepting antisocial orientation (as stated by the deprivation model of Sykes [1958]). 
The data suggest that these assumptions do not hold. Security level has no influence 
on inmates’ views. It should be emphasized that inmates in either medium- or maxi-
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mum-security units are housed separately. These units are theoretically different but 
practically not or only imperceptibly. Nevertheless, it is also possible that if we had 
got data from inmates housed in minimum-security prison (this kind of security level 
was not present in the investigated institution), we would have succeeded in showing 
significant relationships.  
Another possible comparison would be based on inmate custody level which is 
not determined by the past but the present behaviour in the institution. Custody levels 
range from 2 to 4, where the numbers refer to the harshness of circumstances. At 
admission, every inmate is classified into medium level (level 3), and in the case of 
good behaviour or low-level security risk and other requirements, the inmate gets 
into level 2, while in the instance of high-level risk, into level 4. The majority of in-
mates in the studied prison generally stay at medium level, the rates of downwardly 
and upwardly mobiles are 7-8 percent, respectively. Since this classification regard-
ing custody levels takes inmate thinking and general orientation into consideration, 
we can assume that stricter custody level goes together with higher level of accep-
tance of criminal views and of nonconformity. This hypothesis is basically supported 
by the data. Although there is a significant relationship in only one case, associations 
with the other four inmate perspectives point in the same direction. 
Whether an inmate has a job in the institution can also indicate his attitudes to-
wards getting on in conventional life, that is, towards the opposite of crime. The 
findings regarding this assumption are considerably contradictory. Violent thinking 
and prisonization are not at all affected by participating in prison work activities. The 
acceptance of criminal self-conception and opposition to the law are more typical 
amongst non-workers, although the relationships are not too strong. On the contrary, 
workers give priority to contacts with criminals more often. These results raise the 
question that how wide the “range” of these criminal associations is, with whom they 
want to maintain closer relationships. Since the working inmates are housed in sepa-
rate living units and they work with their cellmates or with other inmates from the 
same living unit, it would be logical that these individuals would be their potential 
post-release associations. It may explain the negative sign of the coefficient.  
Institutional behaviour, more specifically rule infractions and rewards can be im-
portant indicators of the position held by prisoners within the institution. The higher 
number of the former and the lower number of the latter can be indicative of the fact 
that inmates have such a way of thinking that facilitate rather than hinder criminality. 
In the case of few punishments and many rewards, we can hypothesize the opposite. 
Previously, rule infractions (institutional punishments) were frequently utilized as the 
indicators of the behavioural aspect of prisonization. However, the role of institu-
tional rewards was not investigated. Within the framework of the present research, it 
was possible to match questionnaire data with institutional records. The problem was 
mainly with the construction of these behavioural variables. The time factor has a 
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significant impact on both of them, as it does matter how long it takes for someone to 
attain a certain amount of rewards or punishments. To this end, the number of pun-
ishments and rewards were divided by the total time spent from the present sentence 
(in months). The derived values were grouped in two different ways. (See the table.)  














Juvenile arrest (no, yes)  0.400**  0.549**  0.335**  0.327**  0.397** 
Number of times he has been in prison 
(once, more) 
 





Educational attainment (completed  
0–7 grades, 8 grades, high school) 
 





Scholastic records (good, medium, bad)  0.122  0.045  0.224**  0.044  0.166* 
School behaviour (good, medium, bad)  0.386**  0.176* 0.211** 0.175* 0 .385** 
Truancy (no, yes)  0.428**  0.497**  0.340**  0.200*  0 .455** 
Longest time spent at a given work-
place (0–1 months, 1–6 months,  







Age group (18–29, 30–39, 40–49,  









Violent crimes (yes, no) –0.038  –0.033  –0.019  –0.095  –0.156 
Sexually oriented crimes (yes, no)  0.307*  0.133  0.004  –0.038  0.300* 
Security level (medium, maximum)  –0.022  0.025  0.100  0.054  –0.021 
Custody level (2, 3, 4)  0.195  0.345**  0.202  0.163  0.155 
Whether he works in prison (yes, no)  –0.159  0.201*  0.133  0.068  0.028 
Rewards (yes, no) – absolute  0.067  –0.134  –0.102  –0.074  –0.018 
Punishments (yes, no) – absolute  0.244*  0.223*  0.159  0.131  0.135 






















* 0 01 0 05. p .≤ < . 
** p < 0.01. 
On the one hand, absolute measures were developed in which the inmates were 
classified into two categories: those who got at least one reward and those who re-
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ceived none at all. We followed the same procedure for punishments. On the other 
hand, since these are fairly “rough” indicators, relative measures were also con-
structed. In the case of both rule infractions and rewards, the values were trichoto-
mized, hereby the constructed variables refer to relatively few, medium and many 
rewards (and punishments). The assumption is that punishments are more frequent 
among those who prefer criminal views and nonconformity, while institutional re-
wards are more frequent in the group of those who respect law and staff expectations 
and those who reject the criminal value system. These hypotheses – irrespective of 
using either the absolute or the relative measures – were only supported in the in-
stance of rule violations. The associations were moderately strong in the case of the 
three-way relative categorization and weaker when using the absolute measures. It 
can be concluded that the relative number of rule infractions are higher among those 
who consider themselves as criminals, clearly oppose the law and the criminal justice 
system, support violence and reject staff expectations. The acceptance of close rela-
tionships with criminals is also associated with the higher number of rule violations, 
although this result is statistically not significant.  
There are no such relationships regarding institutional rewards, although in some 
cases (criminal self-identification, negative attitudes towards the law) the values of 
coefficients are between 0.2–0.3 and negative in the three-way categorization. It sug-
gests that inmates who accept pro-criminal views received relatively more rewards. 
However, it must be noted again that these associations are not significant. In other 
cases, the values of coefficients are very close to zero. It would be reasonable to sup-
pose that reward and punishment are opposites of each other, but it seems they are 
not. In order to clarify this relationship, we would need to understand the mecha-
nisms that are at work when imposing rewards and punishments. For example, it is 
important that (in principle) rule violations are not limited in a given period, while 
imposing rewards are. It is very likely that negative and positive sanctions are initi-
ated by different actors and through different “channels”: the former falls within the 
cognizance of custodians, the latter within that of the treatment staff. Another impor-
tant question is whether the same “threshold” level applies to rewards and punish-
ments. It is fairly conceivable that in a stricter prison it is easier to commit rule in-
fractions than to get rewards.  
4. Summary and discussion  
The data presented in this study shows that there is some kind of combination of 
procriminal views among inmates, which are closely associated with nonconformity 
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to institutional staff. Even though the theoretical model applied in this study makes 
a distinction between the rejection of staff expectations and the components of the 
criminal value system, our findings suggest that for the most part the same factors 
influence both of them and in the same direction. So inmates with more extensive 
criminal background, lower education, only temporary labour market experience, 
stricter custody level, and more instances of previous incarcerations are more often 
characterized by criminal and non-conform views. These findings – even if partially 
– would take us closer to the topic of “the schools of crime”. On the one hand, it is 
obvious that criminals are kept in prison, so the widespread acceptance of the crimi-
nal value system is not unexpected. On the other hand, results concerning pre-prison 
indicators suggest that the roots of criminal views go back to the period prior to the 
entry into the institution. Unfortunately, the current investigation leaves an impor-
tant question unanswered: to what extent prison forms and deepens the already ex-
isting value system. However, it is very unlikely that general nonconformity of both 
the pre-prison and prison period would essentially change after inmates will be re-
leased.  
Regarding prisons as crime-intensifying institution, it would be necessary to con-
duct a research (following the logic of impact analysis) which would aim at explor-
ing control and experimental groups by a follow-up study. It would cover – at least in 
theory – such criminals who have never been in prison. It is the only way to distin-
guish general temporal changes in criminal views from the real effects of imprison-
ment. The investigation should hypothetically start before the occurrence of the 
crime itself, which, certainly, is absolutely impossible. Hence it appears that the con-
cept of the schools of crime remains an open question. Maybe even the question it-
self is wrong, since the real motives of crime should not be sought inside the prison 
but outside its walls.  
Appendix A 
Hypothetical conflict situations used to measure the prisonization are enumerated below.  
Conformity to staff role expectation  
1. An inmate, Gulyás is working as much as he can in the institution. Some other inmates 
threaten him because he does more work than anybody else in the crew. He works as hard as he can 
just like earlier.  
2. Inmate Szabó goes before a committee that makes job assignments. He is given a choice be-
tween two jobs. One job would call for a hard work, but it would give Szabó training that might be 
useful to him “outside”. The other would allow him to do easier time in the institution. But it pro-
vides no training for a job outside. Szabó decides to take the easier job. 
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3. An inmate, without thinking, commits a minor rule infraction. He is given a “write-up” by a 
correctional officer who saw the violation. Later three other inmates are talking to each other about 
it. Two of them criticize the officer. The third inmate, Fodor defends the officer, saying the officer 
was only doing his duty.  
4. Inmates Deák and Budai are very good friends. Deák has 50 pieces of Rivotril pills that were 
smuggled into the institution by a visitor. Deák tells Budai he thinks the officers are suspicious, and 
asks Budai to hide the pills for him for a few days. Budai takes the pills and carefully hides it.  
5. Inmates Kocsis and Pintér are planning an escape. They threaten inmate Szűcs with a beating 
unless he steals a rope for them where he works. While he is trying to smuggle the rope into the cell 
house, he is caught by an officer, and Szűcs is charged with planning to escape. If he doesn’t describe 
the whole situation, may get into serious trouble. He can avoid it by blaming Kocsis and Pintér.  
Appendix B 
Items used to measure the major attitude variables are listed below.  
Attitudes toward law and justice system 
It’s all right for a person to break the law if he doesn’t get caught. 
The only bad thing about breaking the law is the chance of getting caught. 
It’s hard to have much respect for the law after I think about how I’ve been treated by the po-
lice and court. 
It’s all right to bend the law as long as you don’t actually break it. 
It’s hard to have much respect for the law after I think about how I’ve been treated by people 
who are supposed to support the law. 
There’s nothing wrong with breaking the law as long as nobody gets hurt. 
Stealing is just another way to make a living. 
Laws are so often made for the benefit of small selfish groups that a man cannot respect. 
The law is more rotten than core. 
A hungry man has the right to steal. 
Laws are the enemy of freedom. 
Laws are for the poor to obey and for the rich to ignore. 
A person should obey only those laws which seem reasonable. 
Criminal identity 
I would rather lead a life of adventure and dishonesty than that of a law-abiding type with a 
regular job. 
I’m more like people who are after easy money than I’m like people who grind away at a job. 
It is better to do a few illegal things to make money than work at a job with regular, fixed hours 
in the same place every day. 
I’m more like the people who can make a living outside the law than I’m like those who only 
break the law occasionally. 
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I would define myself as a criminal. 
I would like to be able to take things easy and not have to work hard. 
The life of most people who follow the rules and have a steady job is dull. 
People who have been in trouble with law are more like me than people who don't have trouble 
with the law. 
A man is fool to work for a living if he can get by some easier way, even if it means violating 
the law. 
I would define myself as a law-abiding person.5* 
I think more like other inmates than people outside. 
People who have been in trouble with the law have the same sort of ideas about life that I 
have. 
You’ve really got to respect a guy who’s smart enough to break the law and get away with it. 
Criminal associational preference 
I would rather associate with people who obey the law than those who don’t.* 
When I get out I don’t want to associate with the kind of people that are always getting into 
trouble.* 
I want to keep in touch with inmates I have met in here after I get out. 
Upon my release, I will avoid all friends I have here.* 
I don’t care to associate with the kind of people that are in prison.* 
Most of the friends I have made in prison are not like the friends I would make in the streets.* 
The only kind of persons I take as a friend is one who respects the law.* 
The kinds of guys I hang around with here are really a lot like most of the people I knew on the 
street. 
I am friendly with a group of guys who work hard and feel that an inmate should try “to better 
himself” while in prison.* 
Most of the inmates in here are like the people I ran with in the free world. 
Attitudes toward violence and toughness  
In order to survive in prison, an inmate has to establish a “tough guy” reputation. 
The best way to get respect around here is to act tough. 
You have to be hard to make it here. 
If you ever do have to fight, you’re wise to do a good enough job on the other guy that he’ll 
never come back for more. 
Knowing that you are tough is sufficient. You don’t have to show it by force. 
I believe in the use of force to overthrow the law.  
There is never a good reason to use psychical violence no matter what the situation might be.* 
It’s not smart to look for trouble, but once it comes you can’t back away from it and still be a 
man. 
 
5 Here and hereinafter * means reversed items. 
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The study focuses on two index number groups: 
the index numbers of concentration in competition law 
practice and the Lerner index. By means of the exam-
ple of electrical energy, the study illustrates the use of 
index numbers, and evaluates the advantages and dis-
advantages of those. Primarily, provided the illustra-
tion of the power station market, the study argues that 
a raw analysis of data might come as misleading in 
drawing consequences, as a stand against the market 
power inherently alters the structure of the market ana-
lyzed. The study involves the effects of import and the 
arrangements motivating regulative competition poli-
cies and, thus, provides a more realistic picture on 
market power in the sector examined. 
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In competition policies, the notion of market power is a fundamental category. 
Practically the majority of market competition law regulations focus on this; there-
fore, its measurement is of paramount importance (Bishop–Walker [2010]). 
Several ways exist in which market power can be defined and understood. Here 
we use the definition of market power as the capability of companies to sustain their 
prices for prolonged periods of time above the competition (Bishop–Walker [2010]). 
Hence this phenomenon is interpreted in relation to effective competition, whose 
measurement is again not trivial.   
Market power may demonstrate itself in a number of ways, wherever the need for 
its statistical quantification emerges. This article considers a few of the key indica-
tors, focusing on their measurement and problems of interpretation from an eco-
nomic perspective. 
The phenomena examined and their measurements are: 1. market shares and the 
extent of concentration; 2. the general market power measuring figure, the so-called 
Lerner index, the capability of raising price above the marginal cost. 
Prior to studying these two areas in depth, it is worth mentioning and linking two 
(statistically measurable) elements. Market power partially emerged from monopo-
listic or oligopolistic market competition, that is, a monopoly has the ability to sus-
tain high prices over a prolonged period of time. Measurement and discussion of 
market domination abuse is therefore linked to the number of companies functioning 
on the market and their absolute and relative concentration. At the same time, a fairly 
small number of competitors are able to generate tense competition, making raising 
prices improbable. (A classical example is the case of Coca Cola’s and Pepsi Cola’s 
competition, but the tight race that evolved on the mobile telephone market at a rela-
tively small number of competitors is far less likely to occur on the landline market.) 
The latter is clearly linked with the naturally monopolistic setup of providing such 
service, but this article does not cover this area (Sugár [2011b]). Thus, one element 
of market domination is monopoly, the degree of concentration that limits competi-
tion from the supply side (Stigler [1964]). 
Market domination abuse has its prerequisites or provoking factors on the de-
mand side as well. A (nonexhaustive) list of these includes: 1. lack of information 
and general behavioural inflexibility of consumers; 2. rendering a supplier or a ser-
vice provider switch more difficult using administrative tools and withholding in-
formation; and 3. inelasticity of demand on the short and longer term. 
Lack of information of consumers or their failure to follow information closely 
is not the area of classical economics, rather that of behavioural economics. Espe-
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cially in the service sectors, many consumers are unaware that more favourable 
conditions are available and therefore fail to make use of the advantages of a 
switch. (An employee of a mobile operator company recently leaked verbally that 
several clients have not changed their packages over the past 10-14 years, paying 
approximately four times than a modern package’s price that contains the same 
services.) Price inelasticity of demand (often linked with the aforementioned fac-
tor) may also cause consumer inflexibility to change. The more inelastic the de-
mand, the less likely the consumers are to switch service providers.  A good exam-
ple of this is that however there is tight competition on the food market and a large 
number of gas or electricity utility is made available by the service providers, prac-
tically no switches took place in the residential sector in the past years (especially 
on the electricity market). In contrast to compulsory third party insurance, where 
price elasticity is far more significant and the consumers are also better informed 
and transaction costs are lower. 
Perhaps the oldest field with the most information available is the measurement 
of market shares and concentration, even though it may not be the most successful 
method. Several textbooks, studies and case studies have been committed to this top-
ic and it forms part of standard microeconomics and statistics curricula as well. The 
notions of absolute and relative concentration also belong here, for example the un-
even distribution of the number of competing vendors and market shares. (See Hun-
yadi–Vita [2008] or in more detail on the specific indicators Kotz–Johnson [1982–
1988].) 
The simplest indicators of the measurement of absolute and relative concentra-
tion are the number of market actors and the concentration quotient (the per cent of 
revenue shared by the largest player on the market) and the Hirschmann–
Herfindahl index (hereinafter referred to as HHI). These are in general use when 
studying competition policies too. (Another favoured tool of social sciences is the 
Lorenz curve, to which this article does not extend, as it is not widespread in com-
petition analyses.) 
The HHI index is the weighted average of the relative frequencies multiplied with 
themselves: 
2
iHHI z= ∑ , 
where zi is the relative frequency (assuming individual data are available).   
It is well-known that the lower limit of the HHI index is 1/n, which is the actual 
value of the index if and only if the population is distributed evenly and its upper 
limit is 1 with a single market player whose amount is not 0. In practice, when in-
stead of the relative values being squared, they are first multiplied by 100 and then 
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the upper limit of the HHI will be 10 000. Many competition regulation authorities 
use this order of magnitude (which is naturally equivalent to the relative value). 
Based on the practice of the recent decades (for example in the case of the European 
or American authorities), some indicative values have also developed. The range of 
1 500–2 500 is not dangerous, but above 2 500 the concentration is said to be signifi-
cant (DoJ – FTC [2010]). 
Two remarks are worth making in consideration with the usage of the HHI index 
for practical competition policy applications. 
Markets with a different number of actors may be compared or the number of ac-
tors may change due to the integration or the separation of companies. In this case, 
the lower limit of the HHI index depends on the number of elements (market actors). 
Although in practice generally a few market actors are considered at a time, this may 
still cause a comparison problem. One option to resolve this is to transform the indi-









where HHI* is the transformed indicator whose value will fall between 0 and 1.  
This may have practical consequences even in the case of a small number of mar-
ket actors. Residential consumers in Hungary may purchase electricity from a choice 
of six service providers in the 2010s (the so-called universal service providers). 
In 2010, the electricity provided by the universal service providers to the con-
sumers was as shown in the table below: 
Table 1 
The distribution of electricity per service provider  
Electricity providers Distribution (percent) 
ELMŰ  28.8 
DÉMÁSZ 13.7 
E.ON Dél-dunántúli Áramszolgáltató Zrt. 13.3 
E.ON Észak-dunántúli Áramszolgáltató Zrt. (ÉDÁSZ) 17.7 
E.ON Tiszántúli Áramszolgáltató Zrt. 14.1 
ÉMÁSZ 12.4 
Total 100.0 
Source: Hungarian Energy Office. 
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HHI index in this case is 0.171 or 1 710. The largest provider is ELMŰ (Buda-
pest), followed by ÉDÁSZ, but apart from ELMŰ as market leader, the rest of the 
distribution can be said to be fairly even. Considering, however, that there are only 
three proprietor actors on the market (ELMŰ and ÉMÁSZ are property of RWE), 
E.ON is the market leader with a share of 45.2 percent in the case of these three ser-
vice provider groups. The value of the HHI index is 0.384 or 3840, which at first 
sight shows a considerably greater level of concentration, but it may be misleading, 
as the theoretical lower limits are 0.167 in the first case and 0.333 in the second. 
Transforming the HHI index as shown formerly, for six service providers 
HHI* = 0.005, and for the three owners HHI* = 0.076. While it is difficult to judge 
the relative concentration for the first indicator due to the uncertainty of the lower 
limit, the adjusted index clearly shows that the relative concentration due to the pro-
prietorship background is considerably higher.  
It is worth mentioning that the aforementioned transformation of the HHI index is 
often disputed in practice; in this case, the HHI only measures relative concentration, 
while in its original form the smaller number of actors (increasing the value of the 
indicator) considers the extent of absolute concentration as well. Because of this, the 
untransformed version of the index is in more general use. Based on the former data, 
the concentration is acceptable on the market of the six providers, but alarming for 
the three owners that may play a key role in abuse of market domination.  
The values of all the parameters describing the economic phenomena for all the 
market actors are often not known (for example total revenues) only those of the 
more significant ones. This case is not covered by the textbooks, but often emerges 
in competition law practice. 
Let us consider, for instance the market for large power stations in Hungary (of 
capacities greater than 50 MW). Seventeen such power stations operated in Hungary 
in 2011. The following table shows some of their key data. 
Table 2 
Data of large-scale power stations in 2011 
Power station Net capacity (MW) 
Net released electrical energy 
(GWh) 
Utilisation rate  
(percent) 
1. Paks Nuclear Power Station  1 892 14 741.3 88.9 
2. Dunamenti Power Station 1 869 1 501.7 9.2 
3. Mátra Power Station 849 5 762.2 77.5 
4. Tisza II  Power Station 864 1 158.8 15.3 
5. Gönyű  Power Station 425 995.0 26.7 
6. Csepel Power Station 403 1 831.4 51.9 
(Contiued on the next page.) 
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(Contunuation.) 
Power station Net capacity (MW) 
Net released electrical energy 
(GWh) 
Utilisation rate  
(percent) 
7. Oroszlány Power Station 224 858.6 43.8 
8. Tiszapalkonya Power Station 172 9.9 0.7 
9. Kelenföld Power Station 190 422.0 25.4 
10. Borsod Power Station 116 78.7 7.7 
11. Pannon Thermal Power Station 122 47.0 4.4 
12. Bakonyi GT Power Station 113 10.4 1.0 
13. Kispest Power Station 108 377.0 40.0 
14. Újpest Power Station 106 389.0 42.1 
15. Ajka Power Station 88 35.3 4.6 
16. DKCE Power Station 93 304.2 37.3 
17. ISD Power Station 58 88.5 17.4 
Total 7 692 28 611.0 42.5 
Source: Hungarian Energy Office. 
For these large power stations, the extent of concentration is shown by Figure 1 
prepared based on the concentration ratios and the HHI index.  
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MEASURING MARKET DOMINATION ABUSE IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
73 
cant. The main reason for this is that the utilisations of the respective small power 
stations are different from those of the two large ones standing out by far (Paks and 
Mátra, as these are the cheapest in Hungary at the moment). 
Going back to the question of not having sufficient data, it is known that besides 
the seventeen large power stations, several hundreds of small ones are in operation 
(generally in linked generation, that is, focusing on selling thermal energy). In 2011, 
these accounted for 6 percent of the total electricity generated, not influencing sig-
nificantly the large power stations’ market, but their values could not be taken into 
consideration anyway as their individual generation volumes are not available. (Data 
provision liability to the Hungarian Energy Office is only in force for power stations 
with a generation capacity exceeding 50MW.) These small power stations lag behind 
the large ones by far in terms of capacity as well as actual generation.  
If we wish to take these power stations into consideration upon estimating the 
HHI index, then the market shares and the HHI indices must be recalculated as a first 
step. In the case of the electricity released, the HHI index decreases to 0.28 but the 
calculated index only concerns the seventeen large power stations covering 94 per-
cent of the market.  
It is known that the market share of the largest power station that follows is 
below 0.033 percent. (This is also the market share of the Tiszapalkonya Power 
Station among the seventeen large stations.) Based on this, the number of small 
power stations is at least 6/0.033, that is, a minimum of 182 small power stations 
(there is more in reality, but the estimation can be used even if their real number 
is not known). The value of the HHI index is a maximum at the value of 0.28, be-
ing 182 · 0.000332 = 0.00002, in other words, there is only an insignificant in-
crease. 
A similarly well-known property is that the HHI index of concentration can be di-
rectly correlated to distribution as the more the individual values are distributed, the 




= ∑ , 
where V is relative distribution. This expression is only included here for complete-
ness’ sake; its only relevance in competition analysis being that individual data does 
not seem to be available at first sight, only the figures for average and distribution. In 
these cases, however, HHI can be calculated indirectly, further request and analysis 
of data therefore needs consideration. 
Competition analyses widely use another indicator, measuring market power with 
an entirely different logic: the so-called Lerner index. (See the original definition in 
Lerner [1934] and more on its application in Bishop–Walker [2010].) 
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The Lerner index measures the market power of a particular firm by determining 
its relative margin, that is, the capability of the company to raise its selling price 





where P is the price defined by the company and MC is the marginal cost. If the 
company is aiming at maximising its profit, then marginal cost equals marginal reve-
nue (MR). In this case, it can be shown that the Lerner index is inversely proportional 
to the own price elasticity. 
( ) 11 1
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using the MR = MC equality: 
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in other words, the Lerner index is obtained as the inverse of the own price elasticity 
multiplied by –1.  
Theoretically, this is a well-established indicator to measure the abuse of market 
domination. As it was mentioned earlier, its value shows the extent to which a com-
pany is able to maintain its selling price above the marginal cost, which is increas-
ingly a potential possibility as the price elasticity of the company’s product de-
creases, that is, the less responsive the consumers are to changes in the selling price.  
At this point, it is worth clarifying that although the phenomenon of concentration 
and the capability to raise prices are both sources of market domination abuse, they 
do not necessarily occur simultaneously. As the two measurement logics introduced 
formerly show, concentration may result in market advantage in a monopolistic mar-
ket: a small number of actors may exploit the market due to the possible lack of 
competition. The price raising capability measured by the Lerner index may only oc-
cur if the price elasticity of the product is low, and if this is the case, then a number 
of companies may abuse the market through domination. The two phenomena often 
occur together, naturally, but this is not a prerequisite.  To illustrate this, it is worth 
considering the following four cases: 
a) High concentration of the market with a low price elasticity of 
the product: The market can be abused according to both perspectives. 
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This is typically the case with the naturally monopolistic public utility 
sector (electricity, gas, water, canalisation, district heating, etc.). It is 
no coincidence that there is local government intervention, or that the 
price is limited by the authorities, or that a price control is in force in 
this sector. 
b) Low concentration of the market with a high price elasticity of 
the product: This is the case when no market domination abuse is ex-
pected. Examples are foods sold in the retail sector and general house-
hold items.  
c) High concentration of the market with a high price elasticity 
of the product: Due to the small number of service providers, mar-
ket domination abuse is theoretically possible but the high price 
elasticity of the product causes tough competition still. Examples 
generally quoted are mobile operators or compulsory third party car 
insurance. Naturally, the condition of the formation of market com-
petition is the possibility of simple and easy service provider 
switch. (The case of banking services would be similar, but this lat-
ter condition is not available as changing a bank is difficult and 
costly). 
d) Low concentration of the market with a low price elasticity of 
the product: In this case, the consumers have a proper range of sup-
pliers to choose from, but market abuse is still possible due to the 
low price elasticity of the product. This is the least probable case as 
the ease of switching a supplier or vendor limits raising the selling 
price. Although the price of bread is inelastic, it is still difficult to 
keep prices high due to intense competition. Examples also exist in 
the energy sector; the non-residential consumers in the electricity and 
gas sectors are characterised by this. As of 2008, they are only able 
to purchase electricity from the free market. The price elasticity of 
their demand is low (we have conducted several surveys over the 
past years, based on which the demand price elasticity of electricity 
from small businesses on the short run is about –0.3 – –0.4). Because 
of this, although several suppliers offer electricity to them, supplier 
switches are marginal in volume. Market domination abuse has prob-
ably evolved as a result. After liberating the market, price control by 
the authorities remained in control in the residential sector, while 
large companies were in a better negotiating position than large con-
sumers. The suppliers attempted to compensate the profit thus fore-
gone from the small businesses sector, resulting even in price hikes 
of 30-40 percent in 2008. 
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Returning to the basic topic of this article, to the indicators, the Lerner index rais-
es problems in practice as well as theory. The following theoretical problems emerge 
upon its application:  
a) The marginal cost is usually an ineffective method of pricing. In 
a number of industrial fields, the price contains the return of the in-
vestment cost (fixed cost) and the capital cost. 
b) The Lerner index can only be used effectively for single product 
companies, where the particular costs cannot be cross-loaded to other 
products.  (See the distorting effect of multiple product cases in Ap-
pendix 3.1 of Bishop–Walker [2010]). 
Computing the Lerner index  
The theoretical considerations are not particularly relevant concerning the elec-
tricity generation described in the article. The power stations are indeed homogene-
ous producers of a single product (electricity) and theoretically the selling price may 
be close to the marginal cost as many of them are obsolete, write-off power stations 
not capable of generating capital cost significantly in the tough competitive (primar-
ily import influenced) market situation. (As a result of this, a number of power sta-
tions have ceased operations, such as Tisza II and several blocks of Dunamenti 
Power Station.)  
If we wish to quantify the Lerner index, it can be done from the cost-price side. 
The marginal cost per power station and the actual prices need to be known, but 
presently this information is unavailable. In practice, this latter (cost-price side) prin-
ciple is generally followed, resulting in the price inelasticity of demand. As in this 
case it is not possible to take this option, the index is approached from the other side.  
To estimate the price elasticity, time series methods were used at first. The non-
residential electricity sector has been fully liberalised since 2008. Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of the average price at the power stations and their supply (assuming that 
this is the sector that purchases the most on free market basis) between 2008 and 
2011, based on monthly data.  
The data have been seasonally adjusted applying the TRAMO_SEATS method. 
Using both the original and the seasonally adjusted data, calculating in the case of 
time series with the Cochrane-Orcutt algorithm, the price elasticity of demand is 
positive, which contradicts economic rationale. 
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Source: Hungarian Energy Office. 
The fundamental reason for this is that there is a reversed correlation between 
price and demand, it is not the demand that determines the selling price, but it is 
the price that depends on the size of demand (and in the case of a special product 
such as electricity, it depends on the size of supply). This has also been examined 
with the Granger causality test, which proved our hypothesis. The smaller the de-
mand to satisfy, the lower the average price, higher prices may be realised in the 
peak consumption periods. (This is the main reason why the price is often around 
the marginal cost as the occasionally occurring high demands at peak consumption 
periods allow for high profits. This correlation demonstrates itself most clearly in 
stock market prices). 
We also attempted to estimate the price elasticity of demand using power station 
data from 2011. Although the individual power station prices were not known, we 
knew that they sold electricity at an average price of 16.9 HUF/kWh in 2011. As-
suming that price is proportional to the utilisation rate of the power station, and in 
this case Paks sells electricity at an average price of 8 HUF/kWh, with Mátra Power 
Station at 9 HUF/kWh which more or less correspond to the actual prices. The prices 
thus obtained and the corresponding quantities were used to establish a simple expo-
nential regression function. The XY figure (scatterplot) and the estimated function 
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of prices and demand and the regression curve 














It can be seen that the price elasticity of demand is –1.2; in other words, a price 
change of 1 percent will generate an average change of 1.2 percent of demand in the 
opposite direction. The modulus of price elasticity is above 1, that is, the demand can 
generally be said to be price elastic albeit not significantly.    
The Lerner index based on the above is 0.8: the market price may be as high as 
fivefold the marginal cost.    
Alternative calculations of HHI and Lerner index 
Both the HHI index and the Lerner index demonstrate a possibility of consider-
able market domination abuse in the electricity generation sector in Hungary.   
This result is in coherence with the economic situation of large power stations 
having a strong absolute concentration in the area of generation capacities and the 
relative concentration is also significant, while in the area of generation, the degree 
of concentration is even higher due to the greatly varying capacity utilisations. (This 
very difference of capacity utilisation that shows that power stations sell energy at a 
wide range of prices, being forced to match it to their costs. It provides room for de-
ducing the prices from the capacity utilisation, which match other information as 
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well.) The demand price elasticity of power station generation was estimated and this 
gave a clue to estimate the magnitude of the Lerner index, which again showed that 
power stations are indeed able to abuse their market domination, establishing their 
prices well above the marginal cost.   
Still, the scenario described is somewhat contradictory to the general pricing 
practice followed by power stations in Hungary. The prices – according to this sce-
nario – follow the marginal costs; there are explicitly “cheap” power stations where 
the marginal cost is lower: these are typically the large power stations with the ca-
pacity to abuse their market positions and there are smaller and technologically less 
advanced large power stations who sell more expensively. The generally tough mar-
ket competition is often quoted as an explanation to this, principally fuelled by en-
ergy imports. This indicates that the role of imports cannot be neglected when evalu-
ating the possibilities of market domination abuse.  
The interpretation and the incorporation of imports into the measurement as a fac-
tor strengthening or diluting concentration raise a number of methodological and 
economic questions.   
a) There are branches where imports emerge as a true monopoly. 
Such is the natural gas sector, where 86 percent of consumption is im-
port based with the vast majority entering the country within the 
framework of E.ON Trade’s long-term contract established in 1996 
(back then between MOL and Gazprom). Although other sources of 
procurement are available (MOL, Tigáz, and previously Emfesz), be-
cause of this, the Hungarian Energy Office rated E.ON Trade on the 
wholesale market as a supplier with great market power, due to its de-
finitive 55 percent market share (as a thumb rule, this rating is auto-
matically achieved at 40 percent of the market share). As the importing 
company dictates the prices (greatly influenced by the long-term con-
tract’s prices, naturally), import here is typically a factor increasing 
market domination. This is probably the cause of Hungarian gas prices 
being higher than the European average and that E.ON maintains a 
particularly strong negotiation position against the state of Hungary as 
a regulatory authority.  
b) In certain branches there is no import competition at all, mostly 
where transportation costs render this impossible. Such are basic build-
ing materials, diesel, or petrol. In the case of the latter, some petroleum 
derivatives from abroad do enter certain regions of the country, but 
their share does not exceed 20 percent. Therefore, on the wholesale 
market of fuels, MOL could have absolute market domination with its 
80 percent share and its capacity to raise prices could also be signifi-
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cant. The increasing price elasticity of the demand for fuels supports 
this scenario. However, none of the competition authority checks man-
aged to put MOL in the wrong (to date) for its pricing practices, the 
main reason being that MOL’s pricing is not cost based – meaning that 
Lerner index supported examinations are meaningless in this case – is 
linked instead to Mediterranean and Rotterdam index prices, that is, to 
global trends and changing exchange rates, whose correct nature has 
not been called into question with success so far. (See more detail in 
Sugár [2011a].) 
c) There are examples placed between the two extremes mentioned 
before, such is the market for electricity. The share of imports fluctu-
ates between 15 and 20 percent, neither definitive nor significant.  












































































Source: Hungarian Energy Office. 
Imports may be managed upon modelling and measurements by (and this often is 
the practice) that import volume is considered a separate power station. Imported 
electricity comes to Hungary mainly from Slovakia and Romania and in smaller 
quantities from Austria; the main reason being its low price. (Besides Slovakian and 
Ukrainian electricity, the price of Polish and Czech electricity is also lower.) The 
import quantity is limited by the boundary capacity (which has to be bidden for sepa-
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rately). Another option would be the consideration of the imports from each neigh-
bouring country as a power station separately, but data are not available in such 
breakdown. One solution (which we have opted for too) is to separate the import 
volume into two parts, the cheaper but greater volume season (summer) and the more 
expensive but lower volume (winter) season: the periods from April to September 
and from October to March. (Examples of regional modelling are also available 
(Kiss–Barquín–Vázquez [2006].) 
The other factor significantly influencing monopolistic situations is that Hungar-
ian regulations (in conformity with the European ones) consider companies in mo-
nopolistic positions with those in significant market power (as mentioned already in 
the case of natural gas) and brings about monopoly resolving decisions in conse-
quence.   
The Hungarian Energy Office has brought about four resolutions establishing 
significant market power (SMP), of which two – concerning the wholesale and the 
system level service markets – were issued in the summer of 2008 and two further 
ones concerning the retail market in the spring of 2009. The last SMP resolution was 
issued in November 2011. The wholesale SMP resolution has obliged Hungarian 
Electricity Company (MVM) as a company of significant market power to carry out 
the following:  
a) Based on the corresponding legal regulations, the company 
has to auction a quantity of electricity from the quantity available to 
reduce its market share calculated without electricity below 40 per-
cent.  
b) Besides the establishment of the auctioning obligation, the SMP 
resolution also established maximum prices concerning electricity 
sales by MVM. The Office established the company’s maximum sell-
ing price in 2009 as 19.05 HUF/kWh. The resolution of 2011 deleted 
this point considering MVM’s decreasing market power and the level 
of prices that formed. 
In order to interpret the resolution properly, it must be understood that MVM 
fixed a significant part of the capacity of the Hungarian power stations earlier with 
long-term contracts. Although these contracts had to be broken as a result of EU ex-
aminations, the subsequent replacement contracts were also made between MVM 
and the large powers stations mostly. MVM definitively ties down the production 
capacity of Paks Nuclear Power Station and Mátra Power Station. As the resolution 
of the Hungarian Energy Office shows, MVM is obliged to sell part of this capacity 
in auctions, this quantity also having an effect on the extent of market concentration. 
The consideration of this is ambiguous. In our case, we chose the solution whereby 
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the larger quantities auctioned off in 2011 and their prices were considered a com-
petitive power plant package. The capacities of Paks and Mátra power stations were 
decreased proportionally by these quantities. 
By considering all these, the new (fictitiously prepared) power station portfolio is 
as shown by Table 3. 
Table 3 
 Corrected data of large power stations, auctions and imported volumes in 2011  
Power station Electricity sold  (GWh) 
Electricity sold  
(percent) 
Estimated average price 
(HUF/kWh) 
Paks Nuclear Power Station 9 287 25.86 8.0 
Summer imports 4 356 12.13 14.2 
Mátra Power Station 3 630 10.11 9.2 
1st auction 2 500 6.96 13.9 
2nd auction 2 500 6.96 13.4 
Winter imports 2 439 6.79 15.7 
3rd auction 2 200 6.13 14.8 
Csepel Power Station 1 831 5.10 13.7 
Dunamenti Power Station 1 502 4.18 77.4 
Tisza II.  Power Station 1 159 3.23 46.4 
4th auction 1 000 2.78 18.8 
Gönyű Power Station 995 2.77 26.6 
Oroszlány Power Station 857 2.39 16.2 
Kelenföld Power Station 422 1.17 28.0 
Újpest Power Station 389 1.08 16.9 
Kispest Power Station 377 1.05 17.7 
DKCE Power Station 304 0.84 19.0 
ISD Power Station 89 0.25 40.7 
Borsod Power Station 79 0.22 91.6 
Total of large power stations 35 916 100.00 16.8 
The data thus modified alter the values of both indicators significantly. The HHI 
index decreases greatly, from the initially calculated 0.32 down to 0.07, indicating 
that the extent of concentration is not significant if import volumes and auctions are 
taken into consideration. 
Estimating the value of the elasticity coefficient we obtain a value of –1.7, that is, 
the price elasticity is greater, a 1 percent change in price will result in a change of 1.7 
percent of demand in the opposite direction as indicated in Figure 5.  
MEASURING MARKET DOMINATION ABUSE IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
83 
Figure 5. Scatterplot of prices and demand and the regression curve 
















The –1.7 percent price elasticity corresponds to a Lerner index of 0.6, showing a 
far smaller potential to abuse the market; the price may exceed the marginal cost by 
67 percent. Naturally this is not an insignificant value, but far smaller than the poten-
tial to raise the prices fivefold to that of the marginal cost before the introduction of 
the corrective measures.  
The correction of the import volumes and the auctions therefore yielded the re-
sults whereby market concentration was not significant on the source side of the 
electricity generated (imported or auctioned) and the Lerner index indicated a far 
weaker power to raise prices. This means that the obstruction of the development of 
abusive market power can be efficiently achieved by both the intensification of com-
petition (imports) and administrative measures (auctions) at least based on the statis-
tical figures available.  
Finally, it must be remarked that the uncorrected data that indicated the possibil-
ity of market domination abuse may be misleading, as they do not present the supply 
of power stations in pure market conditions, but beside the presence of a company, 
MVM that has dominated the market for decades. MVM determined fully the quan-
tity and the price of electricity taken over in the past and still influences it today. A 
perfectly clear picture would be available if the power stations were selling closer to 
pure market conditions without the presence of a dominating wholesaler. There are 
historic examples available for this: in the beginning of the 2000s, all long-term elec-
tricity purchase contracts in California were terminated and power stations were 
forced to take their capacities to the stock market; this drastic intervention step did 
result in prices close to the marginal cost. A similar construction cannot be envi-
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sioned given the Hungarian conditions, although many researchers of economic sta-
tistics dream about such a scenario, which would be a close approach of the very rare 
case of controlled experiments in economics.   
Our article primarily focused on the practical calculation of the indicators used to 
measure market power and as intended, it linked mechanical measurement to eco-
nomic analysis to obtain as clear information as possible on the market situation and 
the intensity of market power.  
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The fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
surprised the financial markets around the globe. The 
financial collapse immediately afterwards hit every-
body unexpectedly. This article discusses whether 
deeper analysis of the US macroeconomic data would 
have been able to give hints to traders about the ap-







HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
86 
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) published on 1 December 
2008 that the United States had been in the state of recession since December 2007. 
Hereby recession became official, 3 months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
and 5 months after the historic high of the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) bench-
mark. Then almost 8 months had elapsed since Bear Sterns was saved by JP Morgan. 
2008 passed by with the S&P 500 Index falling almost by 41 percent. 
Several authors in literature (Faber [2009], Ritzholtz [2009], Morris [2009]) state 
that the current financial crisis was built in the system, and several renowned econo-
mists have blamed the regulatory bodies, mainly the Federal Reserve System (FED), 
being far too inactive preventing it (Fleckenstein–Sheenan [2008]). Based on their 
opinion, the crisis was encrypted in the system not only since 2001, but since the 
1970s, the start of the real estate market boom. However, it seems that its amplitude, 
depth and arrival have surprised the general public. The aim of this study is to exam-
ine whether the 2008 economic crisis was forecastable, by means of statistical tools 
and time series models, and if there were any visible signs in the economic databases 
noticeable to everyone, to clarify whether its suddenness was the result of global 
blindness or the “storm clouds” were only visible to a few “insiders” only. 
The macroeconomic indicators published by the national statistical agencies and 
supranational organisations (IMF, OECD, World Bank) are available basically for 
free to all investors and decision makers. This is especially true for the macroeco-
nomic indicators of the United States. 
The analysis spectrum of this paper is between the first quarters of 1985 and 
2010. In this given 25 years, the NBER, the ultimate reference for economic cycles, 
identified three macroeconomic downturns.  
The Japanese Banking Crisis of 1990, followed by the Dotcom Crisis of 2000 that 
had started with the burst of the Internet equities bubble and bottomed after the terror 
attacks of September 2001, and finally the financial meltdown starting at the end of 
2007, referred to as the Crisis of 2008. 
The length of the data series and the number of historical events make the analy-
sis of the typical economic characteristics possible. The question of this article is: 
Would analysing the time series and their interactions with naive data mining tools 
have made possible to sense the approach of the crisis, or do even the most accurate 
statistical tools fail to unveil the signs? 
However, the non-profit character of the study must be emphasized. It does not 
aim to find the most secret, always profitable investment strategy and indicator con-
stellation. Neither does it try to criticise the main theses of various macro economic 
theories. 
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The article, however, sets the objective of clarifying the role of the different 
macro indicators eagerly followed by investors that influence their trading decisions, 
the real interactions thereof, as well as their short and long term effects on one an-
other. It aims to uncover non-realised anomalies. In a holistic view, the goal is to 
check whether the general attitude towards statistics and econometrics is true: only 
afterwards they are clever. Hence, I am going to test numerous hypotheses.  
It is assumed that the output indicators, in consequence of self-fulfilling prophe-
cies, are not behaving as results in statistical models but as root causes. Moreover, it 
is presumed that not the indicators followed most intensively by investors carry the 
maximum amount of information about the state of the economy. Nota bene, the role 
of these indicators can change during time. 
It can be hypothesized that if not their own trend-change but the change of inter-
actions between indicators, can indicate the start of a recession. It can be experienced 
in several cases that most of the regressing equations lose their stability in the times 
of crisis. Hence the paper strives to find indicator pairs that are either stable in cru-
cial situations or behave the same way before each crisis.  
It is probable that a recession is indicated later due to error correction mechanism 
among variables in dynamic relationships. Moreover, it is also supposable that the 
explosion or birth of the dynamic relationships among variables carries useful infor-
mation for the trend changes of the variables indicating the recession. 
The study is based on the discussion of the definitions, nature and characteristics of 
the crises (for example Kindleberger [1989], Fisher [1933], Minsky [1977], Dewald 
[1972]. The main reasons of the current crisis (for example Faber [2009], Fleckenstein–
Sheenan [2008], Harris [2008], Morris [2008], Ritzholtz [2009], Király–Nagy–Szabó 
[2008]) are also incorporated in the hypotheses and the findings. It demonstrates the 
purposes of the applied econometric methodology of analysis, goes through the results 
(model estimations, hypothesis tests) and points to further examination and research 
possibilities. Based on my goals, the following hypotheses were verified.  
– First hypothesis: The output indicators, in contrast with prior ex-
pectations, and probably due to the self-fulfilling prophecies, are not 
endogenous but exogenous variables. 
– Second hypothesis: When examining particular variables in dif-
ferent variable categories, it is important to analyze others than the 
ones followed by market participants as it is not sure that the empha-
sized variable carries the most information. Besides, the highlighted 
role can change from one period to the other. 
– Third hypothesis: It is not the trend of the macroeconomic indica-
tors that might be able to indicate the start of a recession but the 
change in the interaction between them. 
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– Fourth hypothesis: It is presumable that due to the necessary er-
ror correction mechanism among variables in dynamic relationships, 
the start of a recession can be hidden or indicated later, as similar 
events tend to characterize upswing times. 
– Fifth hypothesis: The explosion or birth of the dynamic relation-
ships among variables carries useful information for the trend changes 
of the variables indicating the recession. 
In order to prove my hypotheses, data mining and knowledge discovery were applied.  
1. Variables included 
The article is analysing 140 macroeconomic indicators of the US, issued on a 
quarterly basis covering a time span between 1985 and 2010. As the recession of 
2008, in contrast to that of 1990, started undoubtedly in the USA, it wasn’t necessary 
to consider incorporating the macroeconomic indicators of other countries.  
These 140 pieces of indicators – 99 chosen and 41 derived – enable to cover the 
whole economic sphere of the US, starting from GDP through price and interest rate 
levels and production data to the number of filings for bankruptcy protection. Those 
variables were chosen that fulfilled at least one of the two following criteria: 
– They are in spotlight, i.e. the financial markets pay attention to 
them. This principle is fulfilled if they are highlighted in the Thomson 
Reuters data bases. 
– They help to cover all aspects of the US economy, in order to en-
able the identification of the possible latent indicators. This goal is 
based on the “Guide to Economic Indicators” edited by The Economist 
[2006].  
The chosen indicators fall into nine categories (The Economist [2006]). These are: 
1. indicators of value added, 2. employment indicators, 3. fiscal indicators, 4. con-
sumption indicators, 5. investment and savings indicators, 6. indicators of industry 
and commerce, 7. indicators of balance of payments, 8. money and financial markets 
indicators, and 9. indicators of prices and wages. 
It was not intended to have the same number of elements in each category. To 
eliminate absolute values, units and the effect of inflation, 41 indicators are ex-
pressed as a ratio of either current or constant priced GDP (Hajdu–Virág [1993]). 
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2. The structure of the analysis 
For the purpose of meeting my research goals, I analysed the formerly mentioned 
data series. Firstly, I examined whether the chosen variables are stationary, so I ap-
plied the Dickey-Fuller regression for each ty  variable:  
1 1 1Δ μ β α Δ α Δ εt t t r t r ty y y y− − −= + + + + +…  , 
where β δ 1= − . The existence of unit root in the augmented Dickey-Fuller test is 
proven by accepting the null hypothesis of: 
0 1δ 1       δ 1H : H := <  ,  
that is 
0 1β 0      β 0H : H := < . 
Hence, we are considering a time series to be stationary, if the null hypothesis is 
rejected. The τ -test was used as test statistic: 
( )( )βτ β βse=  , 
where β  is the estimation of β  and ( )βse  is the standard error of the estimated coef-
ficient. We are considering a time series being stationary if βτ τcritical> .  
Differencing was applied for all the nonstationary variables until the given vari-
able was deemed to be stationary. Hence the order of integration of each variable 
could be specified. 
In the second step, Granger-causality tests were used to identify the relationships 
between each ty  time series.  
Applied to stationary time series – ( )0tx I∼  and ( )0ty I∼  –  according to the 
null hypothesis x  does not Granger-cause y , if  no better estimate can be given to 
y  compared to the case when only the past values of y  are analysed. Id est: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 2 1 2 1 2
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
ˆ ˆH : MSE y y , y , MSE y y , y , ,x ,x ,
ˆ ˆH : MSE y y , y , MSE y y , y , ,x ,x ,
− − − − − −
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where  MSE  stands for the mean squared error and tŷ  marks the estimated values of 
y . Based on this assumption, the following regression equation was applied on all 
the possible combination of the same order integrated variable pairs ( )t tx , y :  
0 1 1 1 1α α α β β εt t l t l t l l tŷ y y x x− − − −= + + + + + + +… … . 
The hypothesis system can be altered in the following: 
0 1 2
1





H : j, .




The test of this hypothesis system is quite straightforward with the Wald-test de-




1 2 1 2
t t t
emp
t t t t t
ˆMSE y y , y ,
F
ˆMSE y y , y , ,x ,x ,
− −





with ( )2 2 1l ,T l− −  degree of freedom. 
The null hypothesis is rejected, that is, it is presumed that x  does Granger-cause 
y , if  ( )2 2 1emp l ,T lF F − −> . 
In the case of first and second order integrated time series, the analyses follow the 
same idea. Only the hypothesis system, the regression equations applied for the vari-
able pairs and the Wald-test are modified with the first or second order differentiation. 
To be able to measure the interdependency of the chosen variables, a so-called 
cause-reason matrix is compiled. This is a table with rows containing exogenous 
variables (being ‘cause’ in the Granger-causality tests) and columns including en-
dogenous variables (reasons). 
In the cause-reason matrix the exogenous and endogenous codes refer to the 
identifier of the given variable in the database (1 to 140). The cells of the table 
marked with “X” indicate the relationships where the F-values of the Granger-
causality Wald-tests were significant. The matrix reveals that personal consumption 
(variable 1, referred to as: 1) does Granger-cause private investment (2), however 
private investment (2) does not Granger-cause personal consumption (1). 
Using this matrix, a so-called “causality carpet” can be made, hence the relation-
ships between variables can be easily qualified and quantified. It reveals, for exam-
ple, that the free cash flow of institutions (7) – in column – is Granger-caused by the 
added value of households and institutions (5) and new orders of industries (8). At 
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the same time, however, the free cash flow of institutions (7) – in row – does 
Granger-cause amongst both private investments (2) and new industrial orders (8). 
Hence, it can be stated that a feedback relationship exists between the free cash flow 
of institutions (7) and new industrial orders (8). 
Cause-reason matrix of the variables 
Reason of #? 







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ... 
64 1 – X  X X   X X   
29 2  –   X       
7 3   –         
48 4  X  – X       
15 5     –  X     
0 6      –      
38 7  X     – X    
58 8  X  X X  X – X   
41 9  X   X   X –   
5 10          –  
... ...           – 
Note. The “Reason of #?” row states how many variables do Granger-cause the given variable. The “Cause 
of #?” column identifies the number of variables the given variable is a Granger-cause of. 
The cause-reason matrix shows that personal consumption (1) is the Granger-
cause of 64 variables, and there are only 10 variables that do Granger-cause personal 
consumption (1). 
The main goal is to be able to classify whether a particular variable behaves as an 
exogenous or endogenous variable. To this end, normally the Hausman-test is used 
(Hausman [1978]); however, its programming in EViews is not possible. That is why 
a simple rule of thumb is applied. Based on the numerosity of the Granger-
causalities, the variables are classified into four categories. 
Classifying variables based on Granger-causalities:1 
– Exogenous (ex): The given variable does Granger-cause twice as 
many variables than it is the cause of, i.e.“Cause of #”≥ 2* “Reason of #?” 
 
1 In the list, # stands for “how many”. 
BARNABÁS ÁCS 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
92 
– Rather exogenous (r-ex): The former criterion is not met, how-
ever, the given variable does Granger-cause more variables than it is 
the cause of, for example: “Reason of #?” < “Cause of #?”< 2* 
“Reason of  #?” 
– Not applicable (n.a.) “Reason of #?” = “Cause of #?” 
– Rather endogenous (r-en): The given variable is Granger-caused 
by more variables than it does Granger-cause, for example: “Cause of 
#?” < “Reason of #?”< 2* “Cause of #?” 
– Endogenous (en): The given variable is Granger-caused by twice 
as many variables than it does Granger-cause, for example:“Reason of 
#?” ≥ 2* “Cause of #?” 
Regarding the former classification, each variable can be identified as being ex-
ogenous or endogenous. 
In the third step, the variable pairs showing significant Granger-causality were 
described by the equation: 
α βt ty x u= + + . 
It is examined whether the different recession times cause structural breaks in the 
particular regression relationships. That is why each regression equation was tested 
through the Chow breakpoint test (Chow [1960]). Its main point is to examine 
whether the parameters of the regression equations of the sub-periods of a given pe-












The hypothesis system according to this: 
( )
0 1 2 1 2
1 1 2 1 2
α α β β






A structural break is identified, if equality of either regression parameters is re-
jected. The following Wald-test is applied for the test. The F-statistic is based on the 
comparison of the restricted and unrestricted sums of squared residuals and in the 
simplest case involving a single breakpoint, is computed as: 
( )( )
( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 2
emp
e e e e e e k
F
e e e e T k
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where ε ε′  is the restricted sum of squared residuals, 2 1e e′  is the sum of squared re-
siduals from subsample before the break, 2 2e e′  is the sum of squared residuals from 
subsample after the break. T is the total number of observations and k  is the number 
of parameters in the equation, in this case 2k = . This formula can be generalized 
naturally to more than one breakpoint. 
We consider the breakpoint to be significant, if ( )2emp k ,T kF F −> . There is a con-
straint regarding placing the breakpoint, the Chow-test can only be carried out, if the 
size of the subsamples generated by the breakpoint is greater than the number of the 
estimated parameters, that is iT k> .  
In order to be able to examine the effect of recessions on a continuous basis, by 
indexing the breakpoints, the break-point test is conducted for each of the quarters 
between Q1 1988 and Q4 2008 (conforming the iT k>  constraint). This way 84 
pieces of Chow-tests are conducted and 84 pieces of F-values are calculated, that are 
used to build a time series of F-s for all the regressions: 
( )1988 1 1988 2 2008 3 2008 4t q q q qz F ,F , ,F ,F= … . 
The creation of F time series enables the followings: 
– As the critical F-value is the same in all of the tests (in this case 
( )2 3 09k ,T kF .− = ), if all the breakpoints F-values stay under this critical 
level, all the breakpoints should be considered not significant, which 
means that the regression is considered to be stable for the whole pe-
riod, free from any structural breaks. 
– By charting the empirical F-values, the quarters, where structural 
breaks occur, can be identified easily. This happens when either of the 
F-values exceeds the critical F-value. This way the breaks in the re-
gression relationships preceding a recession can be identified. As pre-
viously mentioned, the time series analysed contain three recession pe-
riods identified by NBER: Q3 1990 to Q1 1991, Q1 2001 to Q4 2001, 
and Q4 2007 onwards. 
Variable pairs with a structural break before the recessions at least 
two times out of the three can be identified easily. 
In the fourth step the former regression pairs were put under scrutiny with the 
help of the Johansen-test checking for cointegration. Its purpose is to determine 
whether a group of non-stationary series is cointegrated or not. 
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EViews uses an identification method so that the error correction term has a sam-
ple mean of zero. We identify the part inside the error correction term by regressing 
the cointegrating relations β ty′  on a constant (and linear trend). 
When testing cointegration, the analyzed periods were: 
– Q1 1986 to Q1 2010 to see which variable pairs were cointe-
grated in the whole period. 
– Q1 1986 to Q4 2007 to make the comparison with Q1 1986 to Q1 
2010, and identify those variable pairs that are not affected by the re-
cession at all. 
– The so-called inter-recession bands to identify the variable pairs 
with similar cointegration parameters in all three periods (Q1 1986 to 
Q3 1990, Q2 1991 to Q1 2001, Q1 2002 to Q4 2007). 
– Q1 2002 to Q1 2010 to identify the variable pairs with changed 
parameters after the burst of the dotcom bubble. 
The aim is to identify those variable pairs, that were cointegrated with the same 
β′  parameters for more periods. 
3. Results  
The analysis works with a data set of 140 macroeconomic indicators looking back 
25 years, published quarterly. When analysing Granger-causality, the significance of 
11 084 variable pairs was checked and 843 Granger pairs were categorized. When 
running the Chow-test, 303 576 F-values were calculated and charted in 3 614 
graphs. Doing the individual visual analysis of these, 828 characteristic regressions 
were chosen. 
When testing cointegration, 4 968 Johansen-tests were run and analysed in six 
different time periods.  
As the analysis was based on a wide literature and conducted with the utmost 
care, it can be stated that the main tendencies could be identified, and all material 
factors were discovered.  
In congruence with the presumptions, it was proved that the majority of the eco-
nomic time series are non-stationary. Out of 140 variables, 102 turned out to be first 
order integrated, meaning that the result of the regressions run on the non-
transformed form of these variables will be biased. That is, the traders running the 
classic regression and correlation tests on these variables without differencing them, 
will base their decisions on wrong results. 
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Among others, the Granger-causality analysis revealed that in contrast with ex-
pectations, economic indicators measuring added value are primarily exogenous 
variables. The GDP is in feedback relationship with both the financial sector and the 
monetary policy. 
The employment indicators can be solidly considered endogenous variables, 
however, no common factor can be identified that does Granger-cause the employ-
ment variables.  
In contrast to expectations, the fiscal indicators are strongly endogenous and their 
primary Granger-causes are the profit and output indicators of the non-financial sectors. 
In the case of consumption variables, it turned out that energy consumption and 
crude oil consumption handled similarly previously have completely different char-
acters, the former shows endogenous, while the latter exogenous characteristics. 
As for the investment indicators, it was proven that the expectations are mani-
fested in profit indicators since the profit indicators are exogenous and in contrast, 
the stock indicators are endogenous.  
Among indicators of commerce, the housing ones are rather endogenous, whereas 
those of car sales have no clear characteristics. Common factors can be identified, as 
short term consumption variables Granger-cause housing indicators, while it is the 
long term consumption indicators that determine the car market. 
Neither do the indicators of the current accounts carry a common character, nor do 
common factors play a part in determining the budget deficit and current account balance. 
A surprising finding is that the FED fund rate and the monetary base are exoge-
nous variables.  
Price indicators behave, as expected, clearly as exogenous variables. 
The Chow-tests discovered inter alia that the added value of households and insti-
tutions have the most stable regression relationships among the value added indica-
tors. It was shown that only the aggregate GDP and the GDP created by the govern-
ment are in stable relationship with inflation.  
The regressions including the employment indicators are not stable, this is one of 
the most important findings of the Chow-tests. Out of the five employment indicators 
only the participation rate has classifiable regressional relationship with other vari-
ables. Another interesting fact to note is: the Granger-causality tests showed that em-
ployment indicators are clearly endogenous variables. However, solid relationships 
are only built when they bear exogenous roles. 
Out of ten fiscal indicators, merely four show solid endogenous relationships, 
hence it is also proven that this indicator group is also lacking steady relationships. It 
has to be emphasized, however, that government consumption and investment form 
stable relationships with all of its exogenous variables. The solid relationship be-
tween the fiscal and monetary indicators stresses the presumption that economic 
policymakers of the US are relying on both tools. 
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It is shown that the disposable income to GDP is in steady relationships with all 
the indicator categories. The crude oil consumption, in contrast to the energy con-
sumption, forms solid relationship only with commodities price index, a sign that oil 
consumption is price-flexible.  
Based on the Chow-tests, it can be stated that the profit of the financial institu-
tions builds up solid relationships with the participation rate and the factors affecting 
their economic environment. However the profit of non-financial institutions is in-
fluenced by the indicators of the broader economy, such as consumption expendi-
tures, consumer price index, and industrial production. 
In case of the housing indicators, the focus has to be put on the housing inven-
tory. This variable is influenced by the profit of the financial institutions, the trade 
balance, and the EUR/USD exchange rate in a solid way. The EUR/USD exchange 
rate tends to strengthen if the US economy is slowing down, which is in congruence 
with increasing housing inventories, the housing price decrease, and the declining 
profits of the financial institutions. Based on this, it could be expected that trade bal-
ance and the EUR/USD exchange rate are also in steady relationships; however, 
these tests show the opposite in both relations. 
The retail sales of new passenger cars proved to be a stable variable, as it has sta-
ble relationships with all of its influencing indicators. 
It is stated that the relationship between the consumer price index and the con-
sumption expenditures on durables always breaks at times of recessions. 
The indicators of money supply (M0, M1, M2) are in lagging relationships with their 
exogenous variables, the relationships always become weak after the start of the recessions.  
There is a stable feedback relationship between the S&P500 index and the profit 
of the financial institutions to the GDP. This relationship states that long term price 
appreciation is not possible without the health of the financial institutions. 
Based on the cointegration tests, it can be stated that the added value of the non-
financial institutions is cointegrated in a constant parameter manner with three other vari-
ables; the consumer expenditures on services, the consumer expenditures, and GDP.  
The ceasing character of the cointegration is proven in the case of the following 
variable pairs: 1. Manufacturing production and the gross value added by businesses; 
2. Industrial production and constant price GDP; 3. Private business sector produc-
tion and manufacturing production. 
Manufacturers durables new orders to the GDP and the private business sector 
production demonstrate the strength of the current recession, hence the cointegration 
parameters of the cointegrations equations are the same between Q1 1986 and Q3 
1990 as well as Q1 1999 and Q1 2001. 
The cointegration throughout the whole Q1 1986 to Q1 2010 period (referred to 
as holistic cointegration) between the government investment to GDP and the per-
sonal consumption stresses the automatism of the fiscal policy. 
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In the followings, the results are compared with the hypotheses set up. 
First hypothesis: The output indicators, in contrast with prior expectations, 
probably due to the self fulfilling prophecies, are not endogenous but exogenous 
variables. 
The result of Granger-causality tests showed that surprisingly the output indicators 
are strongly exogenous and they have feedback relationships with both the financial 
sector and monetary policy. Based on these facts, the first hypothesis can be accepted.  
The self-fulfilling prophecies seem to be true in the case of the monetary policy 
as well; hence both the monetary base and the FED fund rate show exogenous char-
acteristics. Special attention should be devoted to the monetary base, as its relation-
ships with other indicators are stable. It has to be stated, however, that fiscal policy is 
an endogenous variable, which could be worrisome for those who are expecting an 
immediate result from fiscal policy. 
Second hypothesis: When examining particular variables, not only the ones fol-
lowed by market participants but also others shall be analyzed, as it is not sure that 
the emphasized variable is carrying the most information. Besides, the emphasized 
role can change from period to period. 
This hypothesis can be accepted as well, mainly based on the behaviour of the 
employment indicators. These variables carry endogenous characteristics; however, 
they do not have any common influencing variables as Granger-causes. Apart from 
that, their regression relationships are not stable. Out of five employment indicators, 
only the regression relationships of the participation rate can be characterized. Still, 
the market does not follow this indicator.  
Similar revelations can be made regarding the consumption of crude oil and that of 
energy. Firstly, the Granger-character of the two variables is totally different – the for-
mer is rather exogenous, the latter is endogenous –, secondly, energy consumption is 
basically in solid relationship with most of its variable pairs, while crude oil consump-
tion has only one stable relationship. Thirdly, energy consumption is cointegrated with 
numerous variables, whereas crude oil consumption shows no cointegration. 
These findings are important, because it shows that the focus of the financial markets 
is on the wrong indicator – huge volatily is occurring after the weekly crude stocks report 
(proxy indicator for consumption), but attention is paid to the energy consumption re-
ports. All the traders want to know the non-farm payroll figures as they are released, 
however, as it seems from the foregoing, it is not a correct indicator to follow. 
Third hypothesis: Not the trend of macroeconomic indicators but the change in 
their interaction is able to indicate the start of a recession. 
This hypothesis is partially confirmed. The characteristic breaks of the regression 
relationships are only confirmed in the case of a few indicators. Regarding the output 
indicators, merely the constant price GDP and the output of the non-financial institu-
tions to the GDP regressions break in a characteristic way.  
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As far as the employment indicators are concerned, only the regression relation-
ships of the participation rate break in several cases, nor the lagging style break is 
proven. Within the fiscal, consumption, investment and commerce variable catego-
ries, the regression relationships of only the following variables break in a character-
istic way: governmental consumption and investment to GDP, consumption expendi-
tures for transportation, private investment, and aggregated industrial production. 
Neither the current account balance, nor the money market indicator has characteris-
tic regression breakpoints, and the same can be stated for the price indicators. 
Fourth hypothesis: It is presumable that, due to the necessary error correction 
mechanism among variables in dynamic relationships, the start of recession can be 
hidden or indicated later, and the same happens also in upswing times. 
This hypothesis is also partially proven, as only the holistic cointegration charac-
teristics could cause these anomalies. However, holistic cointegration makes up only 
one third of the specific cointegration relationships, and it is mainly typical for con-
sumption, investment, and commerce indicator groups. 
Fifth hypothesis: The explosion or birth of the dynamic relationships among vari-
ables carries useable information for the trend changes of the variables indicating 
recession. 
This hypothesis is clearly confirmed due to not only the numerosity of these cointegra-
tion relations but also the fact that starting and ceasing cointegrations are typical for spe-
cific indicators. Since the burst of the ‘dotcom balloon’, cointegrations ceased to exist in 
the case of the aggregated industrial production. However, the numerous cointegrations 
came to existence in the case of energy consumption and consumer satisfaction.  
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In times of economic expansion, cointegrations that characterise the current price 
GDP, the output of non-financial institutes, energy consumption, the free cash flow of 
companies prognosticate new single family home sales and non-farm payroll costs. 
Energy consumption proved to be a very important indicator of the state of the 
economy, as it is clearly endogenous in character, it has stable regression relation-
ships, and carries numerous characteristic cointegrating relationships. Consumer sat-
isfaction is to mention among exogenous variables. The importance of these two 
variables is enhanced by the fact that consumer satisfaction does Granger-cause en-
ergy consumption, the regression is stable, and since 2002 onwards these two vari-
ables has been cointegrated. 
4. Conclusions 
By using statistical methodology, the study identified variables and constellations 
that could have helped discovering the approach of an economic crisis. Based on the 
‘depth and width’ of the database, it is presumable that only a fraction of the context 
was discovered. 
The results support a further test on whether these variables can be ‘wrapped into’ 
latent variables (factors, main components) and the results can be generalised by 
means of these main components. However, it would need numerous changes in 
methodology, for example, in the dynamic factor models (Tusnády–Zierman [1987]).  
Although my analysis was carried out at the macro level, it would be also worth 
analysing mezo- and micro-level data based on the usage of the same variables ap-
plicable to both industries and companies. 
Since the credit crisis definitely started off from the US, this country was focused 
on. But it would be also important to check whether the same could be foreseen for 
other G7 economics. 
References 
CHOW, G. [1960]: Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions. 
Econometrica. Vol. 28. No. 3. pp. 591–609. 
DEWALD, W. G. [1972]: The National Monetary Commission: A Look Back. Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking. Vol. 4. Issue 4.  pp. 930–956. 
DICKEY, D. A. – FULLER, W. A. [1979]: Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time Se-
ries with a Unit Root. Journal of the American Statistical Association. Vol. 74. Issue 366. pp. 
427–431. 
ÁCS: WAS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 FORECASTABLE? 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
100
FABER, D. [2009]: And Then the Roof Caved in: How Wall Street’s Greed and Stupidity Brought 
Capitalism to Its Knees. John Wiley & Sons. Hoboken. 
FISHER, I. [1933]: The Debt Deflation Theory of the Great Depression. Econometrica.  Vol. 1. No. 
4. pp. 537–557. 
FLECKENSTEIN, W. A. – SHEEHAN, F. [2008]: Greenspan’s Bubbles: The Age of Ignorance at the 
Federal Reserve. McGraw-Hill. New York. 
HAJDU, O. – HERMAN, S. – PINTÉR, J. – RAPPAI, G. – RÉDEY, K. [1994]: Statisztika I-II. JPTE Kiadó. 
Pécs. 
HAJDU, O. – VIRÁG, M. [1993]: Pénzügyi viszonyszámokon alapuló vállalatminősítés többváltozós 
statisztikai módszerek felhasználásával. Ipargazdaság. Vol. 44. No. 7. pp. 23–32. 
HARRIS, E.  S. [2008]: Ben Bernanke’s Fed: The Federal Reserve After Greenspan. Harvard Busi-
ness Press. Boston. 
HAUSMAN, J. A. [1978]: Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica. Vol. 46. No. 6. pp. 
1251–1271. 
HUNYADI, L. [2004]: Wald-próba a regresszióban. Statisztikai Szemle. No. 9. Vol. 82. pp. 866–869. 
JONES, J. D. [1986]: Consumer Prices, Wholesale Prices, and Causality. Empirical Economics. Vol. 
11. Issue 1. pp. 41–55. 
KINDLEBERGER, C. P. [1989]: Manias, Panics and Crashes: History of Financial Crises. Basic 
Books. New York. 
KIRÁLY, J.  – NAGY, M. – SZABÓ, E. V. [2008]: Egy különleges eseménysorozat elemzése – a 
másodrendű jelzáloghitel-piaci válság és (hazai) következményei. Közgazdasági Szemle. Vol. 
LV. No. July–August. pp. 573–621. 
MINSKY, H. [1977]: A Theory of Systematic Fragility. In: Altman, E. I. – Sametz, A. W. (eds.): Fi-
nancial Crises: Institutions and Markets in a Fragile Environment. Wiley International. New 
York. 
MORRIS, C. R. [2008]: The Trillion Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High Rollers, and the Great 
Credit Crash. Public Affairs. New York. 
ODED, M. – ROKACH, L. [2005]: Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery Handbook. Springer. New 
York. 
RAPPAI, G. [2010]: A statisztikai modellezés filozófiája. Statisztikai Szemle. Vol. 88. No. 2. pp. 
121–141. 
RITZHOLZ, B. [2009]: Bailout Nation: How Greed and Easy Money Corrupted Wall Street and 
Shook the World Economy. John Wiley & Sons. Hoboken. 
SIPOS, B. [1986]: A Kondratyev-ciklus empirikus vizsgálata és prognosztizálása. Statisztikai 
Szemle. Vol. 64. No. 12. pp. 1209–1237. 
SOREN, J. [1995]: Likelihood-Based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Models. Ox-
ford University Press. Oxford. 
THE ECONOMIST [2006]: Guide to Economic Indicators: Making Sense of Economic. Sixth Edition. 
Profile Books. London. 
TUSNÁDY, G – ZIERMANN, M. [1987]: Idősorok analízise. Műszaki Kiadó. Budapest. 
 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
 
A Method to Maximize the Information  
of a Continuous Variable in Relation  
to a Dichotomous Grouping Variable:  




Károli Gáspár University  
of the Reformed Church 
in Budapest 
E-mail: vargha.andras@kre.hu 
Lars R. Bergman 
Professor 
Stockholm University  
E-mail: lrb@psychology.su.se 
In statistical analyses the researcher should nor-
mally use all the relevant information in the data. This 
argument has been used to advise against the habit of 
dichotomizing (approximately) continuous variables. 
However, if, for instance, a continuous variable is not 
normally distributed, it is possible that an optimal di-
chotomization can reveal relationships between vari-
ables otherwise obscured. Two analytical situations 
when this might apply were treated: 1. The study of 
the relationship between an independent dichotomous 
grouping variable and a dependent continuous variable 
and 2. the discrimination between two groups by iden-
tifying an optimal cutpoint in one or more continuous 
variables, treated as the predictor(s). For these pur-
poses, cutpoint analysis (CPA) is introduced as a 
method for finding an optimal categorization of a con-
tinuous variable together with a computer package 
(ROPstat) to carry out the analysis. Three empirical 
examples are given that show the usefulness of CPA as 
compared to conventional analyses. 
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This paper takes its starting point from either of two analytical questions: 
Case 1: A dichotomous grouping variable is regarded as the inde-
pendent variable and it is asked how two groups differ in a continuous 
dependent variable. 
Case 2: A grouping variable is regarded as the dependent variable 
and it is asked how well you can discriminate between the groups us-
ing information about the values of a continuous variable, which is re-
garded as the independent variable, that is, the predictor of group 
membership. Of course, in practice the continuous variable is usually 
not really continuous, by “continuous” we mean here a variable that is 
at an approximate interval scale level and taking many values, or is at 
least ordinal, taking many values.  
Case 1 is often addressed by a two-sample t-test of the mean difference and Case 
2 is frequently covered by discriminant analysis (DA) or logistic regression analysis 
(LRA). However, it must be assumed that the population means carry the important 
information about group differences in the first case and directly using the continu-
ous variable is the best way of representing the information contained in it in the 
second. 
We claim that sometimes in Case 1 or 2, the information value of the continu-
ous variable is not maximized by treating it as an interval scale variable and work-
ing only with means but instead by an optimal categorization of its value range. By 
“information value” we mean all possible information by which one can draw con-
clusions from one variable to the other. Such a situation can occur in Case 1 when 
group membership relates to the value of the continuous dependent variable differ-
ently in various ranges of it. It might be well that there are no mean differences be-
tween groups but still the percentages belonging to one category of the categorized 
continuous variable vary between groups (see intervals ( )13; P− , ( )1 2; P P , and 
( )2; 3P  in Figure). This line of reasoning receives some support from the not infre-
quent finding that dichotomous variables, as compared to the corresponding con-
tinuous variables, can be surprisingly good at detecting relationships between vari-
ables (Farrington–Loeber [2000]). In Case 2 an appropriately categorized version 
of the continuous variable may be more useful to discriminate between the groups 
than the original variable. This can occur when there are threshold effects of the 
independent variable.  
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The purpose of the present paper is to present a method and a computer program 
to identify optimal cutpoints for categorizing a continuous variable and evaluating 
the usefulness of this categorization. This is done for each of the two cases described 
formerly and the method is called cutpoint analysis (CPA). We will only treat the 
case when the grouping variable is dichotomous but the findings are easily extended 
to the multi-group case.  
First we present a brief discussion of the distributional conditions of the continu-
ous variable in the different groups that must hold for the categorization approach to 
possibly detect group differences otherwise not detected or achieve a discrimination 
otherwise not achieved. 
We note that in CPA the restrictive assumption of interval scaled continuity can 
be relaxed. The minimal constraint imposed is ordinality. 
1. Necessary conditions for preferring  
an optimal categorization method  
Case 1. Suppose one is interested in comparing Group A and Group B with re-
gard to the values of a quantitative variable X. Let X be denoted in Group A by AX , 
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only difference that can occur between the distributions of AX  and BX  is a mean 
difference, denoted by d: 
                                                        ( ) ( )A BF x F x d= + ,  /1/ 
for the distribution functions AF , and BF  for all possible values x, and for some 
value of d. 
If the assumption of normality holds but variance homogeneity is strongly vio-
lated, large differences between the two distributions can occur even under μ μA B= . 
(See Figure.) 
If the assumption of normality is seriously violated, which occurs quite frequently 
(Micceri [1989]), then several situations can occur: Group A and Group B can differ in 
several special ways in terms of the distribution of X also when μ μA B= . One such 
type of difference is when Group A members exist with a substantially lower or higher 
proportion under (or above) a certain value c than Group B members, that is when 
( ) ( )A BF c F c<  or ( ) ( )A BF c F c> . 
If such a cutpoint c exists on the scale of X, it suggests that different ranges of the 
scale of X represent different qualities. The exploration of one or more cutpoints over 
the range of X in relation to the distribution of AX  and BX  may then provide impor-
tant information about the relationship between the independent and dependent vari-
ables. 
It is also important to note that if AX  or BX  is non-normal, the inequality 
                                                      ( ) ( )A BF c F c≠   /2/ 
for some value of c can hold even if the population means of the two groups are 
equal, that is, μ μA B= . Accordingly, the violation of normality is always an indica-
tion that differences between AF  and BF  other than a mean difference may occur. 
Case 2. Whenever /2/ holds for some value c, this can serve as information for 
discriminating between Group A and Group B. If AX  and BX  are normally distrib-
uted, and variance homogeneity holds, then μ μA B−  contains all information regard-
ing the differences between Group A and Group B. However, if these assumptions 
are violated, identification of values c for which /2/ holds may suggest that there is a 
better rule for discriminating Group A and Group B than the one obtained in standard 
DA (Farrington–Loeber [2000]).  
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2. Description of the CPA method 
Case 1. It is helpful if prior knowledge exists about defining the range in which the 
two groups differ. In a substantial portion of cases, however, the researcher has no idea 
about the locations of the optimal cutpoints over the range of the dependent variable X 
but still their existence might be surmised and merit investigation. A simple solution 
would be to compare the two distributions in all of the observed values of X, but this 
approach would necessarily yield high alpha error inflation, which is statistically unac-
ceptable. By the CPA method presented here one can search for cutpoints discriminat-
ing sharply the two distributions without the danger of alpha inflation. 
The main idea of CPA is as follows. 
1. Chose a limited number of cutpoints ( 1c , …, kc ) from the value 
range of variable X. 
2. For each ic  ( 1, , i k= … ) dichotomize X at cutpoint ic , defining 
variable iX  as follows: 0iX =  if iX c<  and 1iX =  if iX c≥ . 
3. Compare Group A and Group B in terms of each iX  by perform-
ing a 2×2 chi-square test or a Fisher-exact test, determining the p-value 
of the significance. 
4. In order to avoid alpha inflation, multiply p by k, the number of 
all cutpoints, that is, the number of performed tests: adjp k p= ⋅ . This 
is the well-known Bonferroni method for adjusting p-values in multi-
ple comparisons (Maxwell–Delaney [2004] pp. 202–208). 
The only questions left open are the choice of the value k and the selection of the 
ic  ( 1, , i k= … ) cutpoints. Whenever variable X has Xk  different values, and Xk  is 
less than maxk , the maximal allowed value for k is set to Xk k= . In all other cases, 
set maxk k= . As a rule of thumb – based on our empirical experience – we suggest 
that the maximal allowed value for k be 10 in most comparisons, that is, 10maxk = . 
Increasing the value of k would decrease the power of CPA, and a decrease of its 
value may increase the chance that relevant cutpoint(s) will be unidentified. In a later 
section we will also provide some empirical support to this choice. 
In the identification process of the k cutpoints, we propose the following two cri-
teria if the number of different values of variable X in the sample exceeds maxk : 
1. Let 1 εc x≥  and 1 εkc x −≤ , where εx  and 1 εx −  are percentile val-
ues in the empirical pooled distribution of variable X with certain small ε 
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values ( ε 0 20.< ). Hence, we do not compare the groups at the lower 
and upper ε part of the pooled distribution. The value of ε can be fixed 
freely by the user – its recommended value may be between 0.01 and 
0.05, depending on the sample size (in larger samples ε can be smaller, 
enabling CPA to detect differences between the distributions over a lar-
ger range of X values). In ROPstat the default value for ε  is 0.025. 
2. The estimated ( )1i iP c X c +≤ ≤  probabilities, where 
1 1i k≤ ≤ − , should be as similar as possible in the total sample con-
taining both groups. 
The description of the computer program can be found in the Appendix. For more de-
tails about the program output, see the empirical examples provided in the next section. 
Case 2. If the grouping variable is regarded as the dependent variable, an impor-
tant aim of the analysis can be to predict group membership based on the value of the 
continuous variable. This model is well-known, for instance, in research evaluation 
and comparison of the performance of diagnostic tests (DeLong–DeLong–Clarke-
Pearson [1988]). 
The key concepts are as follows. One of the two groups is regarded as the crite-
rion group, the other as the control group. Based on the continuous variable X, it is 
decided if a subject belongs to the criterion group or not. The decision is made by 
means of a threshold value cx , on the scale of X. Subjects having X values greater 
than or equal to cx  will be regarded as belonging to the criterion group. A threshold 
value cx  works well if most subjects from the criterion group will be judged as be-
longing to it, in other words, if 
                                     Sensitivity ( ) ( )criterion groupc cx Pr X x= ≥  /3/ 
is close to 1, and most subjects from the control group will be judged as not belong-
ing to the criterion group, that is, if 
                                Sensitivity ( ) ( )1 control groupc cx Pr X x= − ≥   /4/ 
is close to 1. The choice of an appropriate threshold value cx  can be made by means 
of a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (DeLong–DeLong–Clarke-
Pearson [1988]). 
For an optimal cx  value, the ( )cPr X x≥  proportions for the criterion and con-
trol group might differ substantially. Accordingly, cutpoints identified in a CPA will 
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carry diagnostic information for discriminating the two groups. Starting from several 
continuous variables to be used for the group discrimination and then creating one or 
more new dichotomous variables by means of the identified cutpoints, the set of 
these derived variables may serve as predictor variables in a DA or LRA for arriving 
at an efficient discrimination. 
3. Examples 
Example 1. The femininity of applicants to psychology major. In an examination of 
admittance to the Psychology major at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest in 1981, 
the number of males and females were 16m = , and 78n = , respectively. Among these 
94 applicants, 12 males and 70 females filled out a short Hungarian version (including 
300 items) of the California Personality Inventory (SCPI) (Oláh [1985]). One of the 
scales of SCPI is “femininity” (Fem), which informs about the feminine character and 
focus of the interest of the subject. In order to test the validity of this scale, we com-
pared the male and female samples. For testing the equality of theoretical means (the 
sample means were 12.08 for males and 14.00 for females), the two-sample t-test 
( ( )80 2 954t .= , 0 0041p .= ) and the Welch test ( ( )13 2 372W .= , 0 0337p .= ) were 
applied. For examining the stochastic equality of males and females, the Mann–
Whitney test ( 2 339z .= , 0 019p .= ) and the Brunner–Munzel test ( ( )12 2 108BM .= , 
0 0566p .= ) were performed (about stochastic equality, see Vargha– Delaney [1998], 
[2000]). The estimated A measure of stochastic superiority, which assesses the stochas-
tic dominance of males versus females in terms of the Fem scale was 0.29. This shows 
that if we compare two randomly selected male and female persons among the appli-
cants, the chance of having a larger male Fem score is about 0.29, and the chance of 
having a larger female score is about 0.71. 
For a detailed comparison of the two distributions, a cutpoint analysis was per-
formed by means of the group comparison module of ROPstat. The program divides 
the scale of the dependent variable, X into many narrow intervals so that the cut-
points define intervals with as equal proportion of the total sample as is possible, and 
if the number of the different values of X does not exceed 100, each value will be 
placed in the inner part of a separate interval. If the number of different values of X 
exceeds 100, some values of X may fall to the edges of these intervals. The program 
computes the value of the empirical distribution function for the upper limits c of 
these intervals separately for the compared groups (males, ( )1F c  and females, 
F2(c)), and tests their difference at k ≤ 10 different points. In the present example, 
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the program found 10 different values (between 8 and 18), but for the two lowest c 
values (8.05 and 10.05) the pooled cumulative percentage value was less than 0.05, 
and for the largest (18.05) was greater than 0.95. Hence in this case k = 7 and ε = 
0.05. Based on the F1(c) and F2(c) values corresponding to the selected 7 cutpoints, 
the program computes for each c the φ contingency-coefficient measuring the 
strength of association between the grouping variable (in the present case “gender”) 
and the dichotomized dependent variable (in the present case femininity), using ei-
ther the 2x2 chi-square test or the Fisher-exact test with the corresponding unad-
justed and adjusted two-tailed probability values. Due to the relatively small sample 
sizes in the present case, the Fisher-exact test was always performed. The results are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Results from a cutpoint analysis comparing males and females based  
on their California Personality Inventory/femininity level 
(n = 82) 
Detailed point-wise comparison of the two distribution functions 
c F1(c) F2(c) F1–F2 Phi Chi|Fish p-value Adjusted p 
8.05 0.083 0 0.083 0.27    
10.05 0.417 0.029 0.388 0.49 Fisher 0.0005 0.0036*  
11.05 0.500 0.100 0.400 0.39 Fisher 0.0027 0.0191**  
12.05 0.583 0.229 0.355 0.28 Fisher 0.0314 0.2196 
13.05 0.667 0.414 0.252 0.18 Fisher 0.1259 0.8814 
14.05 0.750 0.629 0.121 0.09 Fisher 0.5250 1.0000 
15.05 0.833 0.757 0.076 0.06 Fisher 0.7232 1.0000 
16.05 1.000 0.900 0.100 0.13 Fisher 0.5861 1.0000 
17.05 1.000 0.943 0.057 0.09   
18.05 1.000 1.000   
Note. The significance of phi is tested via chi-square or Fisher-exact test. Tail probability (p) is adjusted by 
means of Bonferroni method. * for 0 05p .< ** stands for p < 0.01;  
To analyze the identity of the two distributions, Kolmogorov–Smirnov’s two-sample test is applied: 
1 280J* .=  ( 0 0754p .= )  
The format of the table follows that of the corresponding computer output of ROPstat with some modifica-
tions.  
Based on the results summarized in Table 1, the most significant difference be-
tween the two genders was obtained for the cutpoint 10 05c .=  (the corresponding 
row in Table 1 is indicated by a bold type face). Below this value (that is in the range 
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0–10) we find 41.7 percent of males and 2.9 percent of females. The difference is 39 
percent, which is highly significant (adjusted 7 0 0005 0 0036p . .= ⋅ ≈ ). It is interest-
ing that the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test shows only a tendency to significance 
( 0 0754p .= ). This weakness of the test is characteristic and is due to the fact that it 
performs a global comparison of two distributions, taking into account every possible 
type of difference, whereas CPA focuses on a small number of potentially informa-
tive cutpoints. 
The psychological explanation of the obtained results may be as follows. The 
femininity of males and females differs from each other mostly in the fact that there 
exists a certain level of minimal femininity ( Fem 10= ), below which we find almost 
exclusively males. Among the females almost everybody (in the present sample 68 
out of 70) shows this minimal level of femininity. Such a strong differentiation, 
however, does not occur at the higher region of the Fem scale, which means that 
there is not a high level of femininity that would mainly be characteristic of females. 
This information is not revealed by standard analyses. 
Example 2. The relationship of birth rank to personality. This study concerns the 
relationship of birth rank to adult personality (Mózes–Vargha [2007]). Studying 
women, we compared first born subjects ( 35m = ) with the rest of the sample 
( 49n = ) in terms of six scales of Parker’s parental bonding instrument (Parker 
[1989], [1990]). Among these six scales we present results concerning father’s care. 
The measure is “retrospective”, meaning that the women reported how they remem-
ber their father cared for them during their first 16 years. 
Table 2 
Comparison of first born and other women’s responses to the father’s care scale 
 in the parental bonding instrument 
(n = 84) 
Group  Size Mean SD Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
First born women 35 23.17 11.44 0 36 –0.829* –0.428 
Other women 49 21.96 8.075 3 34 –0.651+ –0.508 
Note. Dependent variable is father’s care. The significant skewness indicated non-normality. + stands for 
0 10p .< ; * for 0 05p .< . 
Testing the equality of population variances: 1. O’Brien test (Welch type): ( )1 0; 45 6 4 851F . . .=  
( 0 0327p .= ); 2. Levene test (Welch type): ( )1; 55 4 3 645F . .=  ( 0 0614p .= ).  
Testing the equality of population means: 1. Two-sample t test: ( )82 0 570t .=  ( 0 5704p .= ); 2. Welch’s 
modified t test: ( )57 4 0 538W . .=  ( 0 5924p .= ). 
The format of the table follows that of the corresponding computer output of ROPstat with some modifications.  
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For testing the equality of theoretical means, two-sample t-tests were applied but 
none of them indicated any significant difference between the two groups. (See Ta-
ble 2.) Nonparametric rank tests comparing the two groups were also far from being 
significant ( 0 20p .> ). However, in the present case, both the normality assumption 
and the variance homogeneity assumption are violated. On the one hand, this may 
invalidate the two-sample t-tests, on the other hand, it raises the possibility that some 
other types of differences may appear using CPA. The results of this analysis are 
summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Results from CPA comparing first born and other women in terms  
of the father’s care scale in the parental bonding instrument 
(n = 84) 
Detailed point-wise comparison of the two distribution functions 
c F1(c) F2(c) F1–F2 Phi Chi|Fish p-value Adjusted p 
0.18 0.057 0.000 0.057 0.18    
1.26 0.086 0.000 0.086 0.23    
3.06 0.114 0.020 0.094 0.20    
5.22 0.143 0.041 0.102 0.18 Fisher 0.1223 1.0000 
6.30 0.171 0.041 0.131 0.22    
7.02 0.171 0.061 0.110 0.18    
8.10 0.171 0.082 0.090 0.14    
9.18 0.171 0.102 0.069 0.10    
10.26 0.171 0.122 0.049 0.07    
11.34 0.171 0.143 0.029 0.04    
12.06 0.171 0.163 0.008 0.01    
13.14 0.200 0.184 0.016 0.02 Fisher 1.0000 1.0000 
14.22 0.229 0.224 0.004 0.00    
16.02 0.229 0.245 –0.016 –0.02    
18.18 0.257 0.306 –0.049 –0.05 Fisher 0.8069 1.0000 
19.26 0.286 0.347 –0.061 –0.06    
20.34 0.314 0.367 –0.053 –0.06    
21.06 0.343 0.388 –0.045 –0.05 Fisher 0.8191 1.0000 
22.14 0.371 0.449 –0.078 –0.08    
23.22 0.429 0.510 –0.082 –0.08 Fisher 0.5112 1.0000 
24.30 0.486 0.510 –0.024 –0.02    
25.02 0.514 0.612 –0.098 –0.10 Fisher 0.3826 1.0000 
26.10 0.514 0.633 –0.118 –0.12    
(Continued on the next page.) 
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(Continuation.) 
Detailed point-wise comparison of the two distribution functions 
c F1(c) F2(c) F1–F2 Phi Chi|Fish p-value Adjusted p 
27.18 0.600 0,673 –0.073 –0.08 Fisher 0.4993 1.0000 
28.26 0.629 0.776 –0.147 –0.16 Fisher 0.1522 1.0000 
29.34 0.629 0.816 –0.188 –0.21    
30.06 0.629 0.857 –0.229 –0.26 Fisher 0.0202 0.2017 
31.14 0.657 0.939 –0.282 –0.36    
32.22 0.714 0.959 –0.245 –0.35    
33.30 0.714 0.980 –0.265 –0.39 Fisher 0.0005 0.0051** 
34.02 0.914 1.000 –0.086 –0.23    
36.18 1.000 1.000      
Note. To test the identity of the two distributions, Kolmogorov-Smirnov's two-sample test was applied: 
( )1 273J* .=  ( 0 0784p .= ). 
The format of the table follows that of the corresponding computer output of ROPstat with some modifica-
tions.  
F1 refers to the distribution function for first born women and F2 to the corresponding function for other 
women. + stands for 0 10p .< ; * for 0 05p .< , and ** for 0 01p .< . 
In our case the best discriminating point is 33 30c .=  (the corresponding row in 
Table 3 is indicated by a bold type face). A lower value, that is, 33X ≤  occurred for 
71.4 percent (25 out of 35) of first born women, and 98 percent (48 out of 49) of 
other women. These two proportions differ from each other significantly (the two-
tailed probability of the Fisher-exact test is 0 0005p .= ). This is highly significant 
even after performing the Bonferroni adjustment ( 0 005adjp .= ). Accordingly, we 
can claim that first born women are significantly more likely (in the present sample 
the chance is 28.6 percent) to report an extreme high level ( 33X > ) of father’s care 
as compared to other women (in this latter sample the chance is 2 percent). The con-
clusion is that a very high level of experienced father’s care is almost only found 
among first born women. 
Example 3. Discrimination of psychotic and normal women by means of psychiat-
ric rating scales. In the framework of a longitudinal study launched in 1967, 230 
psychotic and 41 mentally normal women were investigated by means of Overall’s 
[1968] factor construct rating scale (FCRS) and Rockland and Pollin’s [1965] ques-
tionnaire (RPQ) for psychiatric rating (Pethő [2001]). In the current analysis we used 
17 elementary scales of FCRS (F1, ..., F17) and 34 elementary scales of RPQ (R1, 
..., R33, R35). A value of zero on these scales reflects the lack of some psychiatric 
symptom, and values close to the maximum show the strong presence of a symptom. 
Preliminary analyses indicated that several of the scales were non-normally distrib-
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uted. For these variables we addressed the following question concerning the dis-
crimination of psychotic and normal subjects: If we dichotomize the continuous vari-
ables, using cutpoints identified by a CPA, and then perform DA and LRA, will we 
arrive at a better group discrimination as compared to conventional analyses based 
on the continuous variables? The following statistical analyses were undertaken: 
1. First a CPA was carried out for all continuous variables. In the 
subsequent analyses we retained only those for which the CPA re-
vealed at least one significant cutpoint. For these scales we performed 
a dichotomization at the cutpoint that had the lowest p-value. These 
scales were as follows: F1–F14, F16, F17, R1–R5, R9, R11–R16, R18, 
R20–R23, R25–R30, and R33, altogether 40 variables. 
2. Subsequently, we performed stepwise DA and LRA with first the 
original 51 continuous variables, then with the 40 dichotomized variables 
to predict group membership. The results are summarized in Table 4.  
Table 4 
Percentage of correct identifications in stepwise discriminant analyses  
and binary logistic regression analyses for the factor construct rating scale  
and Rockland and Pollin’s questionnaire scales in original and dichotomized form 
Group 
Discriminant  







analyses with original 
variables 
Logistic regression 
analyses with  
dichotomized  
variables 
Psychotic (n = 230) (percent) 78.7 87.0 95.7 95.7 
Normal (n = 41) (percent) 92.7 100.0 82.9 85.4 
Total (percent) 80.8 88.9 93.7 94.1 
Number of selected variables 11 7 10 8 
Based on Table 4 we can draw the following conclusions. 
1. Using non-normal independent variables in DA may lead to sub-
stantially weaker discrimination than LRA. 
2. Using derived dichotomized variables may lead to surprisingly 
good results parallel to those found using the original variables, and 
CPA can be an efficient tool for identifying appropriate cutpoints for 
the dichotomization. As an example, we obtained 88.9 percent correct 
identification percentage in DA with 7 selected dichotomous variables, 
compared to 80.8 percent with 11 original variables. 
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3. Also in LRA the dichotomized variables performed well (with 8 
variables resulting in 94.1 percent correct classifications, as likened to us-
ing 10 original variables resulting in 93.7 percent correct classifications). 
4. Summary and conclusion 
It is an almost trivial observation that in statistical analyses the researcher should 
normally use all the relevant information in the data. In the literature there are many 
arguments against the habit of dichotomizing continuous variables, which is usually 
performed for the purpose of simplifying the analyses and presentation or for han-
dling interactions. This attitude is seen in its most extreme form in an editorial in the 
Journal of Consumer Research, entitled “Death to Dichotomizing” (Fitzsimons 
[2008]).  
The warnings against dichotomization are often good advice but the arguments 
build on assumptions of normality and linearity (for example Cohen [1983], Max-
well–Delaney [1993]). If these assumptions are valid, the argument against dichoto-
mization seems solid, however, frequently psychological variables do not follow the 
normal distribution (Micceri [1989]) and the relationships might not be linear. In 
such situations it is possible that the arguments against dichotomization of a continu-
ous variable break down. For instance, take the case of studying the relationship be-
tween one continuous independent variable, regarded as the risk factor, and one con-
tinuous dependent variable, regarded as the outcome. Theoretically, it is possible that 
there is a threshold effect in the independent variable so that there is no risk increase 
for a bad outcome below a certain level of the value in the risk factor but then, sud-
denly, a strong increase in the risk occurs. Or it is possible that the outcome is really 
generated by a normal mixture model with a relationship between the risk factor and 
the distribution membership.  
Within the context discussed formerly, we examined two analytical situations 
where dichotomization may be appropriate. The first one concerned the study of the 
relationship between a dichotomous grouping variable, regarded as the independent 
variable, and a continuous variable, considered as the dependent variable. We de-
vised a dichotomization method, cutpoint analysis, in which a limited number of cut-
points (usually not exceeding 10) in the dependent variable distribution are used for 
different dichotomizations, selecting the one that maximizes the association between 
the independent variable and the dependent variable. In two empirical examples, one 
concerning gender and femininity and the other regarding birth rank and personality, 
the results indicated significant relationships not revealed by standard analyses. 
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These findings were partly explained by clear departure from normality in the de-
pendent variable and by the fact that the relationship had a different form in different 
regions of the variables.  
The second analytical situation that we discussed and where dichotomization may 
be appropriate concerned the discrimination between two groups by identifying an 
optimal cutpoint in one or more continuous variables, treated as the predictor(s). 
CPA can then be used to find an optimal dichotomization of the continuous vari-
able(s) in the sense that the prediction of group membership is maximized. In a third 
empirical example, CPA was used for dichotomizing a number of psychiatric rating 
scales that were used in DA or LRA. This resulted in a higher or at least as high dis-
crimination power between psychotic and normal women as was achieved using the 
original continuous variables. It appears that, for discrimination purposes, the essen-
tial information in the scales was largely binary, of qualitative nature.  
DeCoster, Iselin, and Gallucci [2009] revealed also several situations in which 
the use of dichotomization is appropriate. Specifically, they argue that it is accept-
able for researchers to use dichotomized indicators in the following circumstances: 
1. The study uses extreme group analysis. 
2. The purpose of the research is to investigate how a dichotomized 
measure will perform in the field. 
3. The underlying variable is naturally categorical, the observed 
measure has high reliability, and the relative group sizes of the di-
chotomized indicator match those of the underlying variable. 
CPA is similar to the search for an “optimal cutpoint” in biostatistics. A common 
aim in biomedical research is to investigate whether a certain continuous variable 
(regarded as covariate) has potentially prognostic relevance for a time outcome de-
pendent variable like survival. The optimal cutpoint is that value of the covariate, 
which corresponds to the most significant relationship between the covariate di-
chotomized at this cutpoint and the dichotomous outcome variable (Heinzl–Tempfer 
[2001]). Since the term “optimal” may give the false impression that this method is 
superior to other ones, Altman, Lausen, Sauerbrei, and Schumacher [1994] suggested 
that the method be called the “minimum P-value approach”. When using this 
method, some researchers are ready to ignore the multiple testing and alpha inflation 
problems since their decisions are based on the unadjusted p-value of the “optimal” 
cutpoint. This practice may lead to inconsistent results in medical prognostic re-
search (Heinzl–Tempfer [2001]). In contrast, CPA is protected against alpha inflation 
by performing only a limited number of two-group comparison tests ( 10≤ ) of scat-
tered cutpoints and by applying a Bonferroni adjustment to the p-values of the se-
lected cutpoints. 
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For  comparing  two survival  curves, the most common statistical test is the 
logrank test. This is a type of chi-square test, asymptotically equivalent to the 
likelihood ratio test, which is based on observed and expected frequencies of a 
certain time event belonging to different time points of the two survival curves 
(Bland–Altman [2004], Mantel [1966], Schoenfeld [1981]). The need for applying 
some adjustment on the p-values of repeated logrank tests is now increasingly 
recognized (Altman et al. [1994], Heinzl–Tempfer [2001], Williams et al. [2006]). 
Such an adjustment can be achieved by the following formula for an adjustment of 
the minimal P-value ( minp ) valid for large sample sizes, to allow for the multiple 
testing thanks to Lausen and Schumacher ([1992], [1996]), Miller and Siegmund 
[1982], and Heinzl [2000]: 






P z z ln .
z z
⎛ ⎞− ϕ⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟= ϕ − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 /5/ 
Here corP  denotes the adjusted (corrected) minimum P-value of the logrank sta-
tistic, φ is the standard normal density, z is the ( )1 2minP⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦ -quantile of the stan-
dard normal distribution and ε is defined as follows. The minimum P-value approach 
requires the choice of a selection interval. It is defined by the ε and ( )1 ε− -quantile 
of the observed values of the continuous covariate ( )0 ε 0 5.< < . Values outside the 
selection interval are not considered as potential cutpoints. In CPA we also seek po-
tential cutpoints between εC  and 1 εC −  percentiles, so the meaning of ε in CPA is the 
same. 
By means of formula /5/, we compared the power of the above adjustment rule 
for ε 0 01.= , 0.05 and 0.10 with CPA for a set of different nominal p-values, allow-
ing for as many as 10 cutpoints ( 10k = ) in CPA. Results summarized in Table 5 
show that CPA is much more efficient in detecting possible differences of the two 
distributions to be compared than the one defined by formula /5/. This is reflected 
by the fact that the corP  values are substantially higher – in most cases more than 
twice as large – than the corresponding adjP  values of CPA for unadjusted alpha 
values less than 0.05. Due to this, the cutpoints of CPA can be more easily signifi-
cant despite their strictly controlled Type I error level. However, we agree with 
Heinzl and Tempfer [2001] that without any biological (clinical, psychological, 
etc.) indications for the actual existence of a cutpoint even the correct application 
of the minimum P-value approach as well as CPA has to be considered methodol-
ogically questionable. 
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Table 5 
Comparison of three corrected p-values and the adjusted p-value of CPA based  
on the Bonferroni method for different unadjusted nominal p-values 
Unadjusted p-value ( )ε 0 01corP .=  ( )ε 0 05corP .=  ( )ε 0 10corP .=  ( )10corP k =  
0.10 1.0000 0.8806 0.7208 1.0000 
0.05 0.8980 0.6183 0.4916 0.5000 
0.01 0.3132 0.2087 0.1615 0.1000 
0.005 0.1859 0.1231 0.0946 0.0500 
0.001 0.0509 0.0334 0.0255 0.0100 
0.0005 0.0285 0.0186 0.0142 0.0050 
0.0001 0.0071 0.0046 0.0035 0.0010 
Note. P-values are based on based on formula /5/ ( corP  with ε 0 01.= , 0.05, and 0.10). 
A special type of the minimum P-value approach is the following method. Two 
groups are compared by means of a quantitative variable the same way as in CPA, 
looking for an “optimal” cutpoint. In this approach a cutpoint is regarded as optimal 
if the usual chi-square statistic computed from a 2×2 table based on the frequencies 
below and above the cutpoint in the two groups is maximal. Miller and Siegmund 
[1982] investigated the asymptotic distribution of this maximally selected chi-square 
statistic and provided tail probabilities and critical values for its significance for dif-
ferent nominal alpha levels and selection interval defined by ε and ( )1 ε−  the same 
way as mentioned formerly (see Tables 1 and 2 in Miller–Siegmund [1982]). Since 
the computation of these values is built on the same formula (see formula /8/ in 
Miller–Siegmund [1982] that appears in /5/), the superiority of CPA over this ap-
proach in terms of power still remains. With the same method, Koziol [1991] pro-
vided better critical values and tail probabilities based on the exact finite-sample dis-
tribution theory, Betensky and Rabinowitz [1999] generalized the asymptotic distri-
bution of the maximally selected chi-square statistic for the multi-group case, and 
Boulesteix [2006] generalized the results of Koziol to any ordinally scaled dependent 
variable in the two-group-comparison case. 
The corP  corrected p-values of the minimum P-value approach refer to the sig-
nificance of the most significant cutpoint that discriminates the two groups based on 
the continuous dependent variable, whereas the adjP  adjusted p-values of the CPA 
approach refer to the significance of all k cutpoints identified in CPA. As we could 
see formerly, in the practically relevant cases, when the corrected/adjusted p values 
are close to significance (this is true when the unadjusted p-values are less than or 
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equal to 0.01; see Table 5), the adjusted p-values of CPA are always substantially 
smaller than those of the corrected p-values of the minimum P-value approach and 
for this reason they can detect differences between the two distributions to be com-
pared with a higher efficiency. This is completely true for dependent variables where 
the number of different values do not exceed 10 (in this case CPA compares the two 
distributions with all possible cutpoints). However, if the dependent variable is really 
continuous and has large many different values, it may well happen that the selected 
set of cutpoints in CPA does not include the value of the dependent variable which 
discriminates most significantly the two groups (distributions). To have some infor-
mation about how often this unlucky situation may arise, we carried out the follow-
ing empirical investigation. 
From an archival data set including 811 Rorschach-protocols that served as the 
basis for the construction of the Hungarian Rorschach Standard (Vargha [1989]), we 
selected 236 quantitative variables of elementary Rorschach scores and computed in-
dices. The elementary scores were relative frequencies of different Rorschach re-
sponses (referring to the location, determinant, content category, popularity, or origi-
nality of the response, etc.). These relative frequencies were computed by dividing 
the number of occurrences of different Rorschach-items with the number of total re-
sponse number. As an example, the value of the Anat% Rorschach-variable was ob-
tained for a specific person by dividing the number of anatomical responses occur-
ring in the protocol by the total number of responses. More than 70 percent of these 
Rorschach-variables was practically continuous, having more than 10 different val-
ues. Out of the 811 protocols, 363 originated from mentally normal persons (MN), 
while the other 448 from institutionalized non-psychotic patients (INP).  
In order to assess merits and weaknesses of CPA, the two groups (MN and INP) 
were compared for each of the 236 Rorschach-variables:  
1. performing a CPA (with parameters 10k =  and ε 0 01.= );  
2. identifying the best discriminating point, that is the cutpoint 
within the middle ( )ε; 1 ε−  part of the scale of the dependent variable 
for which the tail probability of a 2×2 chi-square test (or the two-sided 
p-value of the Fisher-exact test if the minimal expected cell frequency 
in the 2×2 table does not exceed 20) is the smallest;  
3. performing the Kolmogorov–Smirnov two-sample test for a 
global comparison of the two distributions. 
The results of the performed analyses can be summarized as follows. 
4. For 157 out of the 236 dependent variables there were more then 
10 different values within the middle ( )ε; 1 ε−  part of the scale of the 
dependent variable. Out of these 157 variables, the smallest adjusted 
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P-value was less than or equal to 0.10 for 68 variables, and in 53 cases 
(78%) out of the 68 variables the mostly significant cutpoint was iden-
tical with the CPA cutpoint for which the tail probability of the 2×2 
chi-square test was minimal. This means that the set of the k cutpoints 
of CPA contained the best discriminating point of the dependent vari-
able in the large majority of cases. However, if one wants to decrease 
the risk of missing a relevant cutpoint, the value of k can be increased 
even above 10. Based on data of Table 5, one can conclude that even 
an increase by 50 per cent can keep the advantage of the CPA method 
over the alternative methods (for example maximizing chi-square). 
5. For a comparison of the efficiencies of CPA and the Kolmo-
gorov–Smirnov two-sample test, we cross-tabulated the significances 
of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test and the most significant cutpoint (ad-
justed probability) of CPA for the 236 Rorschach-variables. (See Table 
6.) From Table 6 it seems to be evident that CPA highly outperforms 
the Kolmogorov–Smirnov in terms of power. It occurred only four 
times out of 236 cases that the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test was signifi-
cant (3 times at 10 per cent and once at 5 per cent level), but the CPA 
was not, whereas the opposite situation occurred in 38 cases. In addi-
tion, in 31 (out of the 38) cases, the CPA was significant at least two 
levels stronger than the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (the opposite situa-
tion never occurred)  
Table 6 
Cross-tabulation of the significances of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test and the most significant cutpoint  
of the cutpoint analysis for 236 different quantitative Rorschach variables 
CP Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test  0 10p .>  0 10p .<  0 05p .<  0 01p .<  0 001p .<  Total 
0 10p .>  137 18 12 5 3 175 
0 10p .<  3 7 2 5 0 17 
0 05p .<  0 1 6 7 6 20 
0 01p .<  0 0 0 6 5 11 
0 001p .<  0 0 0 0 13 13 
Total  140 26 20 23 27 236 
CPA can be regarded as a multiple test like post-hoc analyses in ANOVA. The k 
cutpoints are selected based on the distributional characteristics of the pooled sam-
A METHOD TO MAXIMIZE THE INFORMATION OF A CONTINUOUS VARIABLE 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
119 
ple, independently from the differences between the two groups. The application of 
the well-known Bonferroni method guaranties that if any of the cutpoints is signifi-
cant at an adjusted alpha level, then the probability of Type I error (of the null hy-
pothesis of the equality of the two distributions binarized in this cutpoint) will not 
exceed α. Hence, if any cutpoint of CPA is significant, the two distributions can con-
fidently be declared different from each other. Since CPA gave significant results in 
many more cases than the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, it seems in this context to be 
more appropriate for detecting differences. It is also important to add that CPA not 
only detects efficiently the inequality of the two distributions but identifies also the 
cutpoints where the differences are most salient. 
It should be noted that if the same data set is used both to dichotomize variables 
by CPA and to estimate a regression model with the dichotomized variables as pre-
dictors, the corresponding regression coefficients will obviously be biased. In such 
cases we suggest that, if the sample size is large enough, a portion (say 2/3 of the 
sample) be used for exploration and the rest for the verification of the model. If the 
sample is relatively small, the results of CPA need confirmation in an independent 
study. We assert, however, that, at a minimum, CPA is a simple but effective way of 
deriving hypotheses to be confirmed in future studies. 
To sum up, CPA is a new technique and software for finding efficiently truly sig-
nificant dichotomizing points in a quantitative variable that maximizes the associa-
tion to another dichotomous variable, which might otherwise be hidden if one were 
to use conventional statistical approaches. 
In the present article, only two special cases were treated but we believe that the 
reasoning employed merits consideration also in other ones. The most obvious exten-
sions are to the case where the grouping variable is not dichotomous and to the one 
where the relationship is studied between two variables while controlling for a third. 
ROPstat can handle the multigroup case of CPA whose nice empirical illustration 
can be found in Borbély–Vargha [2010]. 
Appendix 
The description of the computer program 
We implemented CPA in the group comparison module of ROPstat, a new statistical program 
package. It is a user-friendly statistical software that is rich in robust techniques and procedures 
with ordinally scaled variables, and includes a number of procedures for pattern and person ori-
ented analysis. 
Its free demo version can be downloaded from the site www.ropstat.com by clicking on the text 
“Download and test DEMO version in English”. A description of the package can also be found 
there. A CPA is carried out in the following way. 
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1. Run the downloaded setup program of ROPstat. As a result, a folder called 
“c:\_vargha\ropstat” will be created and a program called “ropstat.exe” will be in-
stalled in it. 
2. Run ropstat.exe. 
3. Open an input data file by means of icon “Open”. ROPstat has a special op-
tion accepting SPSS portable files imported from SPSS in *.por format and tab-
delimited files imported from Excel in *.txt format. The DEMO version of ROP-
stat accepts at most 5 variables and 500 cases but otherwise performs complete 
statistical analyses. 
4. After loading a data file, click on the menu point “Statistical analyses”, and 
within it the submenu points “Comparing groups or variables” and “One-way 
comparison of independent samples”. 
5. In the appearing program window, put the given continuous variable (X) 
from the list of variables to the box of “Dependent variables”, and a grouping vari-
able having two code values (or defined by two intervals in the variable character-
istics window of the data sheet) to the box of “Grouping variable”. 
6. In the box of “Scale type”’, change the scale type of the dependent variable 
from “interval” to “ordinal”, and change the option of “Detailed comparison of 
distributions” in this program window from “No” to “Yes”. 
7. When you click on the icon “Run” in the bottom of the program window, a 
list of the following results will appear in a text window: 
a) Nonparametric group comparison with the classical Mann–Whitney test. 
b) Two robust alternatives of the Mann–Whitney test (Brunner–Munzel and 
corrected Fligner–Policello tests). 
c) Detailed point-wise comparison of the two distributions (CPA). The two 
groups are compared by a 2×2 chi-square test if the minimal expected cell fre-
quency exceeds 20, otherwise by the Fisher-exact test. Here 
( )10, number of different values of k min X= . 
d) Kolmogorov–Smirnov’s two-sample test for a global comparison of the two 
distributions. 
8. In the CPA part of the output, the rightmost column with the header “Ad-
justed p” will contain the adjusted p values for the point-wise comparisons. If such 
a p value is less than 0.05, the corresponding score of the test variable can be re-
garded as a significant cutpoint. 
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Hungary’s government debt and its sustainability is a 
current issue from many different aspects. Applying debt-
dynamic analyses, in the first part of this paper, the author 
examines what periods the last twelve years can be split 
into with regard to economic policy. His most important 
conclusion is that in spite of the similar rate of increase in 
the gross debt of the general government as a proportion 
of GDP in the periods from 2002 to 2006 and from 2007 
to 2010, the reasons are markedly different. After that, 
from the several tests of debt sustainability, he makes first 
an analysis based on fiscal reaction function, at the aid of 
which tries to quantify the correction mechanisms of the 
Hungarian economic policy in the last two decades and to 
compare them with international examples. There are 
several reasons for the analysis of the difference between 
the real interest and the real growth rate. On the one hand, 
it shows that Hungary’s government debt left the sustain-
able path in 2001/2002. On the other hand, according to 
its estimations on the primary gap, with the difference be-
tween the real interest and the real growth rate unchanged, 
the general government deficit of around 4 percent of 
GDP, typical in the past few years, may be enough to sta-
bilise the debt ratio. However, in order to reduce the gross 
government debt to GDP ratio below 60 percent within 
the next 5–10 years, the balance has to be improved by 1 
or 2 percentage points. 
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The world economic crisis and especially the related financing crisis proved the 
extraordinary problems caused by indebtedness if there is no more trust and sources 
on the money market dry up. Although the reasons are rather various,1 it is still true 
that a lot of countries – that no one had supposed before the crisis to do so – an-
nounced that they were unable to finance their economy from the market. Hungary 
became one of the first members of this group, which in itself is a reason for the 
scrutiny of the issue. However, this is not the only such factor. Among our competi-
tors in the region, the gross government debt ratio to GDP (hereafter: debt ratio) is 
the highest in Hungary, and this is also true for the twenty years since the change of 
regime. Through interest payments this means a heavy burden on the general gov-
ernment, pressure for the withdrawal of sources with regard to the economy, and en-
hances the vulnerability of the country, which may lead to a financing crisis – as ob-
served in autumn 2008. 
The papers devoted to the issue and published to date can be classified into two 
groups. A part of them endeavoured to explore the specific features of budget policy. 
Karsai [2006] was among the first to draw attention to the parallel movement of budget 
and election cycles, which has since become an axiom in professional and public dis-
cussions. Ohnsorge-Szabó and Romhányi [2007] tried to point out the role played by 
the different items of expenditure in the budget expansion between 2000 and 2006. 
Orbán and Szapáry [2006] outlined frightfully accurately half a decade ago the dangers 
threatening the Hungarian economy from the side of fiscal policy. The different ap-
proaches contributed significantly to the exploration of the problem. Győrffy [2005] 
examined deficit budgeting from the point of view of the institutional system, while 
Muraközy [2008] drew attention to the effects of heritage from the past. 
As for this study, however, the other group of the published papers – which may be 
narrower than the previous one – is more important and it examined budget policy 
through government debt and (also) its sustainability2. Out of them the work of Czeti–
Hoffmann [2006] is worth to be highlighted, since they were among the first who en-
deavoured to apply debt dynamics tools to explore what factors contributed to the change 
of Hungary’s gross government debt between 1995 and 2005 and to what extent. The ar-
ticle published by Pápa and Valentinyi [2008] is notable from different aspects. On the 
one hand, it very concisely summarizes the results of former researches, on the other 
  
1 See for example the writing of Obstfeld–Rogoff [2009] or Stein [2011]. 
2 The expression „sustainability of government debt”, widely spread in the literature, actually refers to the 
sustainability of indebtedness. The related researches (also) examine whether or not a certain level of indebted-
ness can be considered sustainable based on different aspects. 
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hand, in addition to drawing attention to the difficulties of analyses of sustainability, it 
suggests by means of some relatively simple methods also applicable in practice that 
there may be serious problems concerning the sustainability of Hungary’s government 
debt. The article of Ábel and Kóbor [2011] was already made after the crisis, and they 
examined first of all the role of uncertainty in the change of government debt and in the 
light of this, the aspects worth to be kept in mind if economic policy decision-makers 
wish to set an upper limit for government debt as a proportion of GDP. 
A common feature of the formerly mentioned three works is that each of them in-
cludes debt dynamics analysis, however, in the latter two papers the authors made 
only a brief account – in a few lines – of the methodology and the results. After pre-
senting in short the theories of government debt, we endeavour to make up this defi-
ciency in the second part of our study. By disaggregating the change of government 
debt, we look for an answer to what uniform sections the past twelve years can be 
split into as regards economic policy. In the next part the most widespread methods 
for studying the sustainability of government debt are considered, starting with the 
analysis based on reaction function, passing over to the different examinations rely-
ing on the difference between the real interest and the real growth rate. Each of these 
aims on the one hand at evaluating past processes regarding sustainability and on the 
other hand at trying to draw conclusions relevant for the future too. 
1. Sustainable government debt 
A very up-to-date dimension3 of the researches on government debt examines sus-
tainability, and therefore is interwoven with the issue of fiscal sustainability. However, 
before the accurate definition of this latter term it should be underlined that the sustain-
ability of budget is determined by future budget policy, thus, sustainability in the nar-
rower sense of the word is not measurable (Pápa–Valentinyi [2008]). 
The many different definitions of fiscal sustainability are built on the concept of 
solvency. This is most often referred to by economists as the capacity of government to 
be always able to meet current obligations of repayment, without a request for resched-
uling or any other similar external aid (Burnside [2005]). On this basis there is a rela-
tive professional consensus on the definition according to which a budget policy is sus-
tainable if it does not threaten the solvency of the country in the future either (Croce–
Juan-Ramon [2003]). However, a more detailed description is given by Agnello and 
Sousa [2009], who underline in addition that a budget deficit, which very often accom-
  
3 See Török [2011]. 
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panies unsustainable government debt, threatens the welfare state, since it firstly hin-
ders the efficient allocation of resources, secondly affects sensitively the next genera-
tion through growing government debt, thirdly increases inflation and its volatility. The 
approach made by De Castro and De Cos [2002] is also related to the possible threats, 
and they drew attention to unsustainable fiscal policy sooner or later leading to the rise 
of interest rates, which in turn hinders economic growth (see Reinhart–Rogoff [2010] 
and Presbitero [2010]). The presented definitions and descriptions are summarised 
probably in the best way by Buiter [2004], who classifies the consequences of unsus-
tainable fiscal policy into three groups: 1. the state can spend less money and has to 
collect more taxes than planned earlier on, 2. the threat of inflation, and 3. the threat of 
sovereign default grow. In connection with the sustainability of debt, the concept of 
budget limit also occurs frequently (see Buiter [1985] or Blanchard [1990]), according 
to which the present value of revenues to be realized in the future should be equal to 
the present value of the public debt. It is important to see, however, that in itself it is 
not a condition of sustainability, since it is met in case of a later adjustment too. Never-
theless, sustainability prevails exactly if present processes do not lead to insolvency 
even without intervention. Namely, if a budget policy is not sustainable, then the ques-
tion is not whether it will be broken but in what way. The state will either implement 
the correction on its own or the market will do that for it. 
2. Debt dynamics analysis 
To judge the sustainability of an economic process and to select the most sustain-
able path of the possible scenarios, it is indispensable to explore and scrutinise connec-
tions. In the case of government debt4, this (also) means that the examination of the 
past period must be an integral part of the analysis. If one can quantify and through this 
understand what factors and to what extent influenced government debt, and what are 
the most marked characteristics of these processes, then one can draw relevant conclu-
sions. Accordingly, we first give a general outline of government debt, the main trends 
and characteristics thereof. Following this, after the selection and summary of the ap-
propriate methodology, we examine processes concerning debt dynamics, that is, dis-
aggregate the contribution of the different factors to the change of government debt. 
At the time of the change of regime, at the end of 1990, Hungary’s government 
debt relative to GDP was 66.2 percent. According to official data, the proportion of li-
abilities accounted for in foreign exchanges was negligible within this, but their role 
  
4 In the following, consolidated gross government debt accounted for according to the methodology of ESA 
is meant by government debt. 
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was actually significant already at the time. Namely, at the beginning of the nineties 
the costs of indebtedness in foreign exchanges along with unlimited financing by the 
central bank were not recorded directly in the budget, “only” worsened the profit of the 
National Bank of Hungary (NBH), therefore the comparability of data is ensured only 
for the period after the debt transformation implemented at the end of 1996 (Barabás–
Hamecz–Neményi [1998]). As for liabilities, the first section is clearly the period be-
tween 1990 and 1995: the debt ratio then rose by over 20 percentage points. After the 
budget adjustment announced in 1995 the debt ratio decreased continuously for six 
years, and reached a low in 2001 at 52.2 percent. In parallel, the proportion of foreign 
exchange debt recorded in budget accounts soared, which is due to the separation of di-
rect public financing from the central bank in line with EU requirements, in other 
words, government debt was changed. 



























































Gross government debt as a proportion of GDP grew continuously from 2002, 
and reached 80.2 percent in the last year of the examined period.5 Though the pro-
portion of foreign exchange debt within this hardly changed in the first half of the 
decade, varying between 25 and 30 percent, it increased to almost two-fold in the last 
three years examined. The main reason for this is that as an impact of the financial 
crisis the Hungarian state was not able to satisfy the financing needs of general gov-
ernment from the market, thus it had to take up foreign exchange loans from the triad 
of the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the World Bank. 
  
5 The period examined by the study lasts until 31 December 2010, so the use of wealth in private pension 
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Since the change of regime, the structure of the debt stock has also been trans-
formed. In the middle of the nineties the proportion of loans was over 65 percent, 
while their share gradually fell to 10 percent by 2007. Parallelly, the role of securi-
ties, typically government bonds, increased. Within the issued securities, it was 
solely the value of long-term government bonds that grew, which indicates that with 
market economy evolving – in crisis-free periods – the Hungarian state can have 
longer-term liabilities. This is also apparent from the combined proportion of short-
term loans and securities not exceeding 20 percent of total government debt in any of 
the last twenty years. The role of loans increased again in the last three years, and as 
an effect of borrowings from international financial organisations, their proportion 
within total debt stock reached again 28 percent by the end of the examined period.6 
The point of debt dynamics analyses is to decompose the effect of the different fac-
tors on the change of government debt according to the methodology chosen in line 
with the aim of the examination. Hereinafter we will follow the methodology also ap-
plied by Ra–Rhee [2005]. For this, one first has to state the general formula of nominal 
debt, separating liabilities in HUF and in foreign exchanges. 
                     ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 11 1 1 εt t t – t – t – t t – tD PB id ID ix XD OD ,= − + + + + + +   /1/ 
where  
tD  – gross government debt in HUF at the end of period t; 
tPB  – primary balance of general government in period t, not in-
cluding interest payments; 
1t –ID  – government debt in HUF at the end of period 1t − ; 
1t –XD  – government debt in foreign exchanges at the end of period 
1t − ; 
1t –id  – interest rate on government debt in HUF in period 1t − ; 
1t –ix  – interest rate on government debt in foreign exchanges in pe-
riod 1t − ; 
εt  – nominal depreciation at the end of period t; 
tOD  – other items (such as privatisation) in period t. 
Let us suppose that 1t –a  is the proportion of government debt recorded in foreign 
exchanges within total government debt in period 1t − . In this case one can state for 
the interest rate that 
  
6 For more on Hungary’s government debt see the works of Antal [2006]; Muraközy [2004]; Mellár [1997], 
[2002]; Kun [1996], and Czike [2010]. 
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                                ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1t – t – t – t – t –i id – a ix a+ = + + + , /2/ 
where it-1 – interest rate on government debt in period 1t − ; 
Accordingly, government debt may also be given in a simplified form, and it is 
worth to further transform it: 
           ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 εt t t – t – t – t – t t – t – tD PB id – a D ix a D OD ,= − + + + + + +  /3/ 
             ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 εt t t – t – t – t t – t – tD PB id – a ix a D OD ,⎡ ⎤= − + + + + + +⎣ ⎦   /4/ 
  ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 εt t t – t – t – t – t – t t – t – tD PB id – a ix a ix a D OD ,⎡ ⎤= − + + + + + + +⎣ ⎦   /5/ 
                            ( ) ( )1 1 1 11 1 εt t t – t – t t – t – tD PB i ix a D OD .⎡ ⎤= − + + + + +⎣ ⎦   /6/ 
After this let us divide the equation with nominal GDP in period t ( tY ), while 
marking debt relative to GDP, the primary balance and other items by d, pb and od 
respectively. 
                           ( ) ( ) 1 11 1 1
1
1 1 ε t – t –t t t – t – t t – t
t – t
D Y
d pb i ix a od
Y Y
⎡ ⎤= − + + + + +⎣ ⎦  ,   /7/ 
                           ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 11 1 ε t –t t t – t – t t – t – t
t
Y
d pb i ix a d od
Y
⎡ ⎤= − + + + + +⎣ ⎦  . /8/ 




 growth by a new formula: 
( )( )
1
1 1 πt tg+ +
, where g is 
real growth rate, and π is inflation. After this, debt can be broken down in the follow-
ing manner: 
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+ + +
= − + +
+ +
   /9/ 
To quantify the change let us deduct debt in period t–1 from debt in period t: 
                    







t t t t
t t t t t
t t
i ix a
d d pb d od
g
⎧ ⎫+ + + ε⎪ ⎪= − + + =⎨ ⎬
+ + π⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
  /10/ 
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 /13/ 
With the aid of the equation the change of debt may be accurately disaggregated. 
The impact of the different factors may be quantified according to the following 
equations: 
– tpb  – primary balance; 
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 – change in exchange rate; 
tod  – other items influencing debt. 
In the following, the change of gross consolidated nominal (Maastricht) government 
debt in the period from 31 December 1998 to 31 December 2010 is analysed on the ba-
sis of the presented methodology. The development of the different items is shown in 
the Appendix. The choice of the starting date of the examined period is partly explained 
by the availability of data and the fact that the exchange of debt between the NBH and 
the general government was completed at the end of 1996. This means that the use of 
budget data on earlier years would lead to serious distortions, while the correction of of-
ficial data is hindered by methodological limitations. It is important to draw attention to 
DEBT DYNAMICS AND SUSTAINABILITY 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
131 
another aspect as well to the procedure we applied. As we cannot adjust general gov-
ernment statistics by the balance of the NBH,7 the economic management of the central 
bank is only revealed in the disaggregation through the primary gap, in the year of ac-
counting. This has the most important role in quantifying the impact of the change in the 
exchange rate: in case the exchange rate weakens, the value of the government debt ac-
counted in foreign exchanges increases, in parallel, however, the value of the foreign 
exchange reserves of the central bank rises. Equation /13/ quantifies solely the former 
impact, the growth of the foreign exchange reserves is revealed in the primary balance 
through the profit of the central bank. 
During the period examined, between 1999 and 2010, the government debt of the 
country rose by 18.5 percentage points relative to GDP. When looking at the twelve 
years as a whole, 80 percent of the increment turns out to be due to fiscal policy, the 
primary balance of the general government. The effect of the real interest rate could be 
almost fully offset by economic growth despite the crisis, so the difference between the 
real interest and the real growth rate increased the debt by 3 percentage points over 
twelve years. On the whole, the impact of the change in the exchange rate and of other 
items cannot be referred to as substantial either, especially in the light of the fact that 
they almost wholly counterbalance each other. However, the aggregated examination of 
the examined period disguises the most important connections. Namely, if you have a 
closer look, three periods with very different characteristics can be seen based on the 
data after disaggregating the different factors influencing the debt. 
 Table 1 




1999–2001 2002–2006 2007–2010 1999–2010 
Starting debt 62.0 52.2 65.6 62.0 
Closing debt 52.2 65.6 80.2 80.2 
Change in debt –9.8 13.3 14.7 18.3 
Primary balance –4.1 19.3 –0.1 15.1 
Nominal interest 18.0 22.0 18.3 58.3 
Inflation –16.2 –14.0 –11.4 –41.6 
Real interest 1.8 8.1 6.9 16.7 
Economic growth –6.6 –10.2 3.1 –13.7 
Change in exchange rate –0.7 0.2 2.7 2.2 
Other items –0.2 –4.0 2.2 –2.0 
  
7 As was done by Czeti–Hoffmann [2006]. 
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1.  Between 1999 and 2001 the government debt was reduced sub-
stantially as a proportion of GDP, from 62.0 to 52.2 percent. Nearly the 
half of this resulted from the improvement of the primary balance, while 
the other half from the impact of the difference between the real interest 
and the real growth rate. Namely, though the interest level was high, the 
impact of the real interest rate – because of the almost similarly high in-
flation – did not even reach 2 percentage points, while the economy was 
increasing dynamically all through the period, and the effect of the 
change in the exchange rate and of other items was not significant. 
2. The debt rate grew at a robust rate, by 13.4 percentage points be-
tween 2002 and 2006, and reached 65.6 percent by the end of the pe-
riod. The expansive general government had such a serious role in this 
that the primary budget balance in itself increased the indebtedness of 
the country by 19.3 percentage points. Compared to the earlier period, 
the difference between the real interest and the real growth rate de-
creased the debt ratio only to a much lower extent, by 2.1 percentage 
points. As the rate of economic growth remained high and balanced, 
this was caused exclusively by the fact that not independently from the 
hectically changing inflation, the level of the nominal interest went 
down only slowly. However, the aggregate impact of other items 
changed favourably, which was primarily owing to the one-time 
marked rise8 of revenues from privatisation, while the impact of the 
change in the exchange rate was not considerable. 
3. In the years between 2007 and 2010 the debt ratio grew at a simi-
lar rate to that in the previous period, which reached 80.2 percent rela-
tive to GDP by the end of 2010. However, the reasons for indebtedness 
are markedly different. The current balance of the general government 
did not contribute at all in itself to the growth of debt. Instead, the 
changed sign of the difference between the real interest and the real 
growth rate increased the debt ratio by 10 percentage points, which 
stemmed first of all from the dramatic decline of growth, with a special 
regard to the considerable recession in 2009. The weakening of the ex-
change rate, consistent with the financial crisis, also played a part in in-
debtedness. In addition, however, there exists another important factor. 
Although other items increased the debt ratio by “only” 2.2 percentage 
points in total, this item was 4.9 percentage points in 2009, and primar-
ily resulted from the fact that the state placed the unused part of borrow-
ings from international financial organisations on foreign exchange ac-
  
8 The revenue from the sales of the Budapest Airport approximated 2 percent as a proportion of GDP. 
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counts kept in the National Bank of Hungary, thus raising the official 
foreign exchange reserves of the country. 
3. Sustainability analyses 
Public finance within that the sustainability of government debt has been a popular 
research issue for decades. Its main reason is that this aspect of evaluation has always 
been an important dimension of judging the different trends or action programmes in 
economic policy. The popularity of the issue is justified by two additional important 
factors. On the one hand, in parallel with globalisation and economic integration, ac-
cess to capital means less and less a real limitation for the general government. On the 
other hand, excessive indebtedness is a long-term harmful process that can be remedied 
at the lower cost the earlier the intervention is made. Therefore, it is a vital interest of 
decision-makers too to be aware of the long-term impacts of the economic policy they 
pursue, and to see the points where processes are heading. 
Because of all this – and especially since the beginning of the financial crisis – 
there is a high interest in sustainability analyses concerning government debt. How-
ever, it is important to stress that since the change of government debt depends on 
several different factors whose relation is very various even with one another, in the 
majority of cases it is impossible to judge absolutely surely which process is sustain-
able and which is not. Therefore, sustainability analyses, too, usually follow a struc-
ture where past processes are examined and conclusions on sustainability are made 
based on one or two selected aspects. 
In the following, the sustainability of Hungary’s government debt is analysed on the 
basis of two very widespread methods which make part of most such analyses (Callen et 
al. [2003]). One of them is the “response function analysis” measuring sustainability 
through the flexibility of fiscal policy, while the other extrapolates ex-post processes by 
examining the difference between the real interest and the real growth rate, at the same 
time as “freezing” (external) factors outside the direct remit of fiscal policy. 
3.1. Fiscal reaction function analysis 
One of the most widespread types of sustainability tests was first used by Bohn 
[1998], who analysed US budget data with the method of reaction function analysis. 
The essence of the procedure is to investigate the connection between two (or more) 
variables. One has to be a fiscal instrument which indicates the changes in economic 
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policy, while the other has to reflect fiscal goals. In case of researches testing gov-
ernment debt sustainability, to maintain the stability of government debt is an obvi-
ous goal, while the other (fiscal) variable in the relation is primary balance. Namely, 
a number of people already studied the impact of fiscal policy on government debt, 
concerning either debt dynamics analyses (Hall–Sargent [2010] and Bognetti–
Ragazzi [2009)] or the effect of budget policy on interests (Ardagna–Caselli–Lane 
[2004], Baldacci–Kumar [2010]), or its role in successful debt reduction (Reinhart–
Rogoff–Savastano [2003], Baldacci–Gupta–Mulas-Granados [2010], Nickel–
Rother–Zimmermann [2010]). Bohn, however, drew attention to the fact that it is not 
only the primary balance that may influence government debt (as was presented in 
the previous chapter), the effect may also be mutual, and is very much consistent 
with sustainability. Namely, if a government reacts quickly and efficiently to the 
change of government debt through the primary balance, then it practically averts the 
danger of government debt becoming unsustainable. Accordingly, in case of fiscal 
reaction function analyses, government debt (and the fiscal policy behind) is consid-
ered as sustainable if past evidence proves that the position of the budget improves in 
response to the increase of government debt, and prevents indebtedness; while unsus-
tainability occurs if budget policy is inflexible to the development of debt ratio. 
Let us examine on this basis Hungary’s figures for the last twenty years. It has al-
ready turned out from the foregoing as well that in the first half of the nineties the 
primary deficit was relatively large along with a high level of debt (P. Kiss [1998]). 
Following a budget adjustment, the balance improved substantially, and parallelly 
the debt level fell until 2002, then the deficit was very considerable again during four 
years and the indebtedness of the country grew. In the last three years of the exam-
ined period, though the primary balance was in surplus again, the growth rate of the 
debt ratio did not decline. After this let us state the equation of regression estima-
tion:9 
                                             0 1 1 2 1β β β εt t – t –pb d pb= + + + .  /14/ 
Primary balance (pbt) is the dependent variable, and explanatory variables include 
government debt measured at the end of the previous period (dt–1) and the primary 
balance of the previous period (pbt–1). In the regression calculation both the debt and 
the primary balance were measured relative to GDP.10 
                                   
( ) ( ) ( )1 12 322 2 086 4 107
5 993 0 0804 0 4353t t – t –– . . .
pb – . . d . pb= + + . /15/ 
  
9 Details of the estimation are available in the Appendix. 
10 t statistics in parentheses. 
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This equation reveals that in short term, in the first year, a 10 percentage-point 
change of government debt as a proportion of GDP changes by 0.8 percentage point 
the primary balance relative to GDP, with all other factors unaltered. As explanatory 
variables in equation /15/ include –1,tpb  short- and long-term effects are different. 
The estimated coefficient of 1tpb −  is a kind of smoothness parameter, in other words, 
it shows the speed of primary balance in adapting to the change of government debt. 
Roughly 56 percent of total adaptation occurs in the first year. Total adaptation is 
easy to calculate from this: 0 0804 0 5647 0 1424. . . .=  That is, if government debt 
relative to GDP is up (down) by 10 percentage points over a year, then primary bal-
ance as a proportion of GDP improves (deteriorates) by 1.4 percentage points in the 
long run. (Detailed results are available in the table in the Appendix.) 



























































Source: NBH, Ministry for National Economy, IMF [2007]. 
A significant part of fiscal reaction function analyses attempts to eliminate in the 
next step the effect of economic cycles from that of debt on the balance (see Izak 
[2009] or Greiner–Koeller–Semmler [2004]). The essence of this is that budget man-
agement is separated from the direct and automatic negative or positive impact of the 
cyclical changes in the economy on the balance, which gives a more accurate picture 
on the behaviour of fiscal policy. We can do this in the first step by extending the set of 
explanatory variables with the indicator of output gap. To achieve this, at the aid of the 
output gap (ogt) estimated by HP filter, equation /14/ is adjusted in the following: 
                                    0 1 –1 2 –1 3 .t t t tpb d pb og= β + β + β + β + ε  /16/ 
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The results indicate that by eliminating the impact of economic cycles from the 
model, in the case of the debt, both significance and the value of the coefficient 
strengthen, though this latter is rather low even so. As for the impact of the lagged 
level of primary balance (pbt–1), its significance increased compared to the previous 
estimation, and the value of the coefficient rose as well. Although the effect of eco-
nomic cycle was no significant, all in all the explanatory power of the model, that is, 
adjusted R2 slightly grew. (See the table in the Appendix.) 
                         
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )–1 –1–2.891 2.763 4.537 1.232
–10.2416 0.1486 0.6035 0.2670t t t tpb d pb og= + + +  . /17/ 
Referring to the former example, as 40 percent of total adaptation occurs in the 
first year, primary balance relative to GDP improves (deteriorates) by 1.4 percentage 
points in the first year and by 3.7 percentage points in the long term when govern-
ment debt as a proportion of GDP increases (falls) by 10 percentage points. 
Concerning the estimation method, however, a difficult-to-handle problem of en-
dogeneity is caused by the fact that the relation between output gap and primary bal-
ance is supposed not to be “unidirectional”, which distorts results. The solution may 
be to eliminate the impact of cycles not by expanding the scope of explanatory vari-
ables with output gap but by changing dependent variable by introducing cyclically 
adjusted primary balance. 
Namely, the effect of cycles may be eliminated in the easiest way by explaining cy-
clically adjusted primary balance instead of the primary balance used formerly. Though 
there are more and more discussions on the problems of its use (see Lewis [2010] or Dar-
vas–Kostyleva [2011]), the aim of the indicator is exactly to give a picture of budget bal-
ance – which is independent from the change of economic cycles – or its expected 
change with the potential decrease of output gap. However, investigation is restricted by 
the fact that time series on cyclically adjusted primary balance are available only from 
1996. The new equation can be stated in the following way: 
                                  0 1 –1 2 –1_ _ ,t t tpb cic d pb cic= β + β + β + ε  /18/ 
where cyclically adjusted primary balance (pb_cyct) is the dependent variable, and 
the value of cyclically adjusted primary balance in period t–1 (pb_cyct–1) is the new 
explanatory one. 
                         
( ) ( ) ( )1 13 664 3 777 3 896
13 0973 0 1975 0 5432t t – t –– . . .
pb _ cic – . . d . pb _ cic= + +  . /19/ 
The result achieved this way refers to the fact that by eliminating economic cy-
cles, the explanatory power of the model can be enhanced (see Appendix). Concern-
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ing the essence of the fiscal reaction function analysis, the significance of govern-
ment debt increased and regression coefficient rose too. As 46 percent of total adap-
tation occurs in the first year, cyclically adjusted primary balance relative to GDP 
improves (deteriorates) by 2 percentage points in the first year and by 4.3 percentage 
points in the long term when government debt as a proportion of GDP increases 
(falls) by 10 percentage points. 













































Source: The annual macro-economic database (AMECO), Ministry for National Economy. 
The results achieved are in harmony with the findings of former studies. Earlier 
on Izak [2009] made the fiscal reaction function analysis of all the 10 central and 
eastern European countries that joined the European Union in 2004 or 2007. In 
connection with Hungary’s figures they also judged the effect of government debt 
to be significant, while the regression coefficient could be somewhat higher (–
0,2359) than the results we achieved since the examined periods do not exactly 
correspond to each other.11,12 Although in their later investigation Câmpeanu and 
Stoian [2010] did not find the explanatory power of the first difference of Hun-
gary’s government debt to be significant in the change of primary balance, it seems 
to be justified in the light of the fact that they limited their test on the period be-
  
11 The second term in equations /15/, /17/, and /19/. 
12 An interesting finding of the previously mentioned study is that a significant relation between the balance 
and the debt can only be recorded in Hungary out of the examined countries. This may result from the fact that 
government debt is the highest in Hungary in the region, and until it reaches a critical level, it is unnecessary to 
respond to the growth of debt by fiscal austerity. 
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tween 2000 and 2008, in the largest part of which period government debt in-
creased along with a high deficit. 
3.2. Analysing difference between real interest and real growth rate 
Another frequent type of sustainability analyses is built on analysing the differ-
ence between real interest and real growth (see for example Callen et al. [2003] and 
Lewis [2010]). These types of work are based on the relation that the simplest formu-
las describing the change of government debt include the starting value of govern-
ment debt as well as real interest, growth, and primary balance. 
                                                   1Δ 1 t – t




 . /20/ 
Hereinafter the difference between real interest and real growth is defined as follows: 







One of the most important features of the relation between the difference between 
real interest and real growth, primary balance and government debt is that fixing the 
former two leads to the equilibrium point of government debt. As detailed by Mellár 
[2002] too, four versions are distinguished depending on whether primary balance and 
the difference between real interest and real growth are positive or negative. If the lat-
ter is positive, that is, real interest exceeds real growth, the equilibrium point is nega-
tive in the case of a budget deficit and positive in the case of a budget surplus, but is 
not stable in either cases. If the difference between real interest and real growth is 
negative, the equilibrium point is stable in any case. In the case of a budget deficit, its 
value is higher, while in the case of a budget surplus, lower than zero.13 
After presenting the way the value, and especially the sign, of the difference be-
tween real interest and real growth influences the development of government debt, 
the resulting relations are used to test sustainability. In the first step let us have a 
look on how the difference between real interest and real growth changed in Hun-
  
13 Equation /20/ is a first-order difference equation. If the one-period lagged level of government debt rela-
tive to GDP is added to both sides, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable will be the value of the dif-
ference between real interest and real growth increased by one. The stability characteristic of the fixed point de-
pends on how the absolute value of this parameter is related to one. Accordingly, if the difference between real 
interest and real growth falls in the interval of (–2.0), then the fixed point of the dynamic system is stable; if it 
falls outside, then the fixed point is unstable. As in general no negative autocorrelation is recorded for govern-
ment debt, only the sign of the difference between real interest and real growth is usually examined. 
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gary. It is important to underline that in our case real interest is quantified in the fol-
lowing way: 1 1 πt – t – tr i – ,=  which indicates that, as opposed to inflation and simi-
larly to nominal interest, real interest “looks ahead” too, therefore (the change of) the 
debt in period t depends on the real interest in period 1t −  (as well). 
Figure 4. Structure of difference between real interest and real growth  






































Note. The change of debt shows exclusively the impact of the difference between real interest and real 
growth. 
Source: Own calculations based on HCSO data and AMECO. 
At the beginning of the examined period the rate of economic growth exceeded 
substantially real interest. This means that the difference itself between real interest 
and real growth decreased government debt, which would not have grown under 
such circumstances even along with a relatively significant primary deficit. 
At the beginning of the 2000s this trend faded away, and apart from a few excep-
tional years the difference between real interest and real growth reduced government 
debt to a small extent. This was, however, the case only until the beginning of the 
economic crisis: the recession suffered in the year 2009 raised the difference between 
real interest and real growth considerably, which alone increased government debt 
relative to GDP by almost 6 percentage points. 
All in all, therefore, one can say about the last twelve years that the average value 
of the difference between real interest and real growth was close to zero (0.002), and its 
average impact on the increase of debt was extraordinarily small as well (0.32 percent-
age points as a proportion of GDP). The picture is certainly more favourable if the past 
period is examined without the last three years hit by the crisis. In this case it can be 
stated that the negative value (–0.013) of the difference between real interest and real 







 al interest  Growth 
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growth lowered government debt by 0.73 percentage point as a proportion of GDP per 
year on average. The results obtained are extremely sensitive to the way of calculating 
real interest, so preferably it is worth to highlight the general picture that the difference 
between real interest and real growth changed to a low extent but favourably in the 
years before the crisis, while it contributed significantly to indebtedness during the 
crisis. 
After quantifying the difference between real interest and real growth, let us come 
back to the investigation of sustainability. In the first step it is worth relying on the 
work of Blanchard [1990], who introduced the concept of primary budget gap. The es-
sence of the procedure is to assign the primary balance that would stabilise government 
debt to the past data of the difference between real interest and real growth, and to de-
duct that from the current balance. If the real balance is better than the calculated one, 
that is, the gap is positive, then government debt is sustainable, while vice versa further 
interventions are needed to ensure the sustainability of government debt. 
Table 2 







budget gap Averaged period 
Starting govern-




real interest and 
real growth 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
1999–2010 80.2 0.002 0.2 0 –0.2 
1999–2007 80.2 –0.013 –1.0 0 1.0 
Source: Own calculation. 
Based on Hungary’s figures for the past twelve years, using the average differ-
ence between real interest and real growth, a primary surplus of 0.2 percent as a 
proportion of GDP is needed to stabilise the government debt of 80.2 percent 
measured at the end of 2010. This is more or less the same as the primary balance 
in 2010, which means that the budget deficit of around 4 percent recorded for the 
last few years is roughly enough to stabilise government debt. Although economic 
crises return from time to time – at varying intervals, it is worth performing the 
analysis also by leaving out of consideration the last three years, mostly hit by the 
crisis, when calculating the average difference between real interest and real 
growth. In this case the primary balance necessary to stabilise the present govern-
ment debt is –1.0 percent, in other words, allows for a deficit, which means that if 
the total deficit is less than 5 percent, then government debt is already sustainable 
according to the approach of Blanchard. 
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In the case of the Hungarian fiscal policy, however, the stabilisation of govern-
ment debt relative to GDP cannot be considered as a satisfactory objective. This re-
sults on the one hand from our obligation to the European Union, on the other hand 
from the substantial burden on the budget represented by annual interest payments, 
accounting for nearly 10 percent of tax revenues. In the following, therefore, the cri-
terion of sustainability will be to reduce government debt below 60 percent of GDP, 
and to prevent it from growing above this level. 









































Source: Own calculation. 
We should first examine what primary balance would have been needed in the 
past twelve years – with the difference between real interest and real growth in the 
particular period – to stabilise government debt at 60 percent in five years. The 
change of exchange rate and other items affecting government debt relative to GDP 
are left out of consideration in this test, and the simplified version of the equation 
used by Pápa–Valentinyi [2008] is applied to obtain the calculated primary balance: 












⎜ ⎟+⎛ ⎞+ ⎝ ⎠= ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ ⎛ ⎞+
⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 /22/ 
where pb  is the primary balance with which government can stabilise government 












Primary balance stabilising debt in 5 years at 60 percent of GDP 
Actual primary balance 
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that would stabilise government debt at 60 percent of GDP in five years with fixed 
difference between real interest and real growth in the particular year is calculated 
for every year. 
The results reveal that from the point of view of sustainability, the turning-point 
was in 2001/2002. From that time on until the end of the examined period, the primary 
balance was lower than needed each year, and although the position of the budget im-
proved considerably in the last four years, the value of the difference between real in-
terest and real growth rose because of the recession, so the surplus needed to reach a 
government debt of 60 percent of GDP increased too. 
In the next step we will examine what primary budget balance should be achieved 
along with the differences measured between real interest and real growth in the past 
periods, depending on the number of years in which we wish to see government debt 
go below 60 percent of GDP. The most appropriate method for this is the procedure 
applied by Burnside [2005], which is based on the following formula: 















  /23/ 
where 






, and /24/ 
tb  in the equation is current government debt as a proportion of GDP, b
∗  is the gov-
ernment debt to be reached in period J, and the primary balance needed for this is x. r 
continues to mean real interest, while g real growth. Equation /23/ was calculated 
with Hungary’s data using three different u-s. In the most favourable case the differ-
ence between real interest and real growth (u = –0.013) was the same as the average 
difference between real interest and real growth calculated for the period lasting from 
1999 to 2007, that is, the impact of the crisis was eliminated from past figures. Then 
a budget surplus of 3.1 percent of GDP should be reached if government debt rela-
tive to GDP is to be reduced in five years from 80.2 percent at the end of 2010 to 60 
percent, if ten years are allowed, then the necessary primary balance is only 1.1 per-
cent, while in the case of twenty years, 0.1 percent. 
In the baseline scenario, the difference between real interest and real growth is the 
same as the average for the last twelve years (u = 0.002). In this case a budget sur-
plus of 4.2 percent of GDP should be reached to lower government debt relative to 
GDP to 60 percent in five years, while if the Hungarian state wishes to reach the re-
quired level in ten or twenty years, the primary surplus of general government can be 
2.2 or 1.2 percent of GDP, respectively. 
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Note. The horizontal axis represents the number of years planned to see government debt reach 60 percent 
of GDP, and the vertical axis the primary balance needed for this. 
Source: Own calculation. 
In the least favourable scenario it was assumed that the real interest would exceed 
the rate of growth by 1 percent on average in the future. Then a primary surplus of 4.8 
percent is needed to reach the 60 percent level as a proportion of GDP in five years, 
while if one wants to achieve the same in ten or twenty years, then general government 
should have a primary surplus of 2.7 or 1.7 percent, respectively. 
As the primary balance of general government was 0 in 2010 and the surplus is 
planned to be 0.7 percent of GDP in 2011, it can be stated that government debt 
will be decreased to 60 percent of GDP in nineteen and twelve years respectively – 
depending on whether the balance of 2010 or 2011 is taken into account – accord-
ing to the most favourable scenario, while more than thirty years will be needed to 
reach the level aimed at according to both the baseline and the pessimistic sce-
nario. 
The results of our investigation are in line with the findings of earlier works in 
this area (see for example, Aizenman–Pasricha [2010]). Though Aristovnik–Bercic 
[2007] obtained a wider negative gap, it can be explained by their estimation based 
on figures for 2004, when the position of the Hungarian budget was worse than in 
2010. In his study Lewis [2010] confirms our finding, too, that no large adjustment is 
needed to maintain the level of debt, while the position of the budget should be im-
proved significantly to reduce government debt below 60 percent in a relatively short 
time. 
    . 13  u = .00     .  
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4. Conclusions 
Regarding Hungary’s government debt, the last twelve years can be split into 
three different periods. Primary balance and the difference between real interest and 
real growth both contributed to government debt decreasing as a proportion of GDP 
by nearly 10 percentage points until 2001 from 62.0 to 52.2 percent. In the next five 
years, debt grew by more than 13 percentage points, which was solely due to fiscal 
policy, additional factors (difference between real interest and real growth, other 
items) even lowered indebtedness. Although for other reasons, government debt in 
the last four years of the examined period increased further as a proportion of GDP, 
by 14.9 percentage points to 80.2 percent. This was caused primarily by the fall of 
GDP, but the growth of foreign exchange reserves as well as the impact of the 
change of exchange rate contributed to the further rise of debt level. 
Concerning the sustainability of government debt there are two important find-
ings in the light of the results of the fiscal reaction function analysis. On the one 
hand, relation can be detected between government debt and primary balance, that is, 
a kind of correction mechanism can be explored in the fiscal policy of the last two 
decades, which contributes in any case to the sustainability of the process. On the 
other hand, this correction mechanism (the size of the regression coefficient) is rather 
weak both in the short and the long term. Value 1 means total correction, in other 
words, that the increase of debt is fully compensated for by the improvement of pri-
mary balance, while the results of the tests of Hungary’s data with different parame-
ters range between 0.08 and 0.43. 
Based on the investigation of the difference between real interest and real growth, 
it can be stated that all in all this difference did not play a significant role in indebt-
edness in the last one and a half decades. If the period between 2008 and 2010, hit by 
the economic crisis, is left out of consideration, then the average difference between 
real interest and real growth even reduced debt to a small extent. It can be said for 
the future that along with the average value of the differences measured in the past 
period between real interest and real growth, the primary balance of 2010, close to 
equilibrium, is enough to prevent debt from increasing further, but with government 
debt falling to 60 percent of GDP in approximately ten years considered as the crite-
rion of sustainability, the primary balance for 2010 should be improved by an addi-
tional 1-2 percentage points. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Budget balance  





































Source: Report on Excessive Deficit Procedure, April 2011. 
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Source: NBH, HCSO. 







































Source: Own calculation. 










































DEBT DYNAMICS AND SUSTAINABILITY 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
147 
Estimation results for fiscal reaction functions 
Variable Model 1 
tpb  
Model 2 
_ td pb  
Model 3 


















tog   0.2670 
(1.232) 
 
–1_ tpb cic    0.5432*** 
(3.896) 
N 19 19 14 
R2 0.37 0.42 0.66 
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.30 0.60 
Akaike value 86.9 87.5 64.6 
Note. Because of the HAC (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) weight matrix applied in the 
estimation, t statistics are robust, even in the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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The generalized method of moments (GMM) is the 
centrepiece of semiparametric estimation frameworks. 
After putting GMM into context and familiarizing the 
reader with the main principles behind the method, we 
discuss the estimation procedure and the properties of 
the GMM estimator in details. We also provide a short 
survey of recent research areas in the field. To facili-









∗ Acknowledgements: The author wants to thank both Laszlo Hunyadi, Editor-In-Chief of the Hungarian 
Statistical Review and Sergei Lychagin referee, Assistant Professor of the Central European University for their 
helpful comments which have improved the study. All remaining errors are the author’s. 
ZSOHAR: SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE GENERALIZED METHOD OF MOMENTS 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
151 
Econometric analysis begins with some economic phenomenon that is of in-
terest to us that we intend to analyse. First we turn to economic theory to see what 
insights it can offer. It postulates an explanation in some sort of conditions that de-
scribe the phenomena in terms of the key economic variables and model parame-
ters. However, to answer specific questions, we have to quantify the parameters in-
volved. We would like to adopt an estimation method whose implementation does 
not require the imposition of additional restrictions to the data generating process 
beyond those implied by the economic model. If it turns out that just for the pur-
pose of getting these estimates we have to place further restrictions and make more 
assumptions and these are found to be unjustified by theory or inappropriate for the 
data then we run the risk that the invalidity will undermine all our subsequent in-
ferences about the phenomenon of our interest. We would like to use a method of 
statistical estimation that fits well with exactly the kind of information we are get-
ting out of our economic models. But what form does that information take? Very 
often restrictions implied by economic theory take the form what we will refer to 
as population moment conditions. The generalized method of moments (GMM) is a 
statistical method that combines observed economic data with the information in 
population moment conditions to produce estimates of the unknown parameters of 
this economic model. Once we have those parameters, we can go back to perform 
inference about the basic question that is of interest to us. Shortly we will see that 
GMM is very well tailored exactly to the kind of information we are getting out 
from our economic models. 
The purpose of this article is to provide an introduction to the GMM frame-
work and to give a rough picture of current on-going issues in the field. There are 
excellent textbooks and reference books available on the topic which are more 
precise and elaborate in all aspects like Mátyás [1999] or Hall [2005]. We will 
heavily rely on them and the interested reader is encouraged to study them. Our 
treatment misses many details but all simplifications were made to facilitate easy 
understanding. 
After introducing the principle of the method of moments in Section 2, we 
show how to generalize the idea into GMM in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss 
the properties of the GMM estimator. The estimation procedure is described in 
Section 5, while Section 6 provides a short description of testing in the GMM 
framework. We will also address briefly the question of moment selection in Sec-
tion 7. After a short survey of the recent research in Section 8, Section 9 con-
cludes. 
PETER ZSOHAR 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
152
1. The method of moments principle 
The population moment conditions will play a crucial role in the discussion so it 
is worth going back to the primitives to understand the mechanics of GMM. 
The raw uncentered moments are easy to compute and they reveal important as-
pects of a distribution. For example, the first four moments tell us about the popula-
tion mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis. Using them we can immediately place 
restrictions according to our theory on the location, scale or shape of the distribution 
without specifying a full model or distribution. 
Once we have some information on the population, the question remains how to use 
the sample to estimate the parameters of interest. In general, sample statistics each have 
a counterpart in the population, for example, the correspondence between the sample 
mean and the population expected value. The natural next step in the analysis is to use 
this analogy to justify using the sample moments as bases of estimators of the popula-
tion parameters. This was the original idea in Karl Pearson’s work [1893], [1894], 
[1895] in the late 19th century. 
The Pearson family of distributions is a very flexible mathematical representation 
that has several important and frequently used distributions among its members de-
pending on the parameterization you choose. Pearson’s problem was to select an ap-
propriate member of the family for a given dataset. 
Example 1 – Simple method of moments estimator  
To show a very simple example, assume that the population distri-
bution has unknown mean μ  and variance equal to one. In this case, 
the population moment condition states that [ ] μiE x .= If 
{ }: 1 2ix i , , ,n= …  is an independent and identically distributed sample 






= ∑  is the sample analogue to the population mean [ ]iE x . By 
utilizing this analogy principle, the method of moments (MM) estima-








= =∑ . 
Basically we had to work out the first moment, then to replace it with the sample 
analogue and to solve the equation for the unknown parameter. What remains to be 
established is whether this approach is the best, or even a good way to use the sample 
data to infer the characteristics of the population.1 Our intuition suggests that the bet-
 
1 We will return to this subject in Section 4 discussing the properties of the GMM estimator. 
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ter the approximation is for the population quantity by the sample quantity, the better 
the estimates will be. 
To make a step further, it is time to introduce some more general definitions. 
Definition 1 – Method of moments estimator 
Suppose that we have an observed sample { }: 1 2ix i , , ,n= …   from 
which we want to estimate an unknown parameter vector θ R p∈  
with true value 0θ . Let ( )θif x ,  be a continuous and continuously 
differentiable R Rp q→   function of θ , and let ( )θiE f x ,⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  exist 
and be finite for all i and θ . Then the population moment conditions 
are that ( )0θ 0iE f x ,⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ . The corresponding sample moments are 
given by  






f f x ,
n =
= ∑ . 
The method of moments estimator of 0θ  based on the population 
moments ( )θiE f x ,⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  is the solution to the system of equa-
tions ( )θ 0nf = . 
Note that if q p= , then for an unknown parameter vector θ  the population mo-
ment conditions ( )θ 0iE f x ,⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  represent a set of p  equations for p  unknowns. 
Solving these moment equations would give the value of θ  which satisfies the popu-
lation moment conditions and this would be the true value 0θ . Our intuition suggests 
that if the sample moments provide good estimates of the population moments, we 
might expect that the estimator θ̂  that solves the sample moment conditions 
( )θ 0n ˆf =  would provide a good estimate of the true value 0θ that solves the popula-
tion moment conditions ( )0θ 0iE f x ,⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ . 
Now we present some common models in terms of the MM terminology. 
Example 2 – Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
Consider the linear regression model 
0βi i iy x u′= + , 
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where ix  is the vector of p  covariates, 0β  is the true value of the p 
unknown parameters in β , and iu  is an exogenous error term. In this 
case our population moment condition ( )0θ 0iE f x ,⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  translates to 
[ ] ( )0β 0i i i i iE x u E x y x′⎡ ⎤= − =⎣ ⎦ . Then the sample moment conditions 
are given by  
( )
1 1
1 1 β 0
n n
i i i i i
i i
ˆˆx u x y x
n n= =
′= − =∑ ∑ . 
Thus the MM estimator of 0β  is given by β̂  that solves this system 
of p linear equations and is equivalent to the standard OLS estimator. 
Example 3 – Instrumental variables (IV) 
If in Example 2 we allow iu  to be correlated with the covariates in 
ix , we can state the population moment conditions in terms of the 
exogeneity assumption on the p instruments. Our population moment 
conditions are given by [ ] ( )0β 0i i i i iE z u E z y x′⎡ ⎤= − =⎣ ⎦  and the sample 









′− =∑ . 
Just like previously, the MM estimator of 0β  is given by β̂  that 
solves this system of p linear equations and this result shows that the 
standard IV estimator is also an MM type estimator. 
Note that as long as the exogeneity of the error term and the instrument can be 
justified by economic reasoning, these examples do not impose any additional re-
strictions on the population that is not implied by some theory. 
Example 4 – Maximum likelihood (ML) 









∑ . The first order conditions for the maximization of the 
log-likelihood function are then  
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These first order conditions can be regarded as a set of sample 
moment conditions so the maximum likelihood estimator can be given 
an MM interpretation as well. 
So far we have considered cases where the number of moment conditions q was 
equal to the number of unknown parameters p. Assuming functionally independent 
moment equations, the resulting system of equations provided by the moment condi-
tions can be solved to obtain the MM estimator. In the case of q p<  there is insuffi-
cient information and the model is not identified. If q p> , the model is over-
identified, and in most cases, we are not able to solve the system of equations. How-
ever, estimation still can proceed and the next section will show the proper way to 
follow. 
2. The GMM Estimator 
We shall recall that population moment conditions represent information implied 
by some theory. It is quite natural that we want to use the most information avail-
able.2 Unfortunately the MM estimator cannot incorporate more moments than pa-
rameters.3 
Example 5 – Motivation for GMM 
Consider again Example 1. Notice that our estimation was based 
solely on the first raw moment of the distribution. Now suppose that 
we believe to know that the sample at hand is a result of n  independ-
ent draws from a Poisson distribution with parameter λ . Thus the new 
(additional) population moment condition based on the second raw 
moment is 2 2λ λ 0iE x⎡ ⎤ − − =⎣ ⎦ . The MM estimator of λ  should satisfy 
the system of equations based on the sample moments 
 
2 Resisting the temptation to impose additional assumptions that might be unjustified by theory. 
3 However, there are still many possible actions one might think of like using all different sets of moments 
and then averaging the estimates, etc. but here this is not the road taken. 
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Now we have two moment conditions and one unknown parameter 
which means that we do not have a general solution for λ̂ . 
We could use only p number of moments to estimate the parameters but by dis-
missing the ( )0q p− >  additional moments, we would loose the information con-
tained in those conditions. The remedy for this situation was introduced to the 
econometrics literature by Hansen [1982] in his famous article and it is called GMM. 
The idea behind GMM estimation is that once it is impossible to solve the system of 
equations provided by the sample moment conditions, we can still have an estimate 
of θ  that brings the sample moments as close to zero as possible.4 Note that in the 
population still all moment conditions hold and the problem arises because we have a 
finite sample. 
Definition 2 – Generalized method of moments estimator 
Suppose that the conditions in Definition 1 are met and we have an 
observed sample { }: 1 2ix i , , ,n= …  from which we want to estimate an 
unknown parameter vector θ Θ p∈ ⊆  with true value 0θ .  Let 
( )θiE f x ,⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  be a set of q population moments and ( )θnf  the corre-
sponding sample counterparts. Define the criterion function ( )θnQ  as 
( ) ( ) ( )θ θ θn n n nQ f W f ,
′=  
where nW , the weighting matrix, converges to a positive definite ma-
trix W as n grows large. Then the GMM estimator of 0θ  is given by 
( )
θ Θ




4 There are, of course, some statistical antecedents to GMM. The method of minimum Chi-square by 
Neyman and Pearson, E. [1928] deals with the general question how to estimate parameters when having more 
moment conditions than unknown parameters. However, they did not work with population moment conditions 
explicitly, the general idea was basically the same. 
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Basically the GMM estimator is a way of exploiting information from our general 
form of population moment conditions. When the number of moment conditions 
equals the number of unknown parameters GMM = MM. When q p>  then the 
GMM estimator is the value of θ  closest to solving the sample moment conditions 
and ( )θnQ  is the measure of closeness to zero. 
It might be useful to have a look at two practical applications from the literature 
that result in over-identifying moment conditions. 
Example 6 by Hansen and Singleton [1982] 
In their classical paper they analysed the movement of assets over 
time in a consumption-based capital asset pricing model. In a some-
what simpler version of their non-linear rational expectations model, 
the representative agent maximizes expected discounted lifetime utility  
( )τ τ
τ 0







subject to the budget constraint 
1 tt t t t t tc p q r q w−+ ≤ + ∀ , 
where tc  is per period consumption, t t tp ,q ,r  are relative price, quan-
tity and return on the asset with one period maturity, tw  is real wage 
and Ωt  is the information set of the agent in period t. Hansen and Sin-
gleton use a constant relative risk aversion utility function 
( ) ( )γ 1 γU c c= −  so the first order conditions to this optimization 
problem are   
γ






⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥− =⎜ ⎟
⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
. 
This looks pretty much like a population moment condition but the 
problem is that we have two parameters to estimate ( )β γ,  and only 
one moment condition. However, by an iterated conditional expecta-
tions argument for any vector Ωt tz ∈  the Euler-equation becomes 
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γ






⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− =⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
, 
so in theory the model is identified by using any variables that are 
known to the agent in period t, such as lagged values of 1t tr p −  or 
1t tc c −   and can be estimated consistently with GMM.
5 In contrast, 
maximum likelihood estimation of this model would involve exactly 
specifying conditional distributions of the variables and a lot of nu-
merical integration which is computationally burdensome. 
In the structural model from the previous example we were originating population 
moment conditions from what we were referring to as economic theory. However, 
sometimes “economic theory” means just some plausible assumptions based on intui-
tion or other reasoning. Next we show an example which is based on a much less struc-
tural model, and moment conditions come from the exogeneity assumption on the in-
strumental variables. 
Example 7 by Angrist and Krueger [1991] 
The authors investigate the number of years spent in education and 
the subsequent earning potentials of individuals. They were interested 
in the impact of compulsory schooling laws in the US and estimated 
the following equation: 
( ) 0 1β βi i iln w ed controls u= + + + . 
The parameter of interest was 1β , the semi-elasticity of wage with 
respect to education. Estimating this linear equation by OLS could be 
biased and inconsistent as ied  is probably correlated with individual 
factors in the regression error term iu  such as individual costs and po-
tential benefits of schooling or other options outside the schooling sys-
tem, most of which are unobserved by the researcher. Using the struc-
ture of compulsory school attendance laws at that time in the US they 
were able to argue that (in addition to the controls) dummy variables 
indicating the quarter of birth for each individual could be used to in-
 
5 Note that the original variables in the model need not be stationary as taking consequent ratios makes the 
series stationary. 
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strument for the years spent in education. Their exogeneity assumption 
implies that the following population moment conditions hold: 
( )( )0 1β β 0i i iE z ln w ed controls⎡ ⎤− − − =⎣ ⎦ , 
where the vector of instruments iz contains the exogenous variables 
from the original model supplemented by the quarter of birth dummies. 
Note that there are more moment conditions then parameters and we 
could estimate the model by GMM. 
3. Properties of the GMM Estimator 
Under some sufficient conditions the GMM estimator as given in Definition 2 is 
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. In the following we will discuss 
these properties and the sufficient conditions in somewhat more detail. 
Population moment conditions provide information about the unknown parame-
ters. The quality and the utilization method of this information are crucial in several 
aspects. First, a natural question arises about the sufficiency of the information con-
tained in the moment conditions whether it is enough for the estimation to be “suc-
cessful”. This leads us to the issue of identification. 
Assumption 1 – Identification 
In the following, we present the necessary conditions for identification. 
– Order condition: As we have already seen if q p< , the model is 
not identified and we are unable to estimate the parameters. So we 
need q p≥ . 
– Rank condition: Once we have enough moment conditions, it is 
still crucial that among those moments should be at least p functionally 
independent ones which are satisfied if the expectation of the q p×  
Jacobian of the moment equations evaluated at 0θ  has rank (at least) p.  
– Uniqueness: If we think of ( )θiE f x ,⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  as a function of θ , then 
for successful estimation ( )θ 0iE f x ,⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  has to be a unique property 
of 0θ . It means that 0θ should be the only parameter vector which sat-
isfies the population moment conditions. 
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We also need to establish a connection between the population moments and their 
sample counterparts. This will ensure that in the limit, the true parameter vector will 
be the one that solves the sample moment equations. 
Assumption 2 – Convergence of sample moments 
If the data generating process is assumed to meet the conditions for 
some kind of law of large numbers to apply, we may assume that the 
sample moments converge in probability to their expectation. That is 










∑  converges to ( ) ( )0 0θ θ 0n iE f E f x , .⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ = =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦   
Note that we have basic laws of large numbers only for independent observations. 
For a more general case, with dependent or correlated observations, we would as-
sume that the sequence of observations ( )θif x ,  constitutes an ergodic q-
dimensional process. Assumptions 1 and 2 together with the conditions from Defini-
tions 1 and 2 establish that the parameter vector will be estimable. 
Now we make a statistical assumption that allows us to establish the properties of 
asymptotic distribution of the GMM estimator. 
Assumption 3 – Distribution of Sample Moments 
We assume that the sample moments obey a central limit theorem. 
This assumes that the moments have a finite asymptotic covariance 
matrix, ( )1 n F , so that 
( ) ( )0θ 0dnn f N ,F⎯⎯→ . 
Again, if the observations are not independent, it is necessary to make some as-
sumptions about the data so that we could apply an appropriate central limit theo-
rem. 
Theorem 1 – GMM is consistent and asymptotically normal  
Under the preceding assumptions, the GMM estimator is consistent 
and asymptotically normally distributed with asymptotic covariance 
matrix GMMV defined as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 θ θ θ θ θ θGMMV G WG G WFWG G WGn
− −′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
, 
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where G is a ( )q p×  matrix defined as 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )














f x, f x,
f x,
G E E
f x, f x,
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂
⎢ ⎥
∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∂ ⎢ ⎥= =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂
⎢ ⎥
∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
that is, ( )0θG  is the expected value of the Jacobian of the population 
moment functions evaluated at the true parameter value 0θ . 
The point is that in general the variance of the GMM estimator depends on the 
choice of nW , so we can extract the most information from the moment conditions 
by choosing an appropriate weighting matrix. By analysing the quadratic form in the 
GMM criterion function 
( ) ( ) ( )θ θ θn n n nQ f W f
′= , 
we see that setting nW I= gives us the sample moments’ error sum of squares. 
In fact, we could use a diagonal weighting matrix nW w=  to minimize the 
weighted sum of squared errors. This is a natural idea as some moments might be 
more volatile than others and, thus, it makes sense to normalize the errors in the 
moments by their variance. 
However, the elements of ( )θnf  are freely correlated. Suppose the asymptotic 
covariance of the sample moments normalized by the root of the sample size is 
( )0θnAsy.Var n f F⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ . Then the choice of  
1
nW F
−=  weights all elements of the 
criterion function appropriately so should be optimal based on the same idea that mo-
tivates generalized least squares. 
Theorem 2 – Optimal weighting matrix 
For a given set of moment conditions with the optimal choice of the 
weighting matrix 1nW F
−= , the GMM estimator is asymptotically ef-
ficient with covariance matrix 




1 θ θGMM ,optimalV G F Gn
−
−′⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
PETER ZSOHAR 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
162
It is important to emphasize that the efficiency result is valid only for a given set 
of moment conditions. That is, GMM is asymptotically efficient in the class of con-
sistent and asymptotically normal estimators that do not use any additional informa-
tion on top of that is contained in the moment conditions. The traditional ML utilizes 
a fully specified distribution so the two estimators are incomparable in a sense that 
they rely on different information sets. However, as we saw earlier in Example 4 if 
the moment conditions are the same as the first order conditions of ML estimation 
then the two estimators are numerically equal. 
Especially, if the model is correctly specified and the underlying distribution is one 
from the exponential family, we can use the sufficient statistics as bases for moment 
conditions. In these cases GMM is efficient in a sense that it attains the Cramer–Rao 
lower bound asymptotically. The problem with this theoretical case is that it is unop-
erational as GMM’s main strength is not specifying an exact distribution. 
4. Estimation 
After having discussed the properties of the GMM estimator, it is time to turn to 
some more practical issues like estimation. The question is how do we get those 
numbers when we have the data. 
In the exactly identified case when  q p= , GMM works the same as MM and 
there is no need for optimization as the system of moment conditions can be solved 
for the unknown parameters. 
Example 8 – Exactly identified case 
Consider the Poisson model from Example 5. Recall that we had 
two moment conditions for the single unknown parameter λ . Suppose 
we have a sample of 20n =  observations. Now we are going to esti-
mate λ  based on both moment conditions separately. The estimators 
























SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE GENERALIZED METHOD OF MOMENTS 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
163 
In order to utilize both moments at once, we need to compute the GMM estimator. 
Recall that in the over-identified case when q p>  the asymptotic variance of the 
GMM estimator, GMMV  depends on the weighting matrix. We want to get the most 
information out of our moment conditions thus we would like to use the optimal 
weighting matrix that minimizes GMMV . As we discussed earlier, this would be 
1F − . 
Logic suggests that first we should estimate the optimal weighting matrix so that we 
could use it in the criterion function to estimate 0θ  efficiently. The problem is that to 
get an estimator of 1F − , we already need an estimate of 0θ . 
We can resolve this circularity by adopting a multi-step procedure. 
1. We can choose a sub-optimal weighting matrix, say I, and mini-
mize the simple sum of squared errors in the moments 
( ) ( ) ( )θ θ θn n nQ f f
′= . This will deliver a preliminary but consistent 
estimate of 0θ  which can be used then to estimate F and thus 
1F −  
consistently. 
2. With the optimal weighting matrix estimate at hand, we can 
minimize the new criterion function ( ) ( ) ( )1θ θ θn n nˆQ f F f−
′= , and es-
timate 0θ  efficiently. 
This is the so-called two-step GMM estimator which is consistent and efficient. 
Example 9 – GMM estimation 
We now continue with the Poisson example. In the first step we have 
to minimize the criterion function with using I as a weighting matrix: 
( ) ( ) ( )























⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥′ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= =




To facilitate computation, we started the optimization routine from 
the MM estimate based on the first raw moment λ 3 55firstˆ .= . The 
first-step GMM estimate is  
1λ 3 3885ˆ .=  
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which can be used to estimate F  as follows: 
( ) ( ) 20 1 11 11 1 20 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 1
λ λ
θ θ
λ λ λ λ
n i i
n i in
i i i i
ˆ ˆx xˆ ˆF̂ f x , f x , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆx x= =
′
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′ − −
= = ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
− − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ . 
Substituting in for 1λ̂  and inverting F̂  the estimated optimal 
weighting matrix is 
1 10 5333 1 4504
1 4504 0 2085optimal n
. .ˆ ˆW F
. .
− −⎡ ⎤= = ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
. 
In the second step we have to minimize the new criterion 
( ) ( ) ( )1θ θ θn n nˆQ f F f−
′= . 
The optimization routine was started from the first-step GMM es-
timate. Solving the minimization problem, for the second-step GMM 
estimator of λwe get  
λ 3 2651GMMˆ .= . 
We still have to estimate the variance of the estimator, GMMV .  
First we recompute 1nF̂
−  with λGMMˆ  at hand exactly as we did previ-
ously. Then we also have to estimate G, the matrix of the derivatives. 
G is the expected value of the Jacobian but notice that in our case the 







− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
Now we can compute the estimated variance of λGMMˆ  as 
111 0 0973GMM nn
ˆ ˆˆ ˆV G F G .
−−⎡ ⎤′= =⎣ ⎦ . 
Notice that the MM estimate based on the first raw moment equals 
the ML estimate for which we can estimate the asymptotic variance 
from the Cramer–Rao lower bound as λ̂ n . 
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The Table compares the results. 
Comparison of estimators 
Results ML Two-step GMM 
λ  3.55 3.2651 
Standard error 0.4213 0.3119 
In fact, we could continue this multi-step procedure to obtain the so-called iter-
ated GMM estimator. Hansen, Heaton and Yaron [1996] suggest a method where the 
dependence of the weighting matrix on the unknown parameters is acknowledged 
and taken care of during the optimization procedure. Their approach became known 
as the continuously updated GMM. There is fairly compelling evidence to suggest 
that there are gains to iteration in terms of finite sample performance of the estimator 
but in most cases the two-step estimator is applied. 
Given the mathematical form of the moment conditions, in some cases we can 
solve the optimization problem analytically and get a closed form representation of 
the estimates in terms of the data which will speed up the computations. However, in 
other cases such as with nonlinear models, we have to use numerical optimization 
routines. The problem with the widely used Newton–Raphson and other practical 
numerical optimization methods is that global optimization is not guaranteed. The 
GMM estimator is defined as a global minimizer of a GMM criterion function, and 
the proof of its asymptotic properties depends on this assumption. Therefore, the use 
of a local optimization method can result in an estimator that is not necessarily con-
sistent or asymptotically normal. 
Care should be taken with nonconvex problems where the existence of possibly 
multiple local minima may cause problems. With starting the optimization algorithm 
from several initial values spread out in the parameter space, one might be able to 
find the global minimum. However, it should be noted that the multi-start algorithm 
does not necessarily find he global optimum and is computationally intensive. 
There are of course much more advanced numerical techniques and there is a 
freely available and fairly user friendly GMM toolbox for MATLAB by Kyriakoulis 
[2004]. 
An alternative solution in such cases is the use of Monte Carlo simulation methods 
to compute an otherwise intractable criterion function. The method of simulated mo-
ments approach is the simulated counterpart of the traditional GMM procedure and is 
applicable when the theoretical moments cannot be computed analytically. An exten-
sive survey of recent (mostly theoretical) results in the subject can be found in Li-
esenfeld–Breitung [1999]. 
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5. Testing in the GMM framework 
Most of the times there are three broad inference questions that are of interest 
to us:  
– Is the model correctly specified? 
– Does the model satisfy certain particular restrictions? 
– Which model appears to be more consistent with the data? 
The first question is particularly important. Recall that the population moment 
conditions were deduced from an underlying economic model and all our inference is 
going to be based on them. As our estimate is relying on the information contained in 
the moment conditions, it is crucial whether the original model is consistent with the 
data or whether it appears to be a good representation of the data. 
If the hypothesis of the model that led to the moment equations in the first place 
is incorrect, at least some of the sample moment restrictions will be systematically 
violated. This conclusion provides the basis for a test of the over-identifying restric-
tions and if we have more moments than parameters, we have scope for testing that. 
There is a very simple to compute statistic to use as an over-identifying restrictions 
test (the so-called J test) which is just the sample size times the value of the GMM 
criterion function evaluated at the second step GMM estimator 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )10θ θ θ θn n n nˆ ˆ ˆnQ n f Est.Asy.Var n f n f−′⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
Notice that this is a Wald statistic and under the null  
( )0 0: θ 0iH E f x ,⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ , 
and it has a large sample Chi-squared distribution with q p−  degrees of freedom. 
However, the over-identifying restrictions test can be computed only in case of 
q p> , as in the exactly identified model the criterion function is zero. The reason 
for the importance and the popularity of this test is that it really examines the heart, 
the crux of GMM, and it is easy to calculate, as it is an obvious by-product of the es-
timation procedure. The statistic is ubiquitously reported in all applications involving 
GMM estimation just as reporting the log of the likelihood function in ML estima-
tion. We would like to stress that it is very important to do some kind of misspecifi-
cation test as in misspecified models the properties of the GMM estimator are sub-
stantially different which is likely to make all subsequent inferences misleading. 
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Example 10 – Test for over-identifying restrictions 
Consider the Poisson model from Example 9. Now we have 
( )λ 20 0 2694 5 388n n GMMˆJ nQ . .= = × = . 
As [ ]2χ 1nJ ∼ , there is only very weak evidence in favour of the 
population moment conditions so the model can be rejected.6 
The second inference question asks whether the model satisfies certain additional 
restrictions implied by economic and statistical theory that we could impose and what 
might tell us about economic behaviour. Fortunately all the well-known likelihood-
based testing procedures have their GMM counterparts with very similar implementa-
tions. The GMM-based LR test is computed by using nnQ instead of ln L  in the test 
statistic. The GMM-based Wald statistic is computed identically to the likelihood-
based one by using the GMM estimates instead of the ML estimates. The LM test is 
derived by the same logic applied to the derivatives of the GMM criterion function. 
The third question is model selection. The previously mentioned tests are appli-
cable for nested models but selection from a set of non-nested models would require 
specifying the distribution of the data generating process. 
Those interested in details should read the extensive discussion in Chapter 5 of 
Hall [2005]. 
6. Choice of moment conditions 
So far we have covered how we can exploit information from our moment condi-
tions in an efficient way but we haven’t mentioned what is the best set of moment 
conditions to be used. It turns out that there is quite a straightforward answer to this, 
although it won’t be very useful in terms of practical work. 
Maximum likelihood is the asymptotically efficient estimator in the class of consis-
tent and asymptotically normal estimators. Recall that we have already shown that ML 
is an MM type estimator based on the score function. Thus, if we use the derivatives of 
the log-likelihood function as moments, we will get an efficient estimator. Unfortu-
nately this is not feasible as in most economic settings the population distribution is 
 
6 However, the small sample size and the discrete nature of the Poisson distribution should raise some 
concerns. 
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unknown. Making an additional assumption on the underlying distribution places re-
strictions on the economic variables involved that might be unjustified by economic 
theory and that is exactly the kind of thing that GMM was designed to help us avoid. 
But what if we have more moment conditions than parameters? We might expect 
that more information never hurts but it turns out that sometimes in fact it doesn't help 
either. There are two main approaches in the literature to moment selection. One sug-
gests optimal moment condition selection based on asymptotic theory among the class 
of generalized instrumental variables. Unfortunately in many settings it is infeasible 
just like with the score function. The other strand of literature emphasizes practical data 
based moment selection introducing different selection criteria. Some results suggest 
that they may help avoid situations where the asymptotic approximation of finite sam-
ple behaviour is poor. For a detailed summary of recent results please see Hall [2005]. 
7. Actively researched topics 
All our reasoning and inferences so far were based on large sample theory. Two 
important questions arise: 
– How well does this theory approximate finite sample behaviour 
in the kind of places where we want to apply GMM? 
– Can we identify factors and aspects of model specification that 
appear to affect the quality of this approximation? 
Numerous studies try to address these issues in the literature. There are analyti-
cal approaches based on higher order asymptotics and simulation supported studies 
applied to generated artificial data from structures to which we typically fit our 
economic theories. A detailed discussion and summary of the topic can be found in 
Podivinsky [1999] or in Chapter 6 of Hall [2005]. Harris and Mátyás [2004] pro-
vide an extensive comparative analysis of different IV and GMM estimators, fo-
cusing on their small sample properties. These studies assess how well the methods 
perform and the findings are perhaps not that surprising. Loosely speaking, some-
times GMM works well but sometimes it does not. The main factors that were 
found to affect the quality of asymptotic approximation are: 
– form of moment conditions ( )θif x , . Basically, the more nonlin-
earity is involved, the less good the approximation is; 
– degree of over-identification ( )q p− ; 
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– interrelation between the elements of moment conditions; 
– quality of identification. 
How can we improve on the quality of inference then? There are three main 
strands of responses in the literature, two of which stay in the GMM framework and 
one suggesting another method. 
– If we would like to stick to first order asymptotic theory, the 
method of moment selection has to be revised. There are procedures 
for selecting those moments that contribute to parameter estimation 
and retain the ones that help and discard those that don’t add new in-
formation. 
– There are alternative considerations to develop a large sample 
theory and try to use this alternative asymptotic framework to come up 
with inference procedures: 
♦ weak identification – to tackle the case of uninformative mo-
ment conditions; 
♦ artificial resampling techniques, especially bootstrap – to im-
prove the accuracy of critical points used in tests; 
♦ alternative theory of many moment conditions asymptotics for 
cases when q p>> .  
– Step outside GMM. The problems arise because of the structure 
of GMM estimation so propose the generalized empirical likelihood 
class of estimators which contains the so-called continuously updated 
GMM and other empirical likelihood-based estimators. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
The econometrics literature offers the researcher a broad variety of estimation 
methods differing in the amount of information they use, ranging from fully parameter-
ized likelihood-based techniques to pure nonparametric methods and a rich variety in 
between. Choosing one appropriately is a respectful task as a correctly specified para-
metric model provides much better quality estimates than methods that assume little 
more than mere association between variables at one another. However, this efficiency 
comes at a cost of possibly false restrictions. From another standpoint, semi- and non
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parametric methods are much more robust to variations in the underlying data generat-
ing process and still may provide consistent estimates without imposing additional as-
sumptions. We have discussed that GMM is more robust to model specification than 
ML as it requires less information. This explains the increasing popularity of semi-
parametric estimation frameworks like GMM, as they allow to incorporate only as 
much restriction as economic theory implies. 
To state it differently, the GMM estimator is built on more general (assumed) 
characteristics of the population than in the classical likelihood-based framework, as 
it requires fewer and weaker assumptions. 
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Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, 2011 
The Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture supports the work of foreign us-
ers with its bilingual (Hungarian and English) form: it provides comprehen-
sive information about the status of the agricultural sector, shows the share of 
the sector in the national economy, furthermore, presents data on employ-
ment in and production, exports, imports and consumption of agriculture and 
food industry. It contains detailed data on the personal, technical and finan-
cial conditions of agricultural production, on plant cultivation and animal 
husbandry, on the management of agricultural enterprises, product sales, and 
prices. The main data of crop and animal production broken down by geo-
graphical units are published in a separate chapter. The yearbook also pre-
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The Regional Statistical Yearbook of Hungary is a rich treasury of terri-
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2 regions as well as counties. The situation of statistical micro-regions and 
settlement groups, and the main data on the settlement network are portrayed 
in the yearbook through the most important social and economic indicators. 
The CD-ROM contains maps, and Excel tables enable users to make further 
calculations with the data. 
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